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Structure and System in Badiou and Laruelle

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Nothing could be more decidedly foreign to the non-standard philosophy of François Laruelle than the mathematical treatment I am about to give here. This alone seems an excellent reason to proceed. The reader should not expect a thorough formalisation of Laruelle’s theoretical machinery, nor (more likely) a failed attempt at such a formalisation. The question taken up here is simply whether there is an analogy to be drawn between the following: “suture” / “name of the void” in Badiou, “generic” / “radical concept” in Laruelle, and “initial / terminal / zero object” in category theory.

To begin with Badiou, it is well known that in Being and Event the empty set is uniquely positioned as the point of suture between “beings”, qua sets or consistent multiples, and “being” as pure inconsistent multiplicity. The suture operates via an equivocation between the notions “not a set” and “set of nothing”. In both notions, nothing is formed into a consistent multiple. But on the side of “being”, this means that no formation of the unformed has taken place, while on the side of “beings”, it means that a formation of none of the unformed has taken place. Badiou gives the equivocal name “void” to both of these cases, and calls the empty set the “name of the void” by which the void is registered within the ontological system of set theory.

The empty set has this role because it is a minimally-determined object within a system of determinations, and can thus play the part of emblem of the undetermined for that system. Badiou’s set-theoretic ontology is both stabilised by the axiomatic nomination of this object, which forms the starting point for the elaboration of the entire set-theoretic universe, and exposed at this point to the limit of its own coherence. This enables Badiou to manage the dialectic of coherence and incoherence, systematicity and a-systematicity, in a more or less disciplined way. For example, the appearance of the empty set within the power set (or “count-of-the-count”) of every set is characterised by Badiou as presenting the “errancy of the void”, or the haunting of superstructural repetition (which Badiou associates with the bureaucratic machinery of the State) by inconsistency. Or, to give another example, the “evental site” on which the “matheme of the event” supervenes is characterised as a multiple “on the edge of the void”, a set whose intersection with any of its members is the empty set.

If the meta-mathematical narrative of Being and Event is possessed of an impressive sprezzatura, a mixing together of felicity and virtuosity such that one often cannot tell where contrivance leaves off and happy coincidence begins, then much of its dialectical agility is owing to the equivocation at the heart of the system. Where structure is required, the empty set as minimal structural element is on hand to provide a sound basis. Where the system needs to be opened out to the a-systematic, the empty set as “name of the void” provides an escape hatch. The void thus functions as a kind of bellows within Badiou’s mathematical oratory, inflating and deflating as needed, supplying more “beings” here and more “being” there.

All of this Laruelle confronts with a kind of vulgar skepticism, deriding Badiou’s “ontology of the void” as an exercise in philosophical “auto-position” facilitated by a mathematical mirror. If Laruelle’s Anti-Badiou shows little sign of its author’s having comprehended the mathematical apparatus of Being and Event, its sarcasm is nevertheless effectively targeted at the entire character of the enterprise. For Laruelle, Badiou’s “ontology of the void” (“OV”) remains a hierarchical, “planifying” arrangement, secured by the privilege given to the empty set as its central operator: a strait gate through which every concept must be made to pass. By contrast, Laruelle’s non-standard philosophy, modelled (so he says) on quantum physics, holds within it no such place of privilege: there is no single point of “suture” securing a system, but rather a polyphony of theoretical “undulations” rolling in the depths of a matricial, oceanic Real.

There is nevertheless in Laruelle a characteristic operation of unstraitening or destructuration, which aims at producing a “generic” instance which can stand, amidst the other terms of a theory, as a name of the Real itself. This operation does not fix on any single foundational term, such as the empty set, but seizes on the privileged operators of whatever theoretical “material” is at hand, asset-stripping them and repurposing them as what Katerina Kolozova calls “radical concepts”. Laruelle will speak of the “non-Mandelbrotian fractal”, separated from the geometric and algorithmic affordances that give the term “fractal” its strong, specific technical sense and diverted towards a “generic” rendition in which it becomes a figure amongst others of indivisible self-similarity: a pseudonym of the Real.

Detached from context, emptied of content, the generic term does not serve as the cornerstone of a conceptual architecture but instead represents a kind of weak force of identity, according to which anything whatsoever can be disposed within immanence alongside anything else. It is thus taken up as an emblem of underdetermination. What can be a non-Mandelbrotian fractal? Anything one wishes to consider as one; that is, consider according to its generic fractality, its imbrication in the Real. If a technical term affords certain kinds of use, distinguishing one thing from another, the generic term withdraws what it names from distinction. It is a sword beaten into a plowshare.

We can now compare the two emblems, the Badiouvian “name of the void” (of which there can be only one) and the Laruellian “name of the Real” (of which there are many, in illimitable series). Each names a minimal instance of structure: the one given axiomatically, a philosopher’s stone; the other produced through a kind of inverted alchemical reduction to dross. Each represents the starting point of a procedure: the one subtractive, elaborating through purification a conceptual universe; the other subsumptive, drawing philosophical edifices down into the undertow of the Real.

Take for example the effect of the two procedures on the philosophical category of “Life” (as organic process, as intrinsic value, as that which resists the power of death and so on). The subtractive Badiouvian approach refuses to accept “Life” as a name of the Real, assigning it instead to procedures which partition it and develop the pieces according to their own separate logics: thus we find “life” as poetic figure of organic integrity; “life” as the ultimately manipulable material of the sciences which are on their way to knowing how to remake it in their own image; “life” as a field of inert subjectivity fecundated by the amorous encounter; or “life” as the renewed enthusiasm of the political convert, incorporated into the body of a political truth. Finally, “life” for Badiou is the object of a maxim: to live according to an Idea, which alone can bring it to the fruition of which it is capable. What authorises this refusal of authority to “Life” as a philosophical first concept, its handing-over to procedures which take it as a mere skeleton to be invested with glittering logical raiment? Nothing other than the name of the void: the only acceptable final name, precisely because it is the name of nothing.

What is the Laruellian approach? To turn from the strong philosophical concept of “Life” to the weak names of “the lived” (le vécu) and “the enjoyed” (le joui), to that which is lived by the living and enjoyed in their enjoyment (jouissance). Rather than a metaphysics of vital energy, or of desire capillarising pathways and lines of leakage, Laruelle proposes through these generic terms an infraphysics, a principle of underdetermination which gives not laws but occasions, instances of the Real. “Life”, the life of the philosophers, is then neither refused nor mathematically purified, but subjected to its own insufficiency to the lived as it is lived. This is not the philosophical ruse according to which Life is posited as always in excess of “its” concept (the excess thus being philosophically specified and controlled, as philosophy’s own), but the non-philosophical disposition according to which Life, however you conceptualise it, is thought according to the lived, of which it is never more than a model occasioned by (some) living.

For Badiou, the minimal term — the empty set — is an absolute minimum: this is what gives it its structuring power. The generic term in Laruelle is only ever relatively minor: just “minoritised” enough, in the circumstances, which may indeed be varied and admit of multiple generic operators. This is then the difference between determinate indetermination and underdetermined underdetermination.

We come now to our formalisation, which will no doubt seem all the more perverse given the preceding discussion. We suppose that a category (in the mathematical sense) is given in which the morphisms between objects are understood to carry some determination between their domain and codomain. In other words, the existence of a morphism f: A -> B implies, in the category at hand, that “A determines B” in some sense. In Lawvere and Schanuel’s usage, for example, such a morphism in the category of abstract sets represents a “general element” of B: that part of the set B which bears the image of the set A under the mapping f. The collection of all morphisms from other objects into some object A is thus understood to carry all of the possible determinations of A within the category: everything that is determinate about A, from the point of view of the category in which it appears, is determined extrinsically through these morphisms. (This is, very hand-wavily, one way of taking the general import of the Yoneda Lemma).

What does it mean, in such a category, for an object to be “minimally determined”? The answer must be given by way of the morphisms connecting that object to other objects. An “initial object”, if one exists in the category, is an object such that, for every object in the category, there is a single uniquely determined morphism from the initial object to that object. It is provable that if more than one such object exists, all such objects are “isomorphic”, or functionally indistinguishable from each other in terms of the roles they can play within the category.

It so happens that in the category “Set”, the initial object is the empty set. For every set, there exists one and one only mapping from the empty set to that set: the empty mapping which takes no elements of the empty set to no elements of the target set. There is no mapping from any set other than the empty set into the empty set: it is thus both minimally determined and unilaterally determining.

Other categories may have multiple (isomorphic) initial objects, or none. An example worth paying attention to is that of the category of pointed sets. A pointed set is a pair (A, a) of a non-empty set and a single element of that set, which “anchors” it. The morphisms between pointed sets are the mappings between them that take the “anchor” of the source set to that of the target set. In this category, every singleton pointed set ({a}, a), containing only its anchor element, is initial. Unlike the category of sets, however, in the category of pointed sets there is also a unique mapping from every pointed set back into the initial object; which is also, therefore, a “terminal” object. An object which is both initial and terminal is known as a “zero” object, and represents a kind of maximally stable point within a category, being both universally determined and universally determining.

It is clear that initial, terminal and zero objects represent, within a category, privileged structural positions. The Real is of course not a mathematical object; but might not such a minimally-structured object be considered as an emblem of indetermination, and hence a point of conformance to the Real, within the mathematical system regulated by a category? We have seen that this analogy holds with regard to Badiou’s set-theoretic ontology, inasmuch as the empty set Badiou takes as his privileged point of suture with the Real is also the initial object in the category of sets. But does it communicate in any way with Laruelle’s selection of generic terms, local or relative minoritisations which serve to re-orient the systems to which they belong “according to” the Real?

The question can be put more generally: why, among all the languages and “modelisations” considered by Laruelle, do some terms present themselves for genericisation more readily than others? What, given Laruelle’s desire to operate a “democracy of thought”, picks out just these terms as structurally privileged, and therefore apt cases for the “dualysing” treatment? Here the category theoretic analogy suggests a possible answer: a “minimal instance of structure” is always minimal relative to some particular system of structuration. If Laruelle disdains the notion of a universal minimum, a single foundational point of suture, he nevertheless practices a selection of local minima guided by the system at hand. If Laruelle is not himself a systematic thinker, a builder or maintainer of systems as Badiou unarguably is, he is nevertheless inexorably tied to systematic evaluation in his non-philosophical practice: a “heretic”, yes, but loyal to the last.

 

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Der Beitrag Structure and System in Badiou and Laruelle erschien zuerst auf non.


Cyber-Proletariat: Interview with Nick Dyer-Witheford

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Gavin Mueller: Your 1999 book Cyber-Marx is an excellent summary of autonomist Marxism and post-operaismo as well as an argument for its relevance for struggles against a capitalism increasingly suffused with information and communication technology. With Cyber-Proletariat, you are less sanguine about post-operaismo’s embrace of cybernetic technologies. Can you explain your shift in position? What has made information and communication technology appear as a bigger threat for the global working class?

