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The following is an international French-language report-back published by Lundi Matin on January 3rd, 2019. What follows isour translation.
Two years ago we published an interview with a Sudanese exilé who took part in the insurrectionary movements in the Sudan between 2013 and 2016.
Ever since repression has not stopped and many Sudanese have chosen
exile, notably in Europe via Libya and the Mediterranean sea. These
days, the movement demanding the fall of the regime has taken off once
again across all the cities in the country.
As this recounting of the events since mid-December attests, the
Sudanese situation never was exotic, but rather we can see that it
resonates more than ever with the situation that now has taken place for
two months in France.
Since Friday, Dec. 14th the Sudanese people have risen up
against the dictatorship of General Omar El-Bashir and his radical
Islamist regime. The catalyst: a shortage of flour, gasoline and cash,
accompanied by a fall in the value of currency, an inflation of over 70%
(where the price of bread has tripled in a few days in several cities).
But this is not the principal object of revolt. The economic and
political situation has deteriorated over the last few years: on one
side, poverty is more and more widespread while the bourgeoisie of the
regime grows rich, and on the other, parliament seeks to modify the
constitution to allow Omar El-Bashir to be present in the 2020 elections
after 31 years in power. The revolt has been felt across the country
for a few months now. The government militias (Rapid Special Force, who
notably were responsible for mass murder at Darfur) conducted raids in
October in the periphery neighborhoods of Khartoum, beating young
people, shaving their heads, to remind them that any desire to revolt
will be repressed with violence.
Recounting the start of a revolution
But this time the anger has taken off, and for good. Thousands of
people have taken to the streets, in cities across the country. On the
14th [of Dec.] protests were still rather weak. But the
following Wednesday, in the worker and industrial city of Atbara, high
school and university students took to the streets and overwhelmed the
police. During the day’s events, the seat of the National Congress
Party, that of Omar El-Bashir, was burned down. All of the police were
forced to flee the city since the army took the side of people. High
school and university students were in even stronger numbers at Khartoum
the next day: Thursday, they got out onto the streets, blockaded the
universities and certain major road axes in the capital. Similarly, at
Qadaref, in the east of the country, the protests were growing in
number. The movement then was on: on Friday, after prayer (“jumaat alghaddab”: Friday of rage) the streets of the capital, and numerous other cities, were inundated by protesters.
Clik here to view.
The following Saturday and Sunday, the opposition movement took over
football stadiums. Starting Saturday evening, the supporters of the Al
Hilal [football] team protested during the match. The following day, the
government hesitated to call off the following Al Hilal match, since
this canceling of the game would amount to an acknowledgment of the
opposition movement, it then preferred to fill the stadium with “Kizan”
(“men who defend or work for the regime”). Likewise, at Al-Gezira, a
province in the south of the country, El-Bashir went to visit an
exposition, and then calls for protests were made in the city of Wad
Madani (capital of this province). The night before, activists had set
ablaze a part of the exposition. This act was strongly symbolic since
the exposition cost more than $100,000, while the population of Gezira
still remains in poverty. Many of them were arrested. During the opening
of the exposition, they brought out Kizan and schoolchildren to greet
the arrival of the dictator, and to show that all is well, that everyone
is with him. During his speech, live on television, several voices in
the crowd rose up to denounce the massacres perpetrated by the regime (“iasqut iasqut hukma al askir”:
“let it fall, let it fall, the military government”) and to affirm the
refusal to welcome criminals. The TV station cut the live feed and put
on another show. Al-Bashir had to continue his speech behind
closed-doors and surrounded by his supporters. His visit was cut-short
and he quickly returned to Khartoum. At this moment, all the cities in
the country entered into revolt. Wednesday the 25th [of Dec.]
a call was made by unions and opposition parties to protest across the
country, and to notably gather in the city-center of Khartoum and march
to the presidential palace. Thousands of people came out into the
streets. The regime tried to stop the gathering from moving by blocking
streets leading to the city-center and placing snipers atop buildings.
As soon as the marches formed, they were dispersed by tear gas and by
live ammunition rounds, mass arrests, and beatings. The center of
Khartoum had thus become, through the evening, a macabre game of cat and
mouse which resulted in multiple attempts to reach the palace, which
ultimately were in vain. That said, this day was pivotal for the
movement, firstly because the unions have entered the struggle and
secondly because the movement has reached such a magnitude that many
people took the streets which have never done so before.