Nick Dyer-Witheford: My change in position reflects involvement in two moments of struggle – that of alter-globalization from the late 1990s through the early 2000s; and then, from 2008 on, the new social antagonisms and struggles that emerge in the wake of the financial meltdown. Both struggles have revealed new possibilities and new problems for anti-capitalist movements attempting to use cybernetic technologies. On the one hand, there was the evident and much-discussed use of social media and cell phone networks in what we might call the 2011 revolts – the riots, the strikes, the occupations. At the same time, and on the other hand, all those events reveal the difficulties that can attend using those technologies as an organizational matrix—for example, what we can call the “up like a rocket,  down like a stick” syndrome that characterized some of the 2011 movements. Also during that cycle, and particularly coming with the Snowden revelations in North America, was revealed the scope and intensity of the surveillance to which militants are likely to be subjected within the cybernetic milieu.

Underlying those points – which we might call tactical points about the usage of cybernetic technologies by revolutionary movements – is another larger, more strategic point: the changes in class composition which have been effected by capital in terms of its restructuring of the global workforce using automata and networks and, in the financial system, networks of automata. Cyber-Proletariat starts with the question of the validity and significance of the “Facebook revolution” trope, but then moves from that into an attempt at analysis of the deeper effect of cybernetics on the restructuring of labor within advanced capitalism.

GM: That brings me to my next question. This is primarily a book about class composition in the 21st century. Almost every chapter is a weaving of the various forms of labor making up the global supply chains of cybernetic objects such as cell phones and social media sites – miners in the Amazon, content moderators in the Philippines, app developers in San Francisco. Are there potentials for such far-flung varieties of labor, “internally striated and fractioned,” as you put it, to unite politically? Can there be shared interests with such divergences in “subjectivity” – a word you use several times – among these workers?

NDW: The path of global class restructuring that capital has taken over the past 40 years has been one of intensified differentiation and inequality. This has taken a form of the bifurcation of the labor force between upwardly mobile sector of professionals, and on the other hand, a vast sea of insecure, precarious low-wage proletarianized labor. This has been a striking split within what was formerly conceived of – even if somewhat mythically – as the potential solidarity of the industrial mass labor force. This a split is now also intensified by its distribution across the multiple wage zones traversed by the supply chains of global capital.  At the same time, while there are growing inequalities between these two strata – the professional intermediate classes and the proletarianized labor forces – the even greater inequality is, of course, between plutocratic capital and both those segments.

Hence, there are simultaneously issues of real antagonism between these different fractions of capital’s labor, but also possibilities for forms of cooperation. All the more so because what we are seeing emerge increasingly is a range of various re-proletarianizations of the professional strata – all too visible within the university setting, in which people with aspirations towards professional careers find themselves trapped in the ghettos of precarious work; the famous situation of the graduate student without a future, cited  by Paul Mason as a critical dynamic in 2011.

So what we saw during the 2011 cycle was the surfacing both of the potential alliances and the potential antagonisms within this global labor force. There were undoubtedly points in the great occupations, such as Tahrir Square, where the mobilization created large solidarities of different strata against a kleptocratic authoritarian regime. In other places, like Britain in 2011, one saw strands of struggle running parallel but without meeting. You have the eruption of powerful campus revolts among students, and then riots in the cities amongst the most excluded and dispossessed sectors. Both have strong resonances as protests against austerity regimes, but also exist almost in worlds apart, and sometimes with great suspicion and hostility between them. And then in yet other settings one sees situations in which some of the tactics of the 2011 occupations are adopted by middle class strata struggling to preserve elements of their privilege, for example in Thailand and Venezuela.

This is a long way of saying that we’re looking at an extraordinarily contradictory set of class formations that pose very serious organizational questions for communist-oriented movements, questions which I do not think were successfully answered in the 2011 movements, although those movements have posed the questions in the most acute form.

GM: You temper some of your previous work in autonomist Marxist theory with an engagement with communization theory as presented in journals such as Tiqqun, SIC, and Endnotes. How does this body of work supplement or modify autonomist theory?

NDW: Autonomism and communization theory are undoubtedly the most interesting strands of communist movement theorization today and are largely critical of each other. Autonomism emphasizes workers’ antagonism to capital. Communization theory insists that we must understand that workers are also part of capital. Autonomism has always emphasized and celebrated the circulation of struggles amongst different groups of workers. Communization theory reminds us that, as we were just discussing, these segments of the working class can often be antagonistic to each other.

I’ll say that both these strands of theory have their characteristic problems. Autonomism is chronically optimistic, always keen to see one swallow making a spring. Communization theory has a very studied melancholia. In some way, this book is an attempt to set in play a conversation that I found myself having intellectually in my reading, a conversation between these twin faces of ultra-leftism in order to see what emerged from that.

GM: Could you say a bit more about how you see this melancholia as a weakness of communization theory?

NDW: The element in communization theory that I’m most critical of is actually one that it shares to some degree with autonomism: its rejection of what it calls programmatism and its scrupulous refusal to describe any path to a communist situation short of the immediate abolition of the commodity form. I believe that it is extremely difficult to persuade people, including oneself, to embark on the time-consuming, demanding, and, in crisis situations, dangerous task of attempting to create a new society without having any provisional ideas of what that path might look like.

Indeed, I would say that what we saw recently in Greece, which can be taken on the one hand as a failure of classic social democratic electoral strategies, also really seriously shows the problems that can arise when there is a rejection of any attempt to think transitionally about various stages and phases in the movement of anti-capitalist struggle. So I don’t completely buy that part of communization theory, where participants whose work I otherwise I admire, rather exempt themselves from doing some hard work.

I’m much more sympathetic on that front to groups like Plan C in the United Kingdom, who recognize that we do need to collectively as a movement think about issues of transition, but in a non-dogmatic and explorative way that will have to admit the huge degree of uncertainty that would attend any crisis which could result in major transformations.

GM: It has become somewhat common for rising precarity and technological unemployment to be viewed in a somewhat positive light. Most recently British journalist Paul Mason wrote a long essay in The Guardian predicting that a post-work, post-capitalist future is being created before our eyes. In a different vein, accelerationist theory embraces advancing subsumption of social relations to capitalism and its technologies. How does your work respond to these kinds of arguments?

NDW: They point to a reality which many other radical thinkers have pointed to: it’s clear that capitalism is creating potentials – not just technological, but organizational potentials – which could be adapted in a transformed manner to create a very different type of society. The evident example is the huge possibilities for freeing up time by automation of certain types of work. For me, the problem both with Paul’s work, which I respect, and with the accelerationists, is there is a failure to acknowledge  that the passage from the potential to the actualization of such communist possibilities involves crossing what William Morris describes as a “river of fire.” I don’t find in their work a great deal about that river of fire. I think it would be reasonable to assume there would be a period of massive and protracted social crisis that would attend the emergence of these new forms. And as we know from historical attempts in the 20th Century to cross that river of fire, a lot depends on what happens during that passage. So there is, if one could put it that way, a certain automatism about the prediction of the realization of a new order in both these schools, which we should be very careful about.

GM: Your final chapter discusses the organization of proletarian struggles. These struggles, you argue, must adapt themselve to wartime, to this evocative metaphor of the river of fire. You also envision a networked, rather than hierarchical, form of organization. Can you say more about the future of organization? Are there examples of these kinds of emergent forms you can point to?

NDW: You’ve named some of the provocations I suggest in terms of thinking about new organizational forms, provocations elicited by the dilemmas of  the 2011 struggles. Amongst these, one that I put very close to the top of the list is the need for the emergence of new forms of labor organization, which can take better account of the realities of precarious work and unemployment. These are already under way in a variety of forms, both in attempts – and here I’ll speak from my Canadian vantage point – I’m aware of some major trades unions which, if only for reasons of self-preservation, are attempting to open themselves more to the precarity of increasing numbers of their members. But there are also initiatives coming from outside the established trades unions, from precarious workers themselves. to find new forms. So, first, there is a huge challenge around workplace – or unplaced work – organization.

The second thing I suggest is the need for a reassessment of digital organizing tactics: a clearer recognition of the necessity of such organizing, because we do live in a form of capitalism in which social life has become cybernetically subsumed, but also for an appreciation of the limitations and risks of those forms of organization.

I also suggest that this seems to be a moment to think very seriously about new organizational syntheses that could overcome the verticalist-horizontalist split, which of course is a centuries-long division, but now seems particularly necessary to get beyond. Without getting all bubbly about things, I’m encouraged by what I see in terms of experiments with various forms of common front organizations, some of which are active here in Ontario, which are bringing together in tentative, provisional, and experimental ways, people from the Occupy movement, labor movement, and a range of other social movements.

We’ve already mentioned a fourth point, the importance of developing a new non-dogmatic approach to envisaging what one could frankly call transitional strategies – Plan Cs. The fifth, final point,  which really is what you started with, wartime, is simply a suggestion there is a need to be better prepared for truly major crises and for the sorts of risks and openings that these entail. My observation is that, certainly within North America, what calls itself “the left” was taken completely by surprise by what happened in 2008. We had a massive crisis of capital. But organizationally, largely due to the wear-down by neoliberalization, there was a real inability to seize the historical moment. It seems highly likely that there will be further historical moments of crisis, possibly soon. There’s a lot to be learned from the experiences of comrades in such places as Syria, Turkey, Ukraine: places where, insofar as progressive organizations can even still function in the polarizing fatalities of civil war situations, they have to come to grips in a digital environment with issues of potentially fatal surveillance, encryption, verification, authentication in order to operate in these very extreme circumstances. I think we need to think very seriously about that, and prepare seriously.

GM: I hasten to add that, while our conversation has been quite theoretical, your book is a wonderful catalog of a variety of struggles, and packed with empirical details that are of interest to anyone who has been following or participating in struggles, especially since 2008.

NDW: The book is an attempt to sort out some of these struggles and dilemmas that have arisen particularly over the past seven years, and more broadly over the past 15 years, from the position of an academic participant in some of the events that I’m describing. It’s a book that’s very much in motion, and it wears its contradictions on its sleeves, because we need to be able to talk about contradictions and conflicts within the movement in order to be able to move past what, for the moment, seems like an impasse.

is an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Information and Media Studies at the University of Western Ontario. He is the author of Cyber-Marx: Cycles and Circuits of Struggle in High Technology Capitalism (Chicago: University of Illinois, 1999) and Cyber-Proletariat: Global Labour in the Digital Vortex (London: Pluto Press, 2015).

is a graduate student in Washington, DC.

Originally published at Viewpoint Magazine  here

Der Beitrag Cyber-Proletariat: Interview with Nick Dyer-Witheford erschien zuerst auf non.

Kapitalisierung 1 & 2

An Interview with Deleuze/Guattari: Capitalism, a very special delirium.

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QUESTION: When you describe capitalism, you say: 'There isn't the slightest operation, the slightest industrial or financial mechanism that does not reveal the dementia of the capitalist machine and the pathological character of its rationality (not at all a false rationality, but a true rationality of *this* pathology, of *this madness*, for the machine does work, be sure of it). There is no danger of this machine going mad, it has been mad from the beginning and that's where its rationality comes from. Does this mean that after this 'abnormal' society, or outside of it, there can be a 'normal' society?

GILLES DELEUZE: We do not use the terms 'normal' or 'abnormal'. All societies are rational and irrational at the same time. They are perforce rational in their mechanisms, their cogs and wheels, their connecting systems, and even by the place they assign to the irrational. Yet all this presupposes codes or axioms which are not the products of chance, but which are not intrinsically rational either. It's like theology: everything about it is rational if you accept sin, immaculate conception, incarnation. Reason is always a region cut out of the irrational -- not sheltered from the irrational at all, but a region traversed by the irrational and defined only by a certain type of relation between irrational factors. Underneath all reason lies delirium, drift. Everything is rational in capitalism, except capital or capitalism itself. The stock market is certainly rational; one can understand it, study it, the capitalists know how to use it, and yet it is completely delirious, it's mad. It is in this sense that we say: the rational is always the rationality of an irrational. Something that hasn't been adequately discussed about Marx's *Capital* is the extent to which he is fascinated by capitalists mechanisms, precisely because the system is demented, yet works very well at the same time. So what is rational in a society? It is -- the interests being defined in the framework of this society -- the way people pursue those interests, their realisation. But down below, there are desires, investments of desire that cannot be confused with the investments of interest, and on which interests depend in their determination and distribution: an enormous flux, all kinds of libidinal-unconscious flows that make up the delirium of this society. The true story is the history of desire. A capitalist, or today's technocrat, does not desire in the same way as a slave merchant or official of the ancient Chinese empire would. That people in a society desire repression, both for others and *for themselves*, that there are always people who want to bug others and who have the opportunity to do so, the 'right' to do so, it is this that reveals the problem of a deep link between libidinal desire and the social domain. A 'disinterested' love for the oppressive machine: Nietzsche said some beautiful things about this permanent triumph of slaves, on how the embittered, the depressed and the weak, impose their mode of life upon us all.

Q: So what is specific to capitalism in all this?

GD: Are delirium and interest, or rather desire and reason, distributed in a completely new, particularly 'abnormal' way in capitalism? I believe so. Capital, or money, is at such a level of insanity that psychiatry has but one clinical equivalent: the terminal stage. It is too complicated to describe here, but one detail should be mentioned. In other societies, there is exploitation, there are also scandals and secrets, but that is part of the 'code', there are even explicitly secret codes. With capitalism, it is very different: nothing is secret, at least in principle and according to the code (this is why capitalism is 'democratic' and can 'publicize' itself, even in a juridical sense). And yet nothing is admissible. Legality itself is inadmissible. By contrast to other societies, it is a regime born of the public *and* the admissible. A very special delirium inherent to the regime of money. Take what are called scandals today: newspapers talk a lot about them, some people pretend to defend themselves, others go on the attack, yet it would be hard to find anything illegal in terms of the capitalist regime. The prime minister's tax returns, real estate deals, pressure groups, and more generally the economical and financial mechanisms of capital -- in sum, everything is legal, except for little blunders, what is more, everything is public, yet nothing is admissible. If the left was 'reasonable,' it would content itself with vulgarizing economic and financial mechanisms. There's no need to publicize what is private, just make sure that what is already public is being admitted publicly. One would find oneself in a state of dementia without equivalent in the hospitals.

Instead, one talks of 'ideology'. But ideology has no importance whatsoever: what matters is not ideology, not even the 'economic-ideological' distinction or opposition, but the *organisation of power*. Because organization of power-- that is, the manner in which desire is already in the economic, in which libido invests the economic -- haunts the economic and nourishes political forms of repression.

Q: So is ideology a trompe l'oeil?

GD: Not at all. To say 'ideology is a trompe l'oeil, ' that's still the traditional thesis. One puts the infrastructure on one side-- the economic, the serious-- and on the other, the superstructure, of which ideology is a part, thus rejecting the phenomena of desire in ideology. It's a perfect way to ignore how desire works within the infrastructure, how it invests in it, how it takes part in it, how, in this respect, it organizes power and the repressive system. We do not say: ideology is a trompe l'oeil (or a concept that refers to certain illusions) We say: there is no ideology, it is an illusion. That's why it suits orthodox Marxism and the Communist Party so well. Marxism has put so much emphasis on the theme of ideology to better conceal what was happening in the USSR: a new organization of repressive power. There is no ideology, there are only organizations of power once it is admitted that the organization of power is the unity of desire and the economic infrastructure. Take two examples. Education: in May 1968 the leftists lost a lot of time insisting that professors engage in public self-criticism as agents of bourgeois ideology. It's stupid, and simply fuels the masochistic impulses of academics. The struggle against the competitive examination was abandoned for the benefit of the controversy, or the great anti-ideological public confession. In the meantime, the more conservative professors had no difficulty reorganizing their power. The problem of education is not an ideological problem, but a problem of the organization of power: it is the specificity of educational power that makes it appear to be an ideology, but it's pure illusion. Power in the primary schools, that means something, it affects all children. Second example: Christianity. The church is perfectly pleased to be treated as an ideology. This can be argued; it feeds ecumenism. But Christianity has never been an ideology; it's a very specific organization of power that has assumed diverse forms since the Roman Empire and the Middle Ages, and which was able to invent the idea of international power. It's far more important than ideology.

FELIX GUATTARI: It's the same thing in traditional political structures. One finds the old trick being played everywhere again and again: a big ideological debate in the general assembly and questions of organization reserved for special commissions. These questions appear secondary, determined by political options. While on the contrary, the real problems are those of organization, never specified or rationalized, but projected afterwards in ideological terms. There the real divisions show up: a treatment of desire and power, of investments, of group Oedipus, of group 'superegos', of perverse phenomena, etc. And then political oppositions are built up: the individual takes such a position against another one, because in the scheme of organization of power, he has already chosen and hates his adversary.

Q: Your analysis is convincing in the case of the Soviet Union and of capitalism. But in the particulars? If all ideological oppositions mask, by definition, the conflicts of desire, how would you analyze, for example, the divergences of three Trotskyite groupuscules? Of what conflict of desire can this be the result? Despite the political quarrels, each group seems to fulfill the same function vis-a-vis its militants: a reassuring hierarchy, the reconstitution of a small social milieu, a final explanation of the world... I don't see the difference.

FG: Because any resemblance to existing groups is merely fortuitous, one can well imagine one of these groups defining itself first by its fidelity to hardened positions of the communist left after the creation of the Third International. It's a whole axiomatic, down to the phonological level -- the way of articulating certain words, the gesture that accompanies them -- and then the structures of organization, the conception of what sort of relationships to maintain with the allies, the centrists, the adversaries... This may correspond to a certain figure of Oedipalization, a reassuring, intangible universe like that of the obsessive who loses his sense of security if one shifts the position of a single, familiar object. It's a question of reaching, through this kind of identification with recurrent figures and images, a certain type of efficiency that characterized Stalinism--except for its ideology, precisely. In other respects, one keeps the general framework of the method, but adapts oneself to it very carefully: 'The enemy is the same, comrades, but the conditions have changed.' Then one has a more open groupuscule. It's a compromise: one has crossed out the first image, whilst maintaining it, and injected other notions. One multiplies meetings and training sessions, but also the external interventions. For the desiring will, there is --- as Zaire says-- a certain way of bugging students and militants, among others.

In the final analysis, all these groupuscules say basically the same thing. But they are radically opposed in their *style*: the definition of the leader, of propaganda, a conception of discipline, loyalty, modesty, and the asceticism of the militant. How does one account for these polarities without rummaging in the economy of desire of the social machine? >From anarchists to Maoists the spread is very wide, politically as much as analytically. Without even considering the mass of people, outside the limited range of the groupuscules, who do not quite know how to distinguish between the leftist elan, the appeal of union action, revolt, hesitation of indifference.

One must explain the role of these machines. these goupuscules and their work of stacking and sifting--in crashing desire. It's a dilemma: to be broken by the social system of to be integrated in the pre-established structure of these little churches. In a way, May 1968 was an astonishing revelation. The desiring power became so accelerated that it broke up the groupuscules. These later pulled themselves together; they participated in the reordering business with the other repressive forces, the CGT [Communist worker's union], the PC, the CRS [riot police]. I don't say this to be provocative. Of course, the militants courageously fought the police. But if one leaves the sphere of struggle to consider the function of desire, one must recognize that certain groupuscules approached the youth in a spirit of repression: to contain liberated desire in order to re-channel it.

Q: What is liberated desire? I certainly see how this can be translated at the level of an individual or small group: an artistic creation, or breaking windows, burning things, or even simply an orgy or letting things go to hell through laziness or vegetating. But then what? What could a collectively liberated desire be at the level of a social group? And what does this signify in relation to t'the totality of society', if you do not reject this term as Michel Foucault does.

FG: We have taken desire in one of its most critical, most acute stages: that of the schizophrenic--and the schizo that can produce something within or beyond the scope of the confined schizo, battered down with drugs and social repression. It appears to us that certain schizophrenics directly express a free deciphering of desire. But now does one conceive a collective form of the economy of desire? Certainly not at the local level. I would have a lot of difficulty imagining a small, liberated community maintaining itself against the flows of a repressive society, like the addition of individuals emancipated one by one. If, on the contrary, desire constitutes the very texture of society in its entirety, including in its mechanisms of reproduction, a movement of liberation can 'crystallize' in the whole of society. In May 1968, from the first sparks to local clashes, the shake-up was brutally transmitted to the whole of society, in some groups that had nothing remotely to do with the revolutionary movement--doctors, lawyers, grocers. Yet it was vested interests that carried the day, but only after a month of burning. We are moving toward explosions of this type, yet more profound.

Q: Might there have already been a vigorous and durable liberation of desire in hostpry, apart from brief periods. a celebration, carnage, war, or revolutionary upheavals? Or do you really believe in an end of history. after millennia of alienation, social evolution will suddenly turn around in a final revolution that will liberate desire forever?