Wednesday and Thursday, only a few protests took place in the smaller
cities and in the universities. But people were preparing for Friday.
The number of killed grew, this Friday has been baptized as “Friday of
the martyrs” (“jumaat al-shouhada”). On this day, all cities were
in revolt but the agents of repression halted the people from coming
out in as strong of numbers as on Thursday. But this was but a
preparation for the protest on Monday, the 31st [of Dec.], a new day of protest called by the unions which brought out a lot of people.
The face of the movement
If the movement kicked off due to economic and social problems, it is
now above all a political revolt. The main slogan, repeated by all
marches, from the beginning has been “the people want the fall of the
regime” or “freedom, peace, justice and revolution is the choice of the
people.” This is because, in reality, the cause of the uprising are
deeper than the just the sudden rise in prices [of foodstuffs].
Corruption has hit an all-time high: the security forces which hold the
reigns of power divert most public money to their own ends, while
leaving the rest of people in poverty. Like the giant new club now being
built for the NISS (National Intelligence Security Service). In short,
the regime continues to strengthen itself, mobilizing all resources to
this end: thus, the security budget is higher than that of health and
education combines. Since this policy did not just come about yesterday,
the social consequences felt today have been heavy.
Clik here to view.
Since the beginning of the regime war has
continued without end. First war with the Republic of South Sudan, which
voted for its independence in 2011, with which conflict (and notably
the resources for this conflict) has still not yet come to an end. Later
war with Darfur, with Nil Bleu, South Kordofan [province of Sudan] and in the east of the country…
The discriminated and isolated categories of the
population, like the people of Darfur and the Nuba, are even more quick
to revolt against the regime which wages war on their homelands.
Thus, for the Sudanese people today in revolt, the
economic and social problems cannot be solved by the regime: the way to
find a solution is byway of the fall of the regime (“tasqut bes”,
“the fall or nothing”). Further, no opposition party has the strength
to resist the regime. Their positions and strategies have been largely
disavowed. At the moment the revolt began, negotiations were openly
underway with the principal opposition parties at Addis Abbaba on the
subject of the troubling political and economic situation in the
country. Thus, these revolts were not the result of these parties, but
rather a spontaneous reply that have taken on a wider scope, and based
on a common feeling: the regime is the origin of the ills of the
country.
One of the trademarks of the start of the movement
is the fact that its start was essentially thanks to the provincial
cities (notably those in the north) and not the capital itself. Notably,
Atbara is a historically revolutionary bastion and has served as a
springboard for the movement that spread very quickly throughout the
country, thus breaking the isolation of sporadic protests which had
taken place until then. Another trademark has been the fact that
different fringe of society (university and
high school students; workers from different sectors; residents of
different cities; but also unions, NGOs and different social classes)
found themselves together in the revolt. Social networks has played an
essential role in breaking through the counter-information disseminated
by the media which sought to stifle dissident voices.
Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp have also allowed
people to coordinate themselves (notably thanks to the hashtag
#moudoun_essoudan_tantafidd, #SudaneseCitiesRevolt). The images and
video of the protests all over the country have been seen all over the
world, which allowed the protest movement to spread…
Further, the attempts by the government to
separate the different categories of the [Sudanese] population have been
shattered with these new means of communication. We notably recall the
bloody repression against Darfurian students which consequently set off a
large solidarity movement expressing itself during protests and in
social networks: “ialounssouri almaghroor, koulou albalad darfour”, “the racist is arrogant, the whole country is Darfur” (which is a subtle nod to Al-Bashir).
In light of old racist ethnic divisions within
Sudanese society, protesters have attempted to redefine the old fracture
lines within society: there are those who are with the regime (the
Kizan) and those who are against the regime (the Sudanese people). We
see arise the desire to cut with the old political game led by the
government, to then redefine the political field in a new way.
Likewise, many young people, men and women, took
to the streets, some for the first time in their lives, to express their
anger, in large cities but also in smaller villages – and not just in
urban centers. Besides the high school and university students who have
protests, there have also been many children. One of them, Shaoqi
Assadig, 12 years old, was shot dead in Al-Gezira province. The picture
of the child demonstrating in the streets was widely relayed and he
became a symbol of the uprising.