FG: Neither the one nor the other. Neither a final end to history, nor provisional excess. All civilizations, all periods have known ends of history--this is not necessarily convincing and not necessarily liberating. As for excess, or moments of celebration, this is no more reassuring. There are militant revolutionaries who feel a sense of responsibility and say: Yes excess 'at the first stage of revolution,' serious thing s... Or desire is not liberated in simple moments of celebration. See the discussion between Victor and Foucault in the issue of *Les Temps Moderns* on the Maoists. Victor consents to excess, but at the 'first stage'. As for the rest, as for the real thing, Victor calls for a new apparatus of state, new norms, a popular justice with a tribunal, a legal process external to the masses, a third party capable of resolving contradictions among the masses. One always finds the old schema: the detachment of a pseudo capable of bringing about syntheses, of forming a party as an embryo of state apparatus, of drawing out a well brought up, well educated working class; and the rest is a residue, a lumpen-proletariat one should always mistrust (the same old condemnation of desire). But these distinctions themselves are another way of trapping desire for the advantage of a bureaucratic caste. Foucault reacts by denouncing the third party, saying that if there is popular justice, it does not issue from a tribunal. He shows very well that the distinction 'avant-garde-lumpen-proletariat' is first of all a distinction introduced by the bourgeoisie to the masses, and therefore serves to crush the phenomena of desire, to *marginalize* desire. The whole question is that of state apparatus. It would be strange to rely on a party or state apparatus for the liberation of desire. To want better justice is like wanting better judges, better cops, better bosses, a cleaner France, etc. And then we are told: how would you unify isolated struggles without a party? How do you make the machine work without a state apparatus? It is evident that a revolution requires a war machine, out this is not a state apparatus, it is also certain that it requires an instance of analysis, an analysis of the desires of the masses, yet this is not an apparatus external to the synthesis. Liberated desire means that desire escapes the impasse of private fantasy: it is not a question of adapting it, socializing it, disciplining it, but of plugging it in in such a way that its process not be interrupted in the social body, and that its expression be collective. What counts is not the authoritarian unification, but rather a sort of infinite spreading: desire in the schools, the factories, the neighborhoods, the nursery schools, the prisons, etc. It is not a question of directing, of totalising, but of plugging into the same plan of oscillation. As long as one alternates between the impotent spontaneity of anarchy and the bureaucratic and hierarchic coding of a party organization, there is no liberation of desire.

Q: In the beginning, was capitalism able to assume the social desires?

GD: Of course, capitalism was and remains a formidable desiring machine. The monary flux, the means of production, of manpower, of new markets, all that is the flow of desire. It's enough to consider the sum of contingencies at the origin of capitalism to see to what degree it has been a crossroads of desires, and that its infrastructure, even its economy, was inseparable from the phenomena of desire. And fascism too--one must say that it has 'assumed the social desires', including the desires of repression and death. People got hard-ons for Hitler, for the beautiful fascist machine. But if your question means: was capitalism revolutionary in its beginnings, has the industrial revolution ever coincided with a social revolution? No, I don't thing so. Capitalism has been tied from its birth to a savage repressiveness; it had it's organization of power and its state apparatus from the start. Did capitalism imply a dissolution of the previous social codes and powers? Certainly. But it had already established its wheels of power, including its power of state, in the fissures of previous regimes. It is always like that: things are not so progressive; even before a social formation is established, its instruments of exploitation and repression are already there, still turning in the vacuum, but ready to work at full capacity. The first capitalists are like waiting birds of prey. They wait for their meeting with the worker, the one who drops through the cracks of the preceding system. It is even, in every sense, what one calls primitive accumulation.

Q: On the contrary, I think that the rising bourgeoisie imagined and prepared its revolution throughout the Enlightenment. From its point of view, it was a revolutionary class 'to the bitter end', since it had shaken up the *ancien regime* and swept into power. Whatever parallel movements took place among the peasantry and in the suburbs, the bourgeois revolution is a revolution made by the bourgeoisie terms are hardly distinguishable--and to judge it in the name of 19th or 20th century socialist utopias introduces, by anachronism, a category that did not exist.

GD: Here again, what you say fits a certain Marxist schema. At one point in history, the bourgeoisie was revolutionary, it was even necessary--necessary to pass through a stage of capitalism, through a bourgeois revolutionary stage. It'S a Stalinist point of view, but you can't take that seriously. When a social formation exhausts itself, draining out of every gap, all sorts of things decode themselves, all sorts of uncontrolled flows start pouring out, like the peasant migrations in feudal Europe, the phenomena of 'deterritorialisation.' The bourgoisie imposes a new code, both economic and political, so that one can believe it was a revolution. Not at all. Daniel Guerin has said some profound things about the revolution of 1789. The bourgoisie never had illusions about who its real enemy was. Its real enemy was not the previous system, but what escaped the previous systems's control, and what the bourgoisie strove to master in its turn. It too owed its power to the ruin of the old system, but this power could only be exerciced insofar as it opposed everything else that was in rebellion against the old system. The bourgoiseie has never been revolutionary. It simply made sure others pulled of the revolution for it. It manipulated, channeled, and repressed an enormous surge of popular desire. The people were finally beaten down at Valmy.

Q: They were certainly beaten down at Verdun.

FG: Exactly. And that's what interests us. Where do these eruptions, these uprisings, these enthusiasms come from that cannot be explained by a social rationality and that are diverted, captured by the power at the moment they are born? One cannot account for a revolutionary situation by a simple analysis of the interests of the time. In 1903 the Russian Social Democratic Party debated the alliances and organization of the proletariat, and the role of the avant-garde. While pretending to prepare for the revolution, it was suddenly shaken up by the events of 1095 and had to jump on board a moving train. There was a crystallization of desire on board a wide social scale created by a yet incomprehensible situation. Same thing in 1917. And there too, the politicians climbed on board a moving train, finally getting control of it. Yet no revolutionary tendency was able or willing to assume the need for a soviet-style organization that could permit the masses to take real charge of their interests and their desire. Instead, one put machines in circulation, so-called political organizations, that functioned on the model elaborated by Dimitrov at the Seventh International Congress--alternating between popular fronts and sectarian retractions--and that always led to the same repressive results. We saw it in 1936, in 1945, in 1968. By their very axiomatic, these mass machines refuse to liberate revolutionary energy. It is, in an underhanded way, a politics comparable to that of the President of the Republic or of the clergy, but with red flag in hand. And we think that this corresponds to a certain position vis-a-vis desire, a profound way of envisioning the ego, the individual, the family. This raises a simple dilemma: either one finds a new type of structure that finally moves toward the fusion of collective desire and revolutionary organization: or one continues on the present path and, going from repression to repression, heads for a new fascism that makes Hitler and Mussolini look like a joke.

Q: But then what is the nature of this profound, fundamental desire which one sees as beeing constitutive of man and social man, but which is constantly betrayed? Why does it always invest itself in antinomic machines of the dominant machine, and yet remain so similar to it? Could this mean that desire is condemned to a pure explosion without consequence or to perpetual betrayal? I have to insist: can there ever be, one fine day in history, a collective and during expression of liberated desire, and how?

GD: If one knew, one wouldn't talk about it, one would do it. Anyway, Felx just said it: revolutionary organization must be that of the war machine and not of state apparatus, of an analyzer of desire and not an external systhesis. In every social system, there have always been lines of escape, and then also a rigidification to block off escape, or certainly (which is not the same thing) embryonic apparatuses that integrate them, that deflect or arrest them in a new system in preparation. The crusades should be analysed from this point of view. But in every respect, capitalism has a very particular character: its lines of escape are not just difficulties that arise, they are the conditions of its own operation. it is constituted by a generalized decoding of all flux, fluctuations of wealth, fluctuations of language, fluctuations of art, etc. It did not create any code, it has set up a sort of accountability, an axiomatic of decoded fluxes as the basis of its economy. It ligatures the points of escape and leaps itself having to seal new leaks at every limit. It doesn't resolve any of its fundamental problems, it can't even forsee the monetary increase in a country over a single year. It never stops crossing its own limits which keep reapperaing farther away. It puts itself in alarming situations with respect to its won production, its social life, its demographics, its borders with the Third World, its internal regions, etc. Its gaps are everwhere, forever giving rise to the displaced limits of capitalism. And doubtless, the revolutionary way out (the active escape of which Jackson spoke when he said: ' I don't stop running, but while running, I look for weapons') is not at all the same thing as other kinds of esacpe, the schizo-escape, the drug-escape. But it is certainly the problem of the marginalized: to plug all these lines of escape into a revolutionary plateau. In capitalism, then, these lines of escape take on a new character, a new type of revolutionary potential. You see, there is hope.

Q: You spoke just now of the crusades. For you, this is one of the first manifestations of collective shizohrenia in the West.

FG: This was, in fact, an extraordinary schizophrenic movement. Basically, in an already schismatic and troubled world, thousands and thousands of people got fed up with the life they led, makeshift preachers rose up, people deserted entire villages. It's only later that the shocked papacy tried to give direction to the movement by leading it off to the Holy Land. A double advantage: to be rid of errant bands and to reinforce Christian outposts in the Near East thretened by the Turks. This didn't always work: the Venetian Crusade wound up in Constantinople, the Childrens Crusade veered off toward the South of France and very quickly lost all sympathy: there were entire villages taken and burned by these 'crosses' children, who the regular armies finally had to round up. They were killed or sold into slavery.

Q: Can one find parallels with contemporary movements: communities and by-roads to escape the factory and the office? NAd would there be any pope to co-opt them? A Jesus Revolution?

FG: A recuperation by Christianity is not inconceivable. It is, up to a certain point, a reality in the United States, but much less so in Europe or in France. But there is already a latent return to it in the form of a Naturist tendency, the idea that one can retire from production and reconstruct a little society at a remove, as if one were not branded and hemmed in by the capitalist system.

Q: What role can still be attributed to the church in a country like ours? The church was at the center of power in Western civilization until the 18th Century, the bond and structure of the social machine until the emergence of the nation-state. Today, deproved by the technocracy of this essential function, it seems to have gone adrift, without a point of anchorage, and to have split up. One can only wonder if the church, pressured by the currents of Catholic progressivism, might not become less confessional than certain political organizations.

FG: And ecumenism? In't it a way of falling back on one's feet? THe church has never been stronger. There us bi reasiob ti oppose church and technocracy, there is a technocracy of the church. Historically, Christianity and positivism have always been good partners. The development of positive sciences has a Christian motor. One cannot say that the psychiatrist has replaced the priest. Nor can one say the cop has replaced the priest. There is always a use for everyone in repression. What has aged about Christianity is its ideology, not its organization of power.

Q: Let's get to this other aspect of yopur book: the critique of psychiatry. Can one say that France is already covered by the psychiatry of *Sectuer*--and how far does this influence spread?

FG: The structure of psychiatric hospitals essentially depends on the state and the psychiatrists are mere functionaries. For a long time the state was content to practice a politics of coercion and didn't do anything for almost a century. One had to wait fot the Liberation for any signs of anxiety to appear: the first psychiatric revolution, the opening of the hospitals, the free services, instituional psychotherapy. All that has led to the great utopian politics of 'Sectorization,' which consisted in limiting the number of internments and of sending teams of psychiatrists out into the population like missionaries in the bush. Due to lack of credit and will, the reform got bogged down: a few model services for official visits, and here or there a hospital in the most underdeveloped regions. We are now moving toward a major crisis, comparable in size to the university crisis, a disaster at all levels: facilities, training of personnel, therapy, etc.

The instituional charting of childhood is, on the contrary, undertaken with better results. In this case, the initiative has escaped the state framework and its financing to return to all sorts of associations--childhood protection or parental associations.... The establishments have proliferated, subsidized by Social Security. The child is immediately taken charge of by a network of psychologists, tagged at the age of three, and followed for life. One can expect to see solutions of this type for adult psychiatry. In the face of the present impasse, the state will try to de-nationalize institutions in favor of other institutions ruled by the law of 1901 and most certainly manipulated by political powers and reactionary family groups. We are moving toward a psychiatric surveillance of France, if the present scrises fail to liberate its revolutionary potentialities. Everywhere, the most conservative ideology is in bloom, a flat transposition of the concepts of Oedipalism. In the childrens's wards, one calls the director 'uncle,' the nurse, 'mother.' I have even heard distinctions like the following: group games obey a maternal principle, the workshops, a paternal one. The psychiatry of *Secteur* semms progressive because it opens the hospital. But if this means imposing a grid over the neighborhood, we will soon regret the loss of the closed asylums of yesterday. It's like psychoanalysis, it functions openly, so it is all the worse, much more dangerous as a repressive force.

GD: Here's a case. A woman arrives at a consultation. She explains that she takes tranquilizers. She asks for a glass of water. Then she speaks: 'You understand I have a certain amount of culture. I have studied, i love to read, and there you have it. Now I spend all my time crying. I can't bear the subway. And the minute I read something, I start to cry. I watch television; I see images of Vietnam: I can't stand it ...' The doctor doesn't say much. The woman continues: 'I was in the Resistance... a bit. I was a go-between.' The doctor asks her to explain. 'Well, yes, don't you understand, doctor? I went to a cafe and I asked, for example, is there something for Rene?' I would be given a letter to pass on.' The doctor hears 'Rene'; he wakes up: 'Why do you say 'Rene'? It's the first time he asks a question. Up to that point, she was speaking about the metro, Hiroshima, Vietnam, of the effect all that had on her body, the need to cry about it. But the doctor only asks: 'Wait, wait, 'Rene' ... what dies 'Rene' mean to you?' Rene--someone who is reborn [re-n'e]? The Renaissance, this fits into a universal schema, the archetype: 'You want to be reborn.' The doctor gets his bearings: at last he's on track. And he gets her to talk about her mother and her father.

It's an essential aspect of our book, and it's very concrete. The psychiatrists and psychoanalysts have never paid any attentiaon to delirium. It'S enough just to listen to someone who is delirious: it's the Russians that worry him, the Chinese; my mouth is dry; somebody buggered me in the metro; there are germs and spermatozoa swimming everywhere; it's Franco's fault, the Jews, the Maoists: all a delirium of the social field. Why shouldn't this concern the sexuality of the subject--the relations it has with the Chinese, the whites, the blacks? Whith civilization, the crusades, the metro? Psychiatrists and psychoanalysts hear nothing of this, on the defensive as much as they are indefensible. They crush the contents of the unsoncious under prefab statements: 'You speak to me of the Chinese, but what about your father? No, he isn't Chinese? THen , do you have a Chinese lover?' It's atz the same level of repressive work as the judge in the Angela Davis case who affirmed: 'Her behavior can only be explained by her beeing in love.' ANd what if, on the contrary, Angela Davis's libido was a social, revolutionary libido? What if she were in love because she was a revolutionary?

That is what we want to say to psychiatrists and psychoanalysts: yopu don't know what delirium is; you haven't understood anything. If our bnook has a meaning, it is that we have reached a stage where many people feel the psychoanalytif machine no longer works, where a whole generation is getting fed up with all-purpose schemas--oedipus and castration, imaginary and symbolic--which systematically efface the social, political, and cultural contents of any psychic disturbance.

Q: You associate schizophrenia with capitalism; it is the very foundation of your book. Are there cases of schizophrenia in other societies?

FG: Schizophrenia is indissocialble from the capitalist system, itself conceived as primary leakage (fuite): and exclusive malady. In other societies, escape and marginalization take on other aspects. The asocial individual of so-called primitive societies is not locked up. The prison and the asylum are resent notions. One chases him, he is exiled at the edge of the village and dies of it, unless he is integrated to a neighboring village. Besides, each system has its paricular sickness: the hysteric of so-called primitive societies, the manic-depressive paranoiacs of the great empires... The capitalist economy preoceeds by decoding and de-territorialization: it has its exterme cases, i.e., schzophrenics who decode and de-territorialize themselves to the limit; but also it has its extreme consequences--revolutionaries.

['Chaosophy', ed. Sylvere Lothringer, Autonomedia/Semiotexte 1995]

Der Beitrag An Interview with Deleuze/Guattari: Capitalism, a very special delirium. erschien zuerst auf non.

Psychoware – Der pornographische Blick ins fungible Subjekt

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"Fuhren die Angestellten in Berlin, wie dies Siegfried Kracauer in seiner Studie „Die Angestellten“ 1930 beschrieb, während der 1920er Jahre noch an den Wannsee, um den Schmutz, die zweite Haut, mit der sie im Büro überzogen wurden, wegzuspülen, so genügen heute zwei Stunden Gestalt- und Verhaltenstherapie, Bioenergetik oder Transaktionsanalyse in der Woche, um sich von verdächtigen Ausdünstungen und lästigen Mitessern der Seele zu befreien."

 pdf isf-diktatur.freundlichkeit_lp-szepanski

 

Der Beitrag Psychoware – Der pornographische Blick ins fungible Subjekt erschien zuerst auf non.

Financialization: Market Discipline or Capital Discipline?

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Financialization: Market Discipline or Capital Discipline ?
 
John Milios, National Technical University of Athens, john.milios@gmail.com
Dimitris P. Sotiropoulos, University of Aegean, d.p.sotiropoulos@gmail.com
 
"In conclusion, and in contrast to what the Keynesians assume, neoliberalism is an exceptionally effective strategy for capitalist (and not rentier) hegemony . Moreover, the class content of the effectiveness criterion is incontestable. Effectiveness connotes capital’s ability to impose the “laws” of capitalist accumulation, overriding labour resistance without significant difficulty. Apart from theoretical consequences, this finding has important political implications:  the community of interest of those “inside” the enterprise (labourers and managers) as against the “outsiders” of the financial markets is a construction of fantasy . The fantasy is erected upon the no less fantastic distinction between the “productive” and “non-productive” classes, a notion derived from the problematic of Keynes . Such an outlook narrows the strategic horizon of the workers’ movement to defence of a “better” capitalism, that is to say a “better” system of class domination and exploitation. The Keynesian critique of neoliberalism places the boundaries of the practice of the social movements inside the framework of the society of bourgeois exploitation."
 
pdf here
 

Der Beitrag Financialization: Market Discipline or Capital Discipline? erschien zuerst auf non.

Deutschland sucht den Super-Flüchtling – qualifiziert, arbeitswillig und integrationsbereit

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Im Feuilleton einer großen deutschen Tageszeitung war einmal zu lesen, dass die Casting-Shows, was ihr Procedere, ihre Zyklizität und die Interdependenzen von Medien, Markt und Geld betrifft, mit den Bubbles an den Finanzmärkten verglichen werden könnten, wobei der Fernsehzuschauer mit einem einzigen Telefonanruf ähnlich wie ein Kleinanleger an der Börse handeln könne, wobei aber sein Risiko, sieht man einmal von den Telefongebühren oder dem Zeitraub ab, der einem so die letzten Lichtnadeln des Fernsehabends vermasselt, deutlich geringer als das eines Kreditnehmers, dafür aber auch die Rendite gleich null sei, und insofern bliebe das Casting-Dispositiv, das die Wunschproduktion des Konsumenten in Hinsicht auf Zerstreuung steuere, wertlos, wobei die Illusionen des Konsumenten im Gefüge der Sichtbarkeiten permanent moduliert und auf den Kassenmagnaten Superstar hin konzentriert würden, der wiederum beabsichtige, diese Illusionen in möglichst kurzer Zeit in Geld zu verwandeln - dieses illusionistische Procedere bliebe also für den Zuschauer ohne jede nachhaltige politökonomische Folgewirkung, und nichts als der bittere psychische Beigeschmack bliebe am Ende beim Zuschauer zurück, dass man durch die interaktive Beteiligung an der Spekulationsblase Casting diese nur noch weiter in die Höhe getrieben hätte, ohne dass man allerdings daraus in genügender Weise selbst einen Gewinn gezogen hätte. Allerdings sei das Ganze noch wesentlich komplizierter, denn eine gewisse gratification müsse dem Publikum schließlich zugestanden werden, einem Publikum, das den Genuss der Casting-Shows zwar mit Zeitraub bezahle und nicht einmal mit hinreißend süßen Gadgets belohnt werde, aber es werde ihm zumindest das Bewusstsein vermittelt, dass sei schon alles okay, und vor allem sei das Publikum selbst okay, in dieser komischen Welt und dem glücklichen Bewusstsein davon.

So oder ähnlich muss es gewesen sein, als an einem Samstagabend ein Teil der deutschen Bevölkerung inklusive eines Teils der deutschen Linken ihre Teddybären an Hauptbahnhöfen abgeladen hat, um für einen erhebenden Moment, atemlos in der Nacht, einem medialen Spektakel in Realtime beizuwohnen und es zu genießen, und zwar als Akteur, der sich gewiss sein kann, für einen Augenblick selbst der kollektive Superstar für ARD und ZDF zu sein, anstatt vor der Glotze zu hängen und den individuell designten Superstar nur zu wählen. Was das Publikum will, ist das Bild (oder Image) der Leidenschaft, nicht die Leidenschaft selbst, wusste schon Roland Barthes, und ersetzt man nun Leidenschaft durch Hilfsbereitschaft, so hat man den Flair jenes Abends in etwa erfasst.

Bild führt dieses Spektakel am heutigen Samstag einem weiteren medialen Höhepunkt zu. Nichts könnte dafür geeigneter sein, als die medialen Spaces der neuen Popindustrie Fußball. Hatte Bild jahrelang bildkräftige Assoziationen über den Zusammenhang zwischen  Migration und Kriminalität, Rauschgifthandel und religiösem Fanatismus geweckt, Ausländer als nicht integrierbare und gefährliche Eindringlinge oder als arbeitsscheue Subjekte stigmatisiert, so trägt nun die deutsche FußballProminenz die Plakette »Refugees Welcome« mit dem BildLogo auf dem grünen Rasen spazieren. Zur gleichen Zeit arbeitet der herrschende Block in den Regierungsetagen an der Verschärfung des Asylrechts, was den rechtlichen Sonderstatus der Asylanten betrifft, i.e. die Ersetzung von Bargeld durch Lebensmittelgutscheine, Arbeitsverbot, Residenzpflicht, Lager, die man Sammelunterkünfte nennt, und so weiter und so fort. (Agamben erinnert daran, "dass die ersten Lager in Europa für Flüchtlinge errichtet wurden, und dass die Abfolge: Internierungslager - Konzentrationslager - Vernichtungslager eine vollkommen reale Abstammungsreihe darstellt.) Und auf vorgeschobener Linie sollen in Zukunft Abschiebungen aus den Internierungslagern in Griechenland und Italien, wenn möglichst auch in der Türkei, unter der Regie der EU-Grenzschutzagentur FRONTEX stattfinden. Kriegsflüchtlinge und globale Arbeitsnomaden (wie letzere Achille Mbembe nennt), denen nicht einmal der Genuss auf Ausbeutung durch das Kapital vergönnt ist, werden mit staatlichen Operationen der Lagerbildung und integrierten Systemen des Rückführungsmanagements empfangen. Frei soll sich nur das monetäre Kapital in Nanosekundenschnelle bewegen können, die globalen Eliten und ihr Umfeld und die Insassen der Transportmaschinen der Tourismusindustrie.