Clik here to view.
Unions took a long time to enter the movement, and they struggle to
rally their troops, though they played an important role in calling for
protests on Dec. 25th and 31st. They attempted
some strikes which were relatively not very followed through. Further,
the opposition parties have trailed behind, even though they have also
been the target of repression (some of their leaders have been
arrested).
Repression
Faced with this movement the government was initially in denial,
while repressing the protests. Faced with the fraternization of the many
regular army troops with people in revolt in provincial cities (such as
at Atbara), the regime relied on the riot police, the Janjaweed
militias (those who went to war and committed massacres at Darfur),
security forces (NISS), “the popular army” (Kizan civilians armed by the
government) and private militias hired by the local pro-regime
bourgeoisie.
During protests, the deployment of armed repression has been
staggering: snipers atop buildings, constant use of tear gas, regular
use of live ammunition, aiming for people’s heads. Today we count some
40 deaths across the country. Some bodies are found in the Nile, such as
a student of literature at the University of Khartoum, Abderahman
Asadiq. Protesters who are captured are beaten on the street and are
often carried off. There are several hundred people gone missing. Very
often nothing more is heard from them. The mutilations and injures are
incalculable.
Clik here to view.
A state of emergency has been decreed in almost all cities: the armed
forces occupy all urban spaces; universities and schools have been
closed; university students kicked out of dorms; and a curfew has been
enacted in many cities like Atbara and Khartoum. Some people have been
arrested in their homes, raids were carried out during the protests,
with sometimes up to 200 people gone missing from one place. Houses have
been attacked as protesters took refuge. Journalists have been
arrested, newspapers forced to close. The internet has been cut-off
several times in the country – notably to put a halt to use of social
networks.
The regime has found some strong support like that of the emir of
Qatar, Ben Khalifa Al Thani, whois notably the owner of the television
network Al-Jazeera. The few times the network has covered the protests,
it has only showed those protests which do not call into question the
regime (which only speak of economic demands). Broadly, the media has
been gagged by the State to silence what is happening.
While activists are killed just 100 meters from the headquarters of
television network, these networks would rather broadcast music
programs. In response to the serious lack of media coverage, at the
level of Sudan and across the world, protests have cried out with the
slogan: “attalqah ma bitaktul, biktul sukat azol” (“It is not the bullet that kills, it is silence that kills”).
Clik here to view.
State propaganda essentially consists of not only silencing, but also
dividing. The government has arrested Darfurian university students
which they accuse of fomenting the revolt and of belonging to an armed
group at Darfur, the LMS (Liberation Movement of Sudan). An image of a
handcuffed student, with weapons in front of them, was used to say that
they were responsible for killing protesters, as a means to increase
anger. This is where the population’s response to State racism came in
support of the Darfurians. Omar El-Bashir has spoken several times on
television to address the situation. The first time he told Wad Madani
that the protesters were traitors and thieves, and that Israel was
behind these movements. The second time took place on Dec. 30th
: Omar El-Bashir instrumentalized some Koranic suras and Hadith
passages to justify the deaths of the protesters. There is thus now a
willingness to kill and this came to fruition on Dec. 31st where the number of dead had been higher than usual.
Solidarity
We cannot predict how this movement will end, if revolution will be achieved, if the revolt will be snuffed out or if a coup d’etat will put an end to any protest. In the face of any attempts of the State to break the cohesion created during the struggle, the people have affirmed their unity and support, without failure, for the victims of State racism. But it also in the neighborhoods where elders have helped the youth in revolt; where men and women are fighting hand-in-hand against repression; where doors open to those chased by police squadrons; where doctors are arrested for rescuing injured protesters; where soldiers join the protests and refuse to fire on the people, or in some cities even protect people from police violence… Solidarity is also international since [Sudanese] exilées around the world have protested in almost every Western capital to support their fellow compatriots in struggle. They demand a stop to any collaboration with the regime of Khartoum. They relay the voices of those far away and raise medical funds sorely needed by those who have been injured.
taken from here
Der Beitrag Sudan, Revolution til the End erschien zuerst auf non.copyriot.com.