Auf ihren Sonderstatus als Flüchtlinge wäre also mit der Forderung der Abschaffung des Flüchtlingsregimes angemessen zu reagieren, der Forderung nach Rechtsgleichheit, was die freie Beweglichkeit, Mobilität, Bildung, Arbeitserlaubnis etc. angeht. Es steht aber zu befürchten, dass der Flüchtling jetzt das Objekt eines Spektakels wird, bei dem man wahlweise den Schalter switcht, auf Malus oder Bonus. Wirklich das Flüchtlingsregime anzugreifen, das hieße also den rechtlichen Nicht-Status der Flüchtlinge, der etwa durch Lebensmittelgutscheine statt Bargeld, Arbeitsverbot, Residenzpflicht und Sammelunterkünfte markiert wird, anzugreifen. In all diesen Punkten werden die Maßnahmen aber gerade verschärft. Es ist generell zu befürchten, dass die Rechtsgleichheit des Flüchtlings im Kapitalismus aus rein "logischen" Gründen gar nicht möglich ist. Bei Kant kann man schon nachlassen, dass in einer Nation, die sich über ihr Territorium, das sozusagen Volkseigentum ist, definiert, der Fremde unweigerlich als Unperson gesetzt ist. Die Nation verbietet es geradezu, ein Gast-Recht zu etablieren, bei dem der Gast sui generis als Rechtsperson verstanden wird. Gastfreundschaft ist nämlich keine philanthropisch-humanitäre Geste und auch keine Art von Mildtätigkeit, sie ist das Politische, das durch die Subalternen erkämpft werden muss.

Das rassistische Phantasma, das stets Teil eines Staatsrassismus ist, mit dem das Leben und das Sterben der Bevölkerung überwacht und reguliert wird, hat im Moment eine leichte, wenn auch nicht unbeabsichtigte Modifizierung angenommen. Gemäß den allgemeinen Spielregeln des Neoliberalismus finden wir eine Fortentwicklung vom Sicherheitsdispositiv hin zum Risikodispositiv vor. Der rassistisch konnotierte Migrations-Diskurs stellt die einheimische Bevölkerung als einen integralen, als einen quasi-organischen Körper vor, der durch klare Grenzen gegenüber der Außenwelt charakterisiert ist, und der gegen jene Nomaden verteidigt werden muss, die die gesunde Homogenität des Volkskörpers bedrohen. „So wie der Schutz des Heims ein entscheidendes Anliegen des Bürgers und Privatmannes ist, so ist die Integrität seiner Grenzen die Existenzbedingung des Staates«, wusste schon der Marquess Curzon of Kedleston um das Jahr 1900 zu berichten. Oder nehmen wir Foucault in »Überwachen und Strafen«: »Eines der ersten Ziele der Disziplin ist das Festsetzen - sie ist ein gegen das Nomadentum gerichtetes Verfahren.« Und dies schließt die strikte Unterscheidung zwischen dem guten und erwünschten und dem schlechten und unerwünschten Flüchtling ein, zwischen potenziell qualifizierten Fachkräften, an denen es in Deutschland in spezifischen Arbeitsbereichen gerade mangelt, und dem unbrauchbaren Menschenmüll. Der neoliberal flexibel gehaltene Arbeitsmarkt grüßt mit der Parole »Refugees Welcome« und mit ihm exerziert das Kapital und sein Staat eine zielorientierte „Willkommenspolitik“, um die Arbeits- und Einreisewilligen nachhaltig in die Bevölkerung einzugliedern. Eine sanfte Kontrolle kolportiert die schonungslose Lagerpolitik, die man mit den unwillkommenen Migranten pflegt.

Und ein zweites gilt es zu berücksichtigen. Wolfgang Pohrt hat vor ca 25 Jahren in seinem Essay »Der moderne Flüchtling. Über „Ambler by Ambler« folgendes geschrieben: „Ähnlich wie heute, wo 100.000 zusätzliche Menschen in der BRD eine vernachlässigbare Größe wären, während 100.000 Asylbewerber, denen das Recht auf Freizügigkeit wie auf Arbeit entzogen wurde, bereits jetzt einen die Grundrechte unterminierenden Sonderfall darstellen und sich tatsächlich zu dem sozialen Problem entwickeln können, als welches man sie betrachtet; ähnlich wie heute also wurden damals (nach 1918) die Flüchtlinge zu einem destabilisierenden Element durch die Behandlung, die ihnen widerfuhr. Festgehalten im Stand der Rechtlosigkeit, welcher den der Gesetzlosigkeit einschließt, waren sie das anschaulichste Beispiel für das Schrumpfen des Geltungsbereichs von Gesetzen, für Zersetzungserscheinungen im Bereich staatlicher Kontrolle über die Bevölkerung und überhaupt für die wachsende Unfähigkeit des überkommenen Sozialgefüges, das Leben der Menschen in geregelten Bahnen zu halten.“ Wenn heute ein de Maziere äußert, dass wir uns überall auf »Veränderungen einstellen müssen: Schule, Polizei, Wohnungsbau, Gerichte, Gesundheitswesen, überall”, dann klingt dies nach der Neugestaltung der Bereiche staatlicher Kontrolle, für die das destabilisierende Element des Flüchtlings die Rolle des Auslösers übernimmt, um etwa das ein oder andere demokratische Recht zu verabschieden oder die Verarmung von Teilen der Bevölkerung noch weiter hoffähig zu machen, genauer jenes Teils, den die krankmachende Verarmungsmaschinerie in Billigarbeitskräfte und Sozialhilfeempfänger, die heute durch den Besuch der „stalinistischen“ Zwangsernährungs-, Bekleidungs- und Ein-Euro-Ketten (Seeßlen) ihr Leben phasisch sichern müssen, aufteilt und reguliert.

Was der deutsche Bürger auf keinen Fall wollen wird, das ist eine kommende Gegenwart, das sind die nomadischen Flüchtlingsströme, die die Autobahnen umfunktionieren und damit Kontingenzerweiterung betreiben. Dem Bürger wird es bald wieder mulmig werden, denn das ist das Letzte, was er will, Kontingenzerweiterung, und nicht einen Finger wird er krumm machen, um hier die Rechtsgleichheit der Flüchtlinge durchzusetzen. Denn dies könnte sich zu einem globalen Klassenkonflikt ausweiten. Als Flashmob unterwegs, könnte es bei den Flüchtlingen bald zu ersten Formen der Selbstorganisation kommen.

Was will der deutsche Bürger, i.e. die Mittelschicht? Sie will den Flüchtling genießen, und sie will den besten, das heißt den qualifizierten, ziviliserten, arbeitswilligen und integrationsfähigen Flüchtling zum Superstar küren. (Lacans Trieb-Konzept arbeitet mit einer wichtigen Unterscheidung, nämlich der zwischen Trieb und Begehren, und dies jeweils in ihrer Relation zum Genießen (jouissance). Für Lacan ist das Begehren immer mangelhaft - ein Begehren zu begehren -, wobei es niemals an ein Ziel gelangen kann; es ist ein Begehren nach einer jouissance, die jedoch niemals erreicht werden kann, weil das Begehren keineswegs auf ein Objekt abzielt und deshalb immer überraschbar bleibt. Im Gegensatz dazu erreicht der Trieb die jouissance in einem repetitiven Prozess, in dem er sie gerade nicht erreicht. Denn man muss ein Ziel nicht erreichen, um genießen zu können. Das Genießen selbst bindet nur an den repetitiven Prozess und damit auch das Subjekt. Genießen, egal wie marginal, flüchtig oder minimal, ist der Grund, warum man in der Trieb-Schleife hängenbleibt. Der Konsum bzw. Genuss existiert, insofern der Trieb das Ziel verfehlt; Genuss ist, was das Subjekt bekommt, selbst wenn es das nicht will. Genießen ist dieses kleine Extra, das das Subjekt einfach nicht in Ruhe lässt. Und um zu genießen, muss das Begehren suspendiert werden, es muss sozusagen der zu konsumierende Gegenstand aufgelauert werden, der zunächst im Auflauern simuliert wird, bevor er dann tatsächlich auftaucht und einverleibt wird.)

Es gilt natürlich vorest abschließend zu bemerken, dass nach wie vor selbst von der Linken viel zu wenig über die ökonomischen und politischen Ursachen gesprochen wird, über den kapitalistischen Weltmarkt und die imperialistischen Kriege, die für Kriegs- und sog. Wirtschaftsflüchtlinge verantwortlich zu machen sind. Das sind u.a. produktive Unternehmen der Deutschland-EU, die mit zudem subventionierten Waren die afrikanischen und arabischen Ökonomien überschwemmen und den einheimischen Bevölkerungen ihre Lebensgrundlage entziehen. Märkte werden durch den Export von Hühnchenflügeln und Schlachtabfällen aus Deutschland zerstört. Im Zuge des globalen Landraubs werden Lebensmittel oder fruchtbare Böden (Palmölplantagen in der Elfenbeinküste, Rosen aus Kenia, Erdnüsse aus dem Senegal etc), Fischfanggebiete und Rohstoffvorkommen (bspw. Uran aus Niger, Tschad und Mali) vom westlichen Kapitala angeeignet. Im Unterschied zu europäischen Arbeitern werden weite Teile der Arbeitsnomaden in Afrika nicht gebraucht und unterbieten sich in der Konkurrenz um Lohnarbeit und landen schließlich in Slums bzw. in der Verelendung. Die überflüssigen Arbeitsnomaden tragen allenfalls dazu bei, mit ihren Niedrigstlöhnen in Kombination mit der Produktivität wetslicher Unternehmen deren Erfolg und damit die Ruinierung der Ökonomien ihrer Herkunftsländer weiter voran zu treiben. Die ruinöse Rolle der Weltbank und des IWF wäre zu beschreiben, die Nahostpolitik des Westens und die dadurch entstandenen »faile states« und so weiter und so fort.

Und schließlich wäre auf die längst eingestellte Weltmarktdebatte der marxistischen Linken zu verweisen, den Luxus, dass sich Autorinnen wie Amir Samin und Christel Neusüss über eine Theorie des »Ungleichen Tausches« streiten konnten. Während Samin auf die Politik der ursprünglichen Akkumulation in der Dritten Welt und der damit verbundenen Politik der niedrigen Löhne abstellte, die zum ungleichen Tausch führe, ging Christel Neusüss von einer durch die Naionalstaaten und deren Währungen induzierten Modifikation des Wertgesetzes auf dem Weltmarkt aus, wobei das Wechselkursverhältnis die jeweiligen nationalen Produktivitätsunterschiede anzeige. Durch höhere Ausbeutungsraten der Arbeiterklassen könnten die Kapitale der niedrig entwickelten Länder eine Profitrate erzielen, die ihnen die Konkurenz mit den fortgeschrittenen Kapitalen erlaube. Auch diese Debatte wäre aufzugreifen und zu modifizieren. So oder so, es findet nach wie vor eine globale Distribution ungleicher Arbeitsquanta an den Weltmärkten statt, man denke an die Billigimporte aus ostasiatischen Staaten, in denen erhebliche menschliche Arbeit festgefroren ist, an die Smartphones, die die westliche Bevölkerung genießt, um die Effektivität ihrer Arbeit und ihre Verblödung zugleich zu intensivieren. Und ein bisschen gilt es auch den Weltrekord zu genießen, nämlich die über 60 Millionen Menschen, die laut UNHCR im vergangenen Jahr auf der Flucht waren.

Der Beitrag Deutschland sucht den Super-Flüchtling – qualifiziert, arbeitswillig und integrationsbereit erschien zuerst auf non.

China Crash (englisch/deutsch)

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The Faltering of Economic Transition.

In days of panic selling and bursting bubbles, the Chinese stock markets appear to be a casino of roulette bets on future economic trends. Beyond the daily ups and downs of the stocks game, we can identify maneuvers of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and other players, as well as long-term trends of Chinese capitalist development.1

What started all the fuss? Chinese share prices have been volatile for years, but started to rise especially fast in November 2014 – also in comparison to those in other countries.2 All in all they increased by more than 100 percent in six months before the market collapsed on June 12, 2015. The government started buying large amounts of shares, canceled new stock market launches, ordered state-owned enterprises (SOEs) not to sell shares and used other measures to stop the free fall of share prices. Only when half of the shares had officially been taken off the market and many of the remaining had been bought by state agencies did the fall slow somewhat. It continued, though, with more short periods of panic around July 27 and August 24, then leaving the index 40 percent lower than on June 12.3

These events happened in a financial sector framework that has stayed more protected and state-controlled than those in other capitalist countries throughout China’s "reform" period – i.e. from the late 1970s until today. Stock exchanges were set up in Shanghai and Shenzhen only in 1990 and 1991, in part to support the restructuring of SOEs. However, they played a minor role until the early 2000s, when the government made more efforts to further commercialize the financial sector to make it more suitable for capitalist expansion. A first large stock market bubble popped in early 2007, when shares went down after rumors that the government would raise the benchmark interest rates and go after credit-financed speculation.4 After 2007, the financial sector was further extended in the course of government policies to cushion the effects of the global economic crisis – i.e. a huge government stimulus program based on credit generated through the state-controlled banking sector.5 The effects of the crisis also led to the expansion of a "shadow" banking sector, which is largely outside the control of the government but plays an important role in financing private business and local governments’ development projects.6

Debts and Slowdown

In the years since 2008, the government stimulus programs continued, largely directed at construction and infrastructure. Subsequently, total debt rose from 158 percent of GDP in 2007 to 282 percent in 2014, including highly indebted local governments and SOEs – and this debt is hampering economic development and growth.7 In order to generate sufficient funds – necessary to ensure further economic growth and prevent social discontent as well as political instability – the government intends to further "liberalize" the financial sector. In late 2013, it launched new measures, e.g. the creation of a new free trade zone in Shanghai, efforts to internationalize the currency renminbi, and a further deregulation of the stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen.8

Meanwhile, signs of an economic slowdown are mounting. After two decades of GDP growth rates averaging about 10 percent per year, the growth has slowed down to below 8 percent since 2012, hovering between 6 and 7 this year.9

The government has already acknowledged the economic deceleration and officially defined the situation as the "new normal" (xin changtai) in 2014. The term reflects the intended change of the development model away from a fast growing export economy to a more balanced one, but it also shows the government’s attempt to appease economic actors who fear the effects of the transition.10 However, the symptoms of the slowdown are numerous and more extreme than anticipated, and the government finds it hard to control the effects. Domestic consumption has stayed chronically low (despite rising wages), as has private investment. Rising wages have added to rising unit labor costs – meaning some sectors in China lost competitive strength.11 As a result, some industrial capacities have been relocated to inland provinces with lower wages, some labor-intensive industries even to other countries.12 In addition, industrial profits have declined,13 while several sectors suffer from over-capacities due to recent large – often state-subsidized and "wasted" – investments.14 Recently, exports have stagnated or even declined.15

Infusions and Bubbles

In order to avoid further debts and their effects on growth and economic development in general, the CCP government needs new funds. The huge reserves of foreign currencies – result of the trade surpluses – cannot be used to the same extent anymore because the trade surplus is volatile and the reserves have already decreased.16 The middle classes’ immense savings17 could provide a remedy if they could be used for financial infusions, e.g. for indebted SOEs and deficient state-run pension and health insurance funds.18 Channeling part of those savings into the stock market could help transform debts into forms of equity, thereby passing the economic risk on to private investors.

Against this background, several events led to the recent overheating of the stock market: First, the government relaxed restrictions on the purchase of shares with borrowed money (margin trading) in 2014. Second, larger amounts of "cheap" money became available after China’s central bank lowered the benchmark rates on November 21, 2014.19Third, real estate has been a major factor in the generation of economic growth in the past decade, but real estate prices have been stagnating or dropping since 2012 – the release of pressure from the real estate bubble that started in the mid-2000s.20As a result, in 2014 larger parts of the middle class were prepared to invest in shares instead of real estate, hoping to increase their savings. Fourth, in fall 2014 the government started a media campaign encouraging private investment in the stock exchange, so that new private investors trusted the government, its willingness to support the rise of shares’ value, and its ability to control the market. Tens of millions of new stock portfolios have been opened since, and many shares were even bought with borrowed money in expectation of rising share values and large profits.

In this way, the earlier housing bubble was replaced by a stock bubble. The first signs of problems and a possible slump in share values appeared in spring 2015, and even the Chinese media talked about a "bubble" (paomo) for months. But it was not until mid-June – after government steps to restrict margin lending had been announced, shares had collapsed, and the first interventions to "rescue the market" (jiushi) had failed – that trust became angst and angst became panic, so that many investors started selling for ever lower prices.

Turning point

The stock market crash happens at a time when the Chinese development model has reached a turning point, and the financial turmoil reflects underlying structural problems of the economy, as well as social changes and tensions in the society as a whole. Since the early 1990s, China has become the second largest economy in the world and the engine of global growth, today representing 15 percent of global GDP.22 First, that boom was, however, driven by exports of consumer goods produced by "cheap" migrant labor, and the foundations of that model have been crumbling for some time. While exports, i.e. income generated by selling goods to economic players in other countries, are still an important factor, they are not the main economic driving force anymore. Since the crisis after 2007 and the stimulus programs, that role was taken by investments in infrastructure and real estate – based on credit and leading to the aforementioned rapid increase of debts.

Second, the social composition behind the boom is also changing. The most dynamic sectors of the Chinese economy – manufacturing, construction and services – are still resting on the labor of roughly 280 million migrant workers, but the mechanism of "cheap" migrant labor filling vacant (urban) jobs and then returning to the countryside in times of crisis and unemployment – as occurred in 1997–1998 and 2008–2009 – is partly jammed since many migrants have already permanently settled in cities. Meanwhile, fewer people leave the countryside because China has reached the so-called Lewis turning point, i.e. the surplus of rural labor – the source of migration – is coming to an end.22 This has led to an increase in the regional labor shortages that started to appear about ten years ago.

Third, the second and third generations of migrant workers are voicing their demands for better living conditions, have more experience in organizing and struggle, and have managed to make use of the labor shortages. The result has been a sharp increase of migrant workers’ struggles since the mid-2000s, leading to steady wage rises.23 While the cheap labor model has not disappeared, it is surely under pressure "from below" by migrant workers with increased power.

Fourth, meanwhile, the CCP government wants to stabilize its regime and, therefore, has to ensure further growth. To prevent an increase in workers’ protests it is prepared to make material concessions.24 It has been actively promoting the transformation from an economy based mainly on cheap labor, contract manufacturing and exports to one driven by high value-added (high-tech) production (upgrading) and a large domestic market lowering the dependency on exports (rebalancing).25 The slowdown as a result of this transformation was expected and stands behind the recently announced "new normal" policies, but efforts in this direction go back to the 2000s, were intensified in the 12th Five Year Plan (2010–2015), and will probably be the theme of the 13th (2016–2020) that the CCP is working on now. However, this is an ongoing process with an open end – largely depending on global challenges and crises, social struggles in China, and government attempts to manage these.26

Economic Effects

Obvious economic problems in China connected to this "rebalancing" and the global crisis notwithstanding, we have to wait and see to what extent the stock market crash itself will affect China’s position in the global economy and the "upgrading" process. Despite the crash and slowdown, the Chinese economy does not seem to be on the verge of collapse. Signs of economic weakness can be seen in various sectors – e.g. deflation as a result of overproduction –, and a "hard landing" is still possible, but so far most economic indicators show a slow and continuous decrease rather than a free fall.27 The Chinese financial markets and the renminbi are still protected, and that gives the CCP government more control in the face of crisis compared to other countries. Moreover, the Chinese stock market and the percentage of savings invested in shares are fairly small compared to those of the USA or Europe, so financial losses and the effects on the so-called real economy might be more limited than the panic reports on the crash suppose.28

However, the crash affects the function of the financial markets in China. Chinese companies as well as local government projects are still financed through (state-controlled) banks – i.e. debts – rather than the stock exchange. For the moment, the attempt to channel household savings into the stock market and use them to replace debts with equities has failed. The Chinese stock exchanges became a kind of "zombie" stock market because the government pumped in money to keep it alive, yet they have died nevertheless, i.e. largely stopped functioning as markets. As a result, many foreign investors have withdrawn capital – not just in connection with the stock market crash.29 It is not clear how the CCP government can regain the trust of domestic and foreign investors who want to speculate on market-driven stock exchanges. That might lead to aggravated problems of generating funds for SOEs or social funds, and of managing the increased debt in general.

Power and Legitimacy

Meanwhile, the political impact might be large. Reports suggest that the stock market crash weakened the position of certain "reformers" in the CCP who support more marketization, while the position of "conservatives" who defend a stronger role of the state and of SOEs might be strengthened. Other observers see a factional battle for influence and power within the current regime between the so-called "princelings" behind president Xi Jinping, who favors structural reforms towards the "new normal," and the "populists" around prime minister Li Keqiang, who allegedly stood behind the stock market rally as a mechanism for stimulating growth after the real estate bubble had popped.30 However, the CCP leadership as a whole is opposed neither to further liberalization nor to structural reforms – if necessary just at a lower speed –, and rivals and troublemakers inside the CCP risk being swept away through the recently intensified anti-corruption-campaign.31

More striking is the effect of the crash and the CCP response on one of the pillars of CCP rule. Most of the new private investors are from the middle class – professionals, state employees or businesspeople who invested the money they had saved for their children’s education, for buying housing, or as retirement savings. This middle class has benefited from two decades of boom and, therefore, has generally supported the CCP since the 1990s. Now the CCP might lose legitimacy with the rising doubts in its ability to control the economy or, more precisely, in its ability to create opportunities for the middle class to further accumulate wealth. In addition, part of the middle class had already been disturbed by the aforementioned anti-corruption campaign, which has interfered with business transactions and paralyzed government officials because of their fear of getting purged. Both – the effects of the stock market crash and of the anti-corruption campaign, as well as the obvious abyss of corruption and official dilettantism illustrated by the explosion of dangerous chemicals in the port of Tianjin on August 12, 2015 32 – might weaken the position of the CCP and its ability to enforce social peace in the face of rising discontent.

Endnotes

  1. This article started as an interview with the Italian website http://www.infoaut.org in early September 2015: http://www.infoaut.org/index.php/blog/approfondimenti/item/15426-crashing-stocks-la-trasformazione-cinese-arriva-ad-un-punto-di-svolta. The English and German versions can be found at http://www.gongchao.org.
  2.  http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user3303/imageroot/2015/07/20150708_chinavol1.jpg

3. Despite the slump, in early September the Chinese stock market index was still considerable higher than at the end of August 2014 (roughly 40 percent). For the development of the Shanghai Shenzhen CSI 300 Index see http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/SHSZ300:IND; observers see the development as an overdue "correction": http://www.ft.com/cms/s/3/b6b826c8-1c08-11e5-a130-2e7db721f996.html

4.  http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/02/business/worldbusiness/02yuan.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-02/27/content_5780066.htm

5. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/world/asia/10china.html; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/09/AR2008110900701.html

 

6.  On the "shadow" banks see http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_351-400/WP375.pdf. The local governments – unable to take out direct loans – have formed companies called "Local Government Financing Vehicles" (LGFV) to be able to borrow money and increasingly used the shadow banking sector: http://www.ibtimes.com/chinas-local-government-financing-vehicles-lgfv-7-things-you-should-know-about-chinas-local-debt; the shadow banking system accounts for 30 percent of all new credits since 2007: http://www.mckinseychina.com/putting-chinas-debt-into-perspective

7. "China has become indebted before it has become rich": http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/895604ac-10d8-11e4-812b-00144feabdc0.html; http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2015/03/05/is-chinas-1929-moment-coming; http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2014/07/china-s-debt-gdp-level

8. www.bloombergbriefs.com/content/uploads/sites/2/2014/09/EN-China_Financial_Data.pdf

9. In official numbers; some estimations are even lower; see, for instance, http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-08-26/china-stunner-real-gdp-now-negative-11-evercore-isi-calculates

10. On the "new normal" see http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-11/09/c_133776839.htm; http://en.people.cn/n/2014/1110/c90883-8807112.html

11. For instance, parts of the garment sector. On the development of wages see http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/05/23/seeking-help-for-chinas-labor-market

12. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2010-07/06/content_10069557.htm; http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2013/07/12/this-is-why-the-textile-industry-is-relocating-to-places-like-bangladesh

13. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-27/china-s-industrial-profits-fall-most-since-2011-as-economy-slows; http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/07/27/uk-china-economy-profits-idUKKCN0Q102M20150727

14 On "wasted" investments, i.e. misallocation of capital, see http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/002a1978-7629-11e4-9761-00144feabdc0.html; http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/1842793/solution-chinas-industrial-overcapacity-setting-more-factories

15 In order to boost exports, the Chinese government started devaluing its currency on August 11, 2015: http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/aug/11/china-devalues-yuan-against-us-dollar-explainer; http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/11/business/international/china-lowers-value-of-its-currency-as-economic-slowdown-raises-concerns.html?_r=0. The analogies to the development in Japan in the 1980s and after are striking: stimulus, debts, overcapacities, deflation, stagnation: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8d5eb8ae-5241-11e5-b029-b9d50a74fd14.html

16 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/baee0b5c-b1b1-11e4-8396-00144feab7de.html

17 The savings rate in China is the highest in the world (above 50 percent); the global average is 20 percent; see, for instance, http://en.people.cn/90778/8040481.html

18. In addition, the government has tried to release the financial pressure on local governments by a debt-to-bond swap scheme: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/21/us-china-debt-swap-idUSKBN0O60P22015052; http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-14/china-said-to-consider-adding-1-trillion-yuan-debt-swap-quotas

19. For the first time since 2012 – and it has lowered it several times since: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-27/china-cuts-interest-rates-reserve-ratio-in-bid-to-stem-slowdown; http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/26/business/international/china-interest-rates-stock-market-distress.html?_r=0

20. The housing bubble is linked to the stimulation of growth by local governments which appropriated rural land for low prices from farmers and sold it to property developers who built clusters of tower blocks. After the housing prices had multiplied in China since the mid-2000s (so that even the urban middle class had problems financing property), the government started measures to cool down the market in 2011. Prices have been stagnant or falling since: http://www.businessinsider.com/real-estate-crash-in-china-2012-5?IR=T. Another reason for the cooling down of the property market is the demographic change: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ca218cbc-7c63-11e4-9a86-00144feabdc0.html

21. On China’s economic performance see http://blogs.ft.com/ftdata/2014/10/08/chinas-leap-forward-overtaking-the-us-as-worlds-biggest-economy

22. While, officially, still 48 percent of population live in the countryside, observers estimate that only 20 percent of the labor force still work in agriculture – most of them middle aged or older. In addition, the whole population is aging, an effect of the One Child Policy started in the early 1980s, and every year fewer people enter the labor market: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/767495a0-e99b-11e4-b863-00144feab7de.html; http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/tide-turns-sichuan-rural-labourers-find-opportunities-closer-home

23. On these struggles see http://www.gongchao.org/en/texts/2014/new-strikes-in-china. The Chinese government, aware of the pressure and need to control these struggles through a combination of repression and concessions, has raised the minimum wage by an average of more than 10 percent a year since 2009 and plans further increases: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/01/us-china-salary-idUSBREA3004H20140401

24. It is important to note that the government has also reacted with increased repression directed at striking workers and their supporters, labor and environmental NGOs and feminist activists, in addition to the more well-known repression of "civil rights" lawyers.

25. On the problems of rebalancing see http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f8ed7dd8-841d-11e3-b72e-00144feab7de.html. The Chinese economy has already changed: the service sector accounts for 48 percent of total economic output, manufacturing and construction 43, and agriculture a mere 9 percent (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/eab80bda-5508-11e5-8642-453585f2cfcd.html).

26. Here the analogy with Japan reaches a limit because, in China, workers’ expectation of further improvements and their determination to fight for them seem much bigger than they were in Japan in the 1990s.

27. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/26/opinion/false-alarm-on-a-crisis-in-china.html, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/14/chinese-economy-western-markets-china. Some reports see more signs of crisis and paint a picture that is far different from the one official government statements suggest: "the patient is sick" in http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2015/08/28/2138656/guest-post-trying-to-throw-our-arms-around-the-sick-chinese-economy; http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-17/how-china-s-slowdown-is-worse-than-you-think. Other sources discuss a kind of "quantitative tightening" due to capital flight, and to the decrease in foreign reserves as a result of the currency devaluation, which in turn points to new problems: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-07/china-s-foreign-exchange-reserves-fall-in-august-on-yuan-support, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a8c9b500-555a-11e5-a28b-50226830d644.html, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/baee0b5c-b1b1-11e4-8396-00144feab7de.html

28. In addition, the number of shareholder companies is fairly small, and a large part of the shares (85 percent) is held by about 90 million small (private) investors – most of whom started investing only in the past two years. This means that less than 10 percent of Chinese households hold a portfolio (vs. 55 percent in the US), and they invest a small portion of their money in shares (about 15 percent). http://uk.businessinsider.com/statistics-on-chinese-invested-in-stock-market-crash-2015-7, http://uk.businessinsider.com/chinese-households-invest-little-in-stocks-2015-7?op=1?r=US&IR=T, http://uk.businessinsider.com/most-chinese-investors-and-corporations-are-not-invested-in-stock-market-2015-7?r=US&IR=T#ixzz3fPbUftPM

29. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/19/chinas-flight-of-capital-causes-global-ripples; http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1b7ae16e-4ff7-11e5-8642-453585f2cfcd.html

30. http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2015/07/27/chinas-collapsing-stock-market-underlines-need-for-new-normal-reforms

31.So far, not only have over a hundred cadres at the level of provincial governor or higher been punished, but also hundreds of thousands in lower ranks who are an important pillar of CCP rule: http://www.scmp.com/topics/xi-jinpings-anti-graft-campaign, http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/yw/201502/t20150212_51324.html

32. For an analysis of the explosion’s significance, see http://chuangcn.org/2015/08/tianjin-explosion

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In den Tagen der Panikverkäufe und platzenden Blasen wirkten die chinesischen Börsen wie Spielbanken, in denen beim Roulette auf mögliche Wirtschaftstrends gesetzt wurde. Hinter dem Auf und Ab der Kurse stehen wirtschaftspolitische Manöver der herrschenden Kommunistischen Partei Chinas (KPCh) und anderer Spieler sowie langfristige Entwicklungen des chinesischen Kapitalismus.1

Wie begann das Trara? Die chinesischen Aktienkurse sind seit Jahren volatil, begannen jedoch im November 2014 enorm zu steigen – auch im Vergleich zu anderen Ländern.2 Insgesamt legten die Kurse innerhalb von sechs Monaten um mehr als 100 Prozent zu, bevor sie am 12. Juni 2015 kollabierten. Die Regierung begann unter anderem, große Mengen von Aktien aufzukaufen, sagte Börseneinführungen ab und verbot Staatsunternehmen, Aktien zu verkaufen, um den freien Fall der Kurse zu stoppen. Erst nachdem die Hälfte der Aktien offiziell vom Markt genommen und viele der übrigen von staatlichen Agenturen aufgekauft worden waren, konnte der Absturz abgebremst werden. Die Kurse fielen jedoch weiter, mit kurzen Panikphasen um den 27. Juli und den 24. August, bis sie Anfang September etwa 40 Prozent unter dem Niveau vom 12. Juni lagen.3

Dies geschah im Rahmen eines Finanzsektors, der im Laufe der "Reformen" in China seit den 1970er Jahren weitgehend unter staatlicher Kontrolle geblieben ist und stärker als in anderen kapitalistischen Ländern nach außen hin abgeschottet blieb. Die Börsen in Shanghai und Shenzhen wurden erst 1990 und 1991 eröffnet, auch als Teil der Maßnahmen zur Restrukturierung der Staatsunternehmen. Bis Anfang der 2000er Jahre spielten sie jedoch eine untergeordnete Rolle. Dann bemühte sich die Regierung, den Finanzsektor den Erfordernissen der kapitalistischen Expansion besser anzupassen und stärker zu kommerzialisieren. Eine erste Aktienblase platzte 2007, als die Kurse nach Gerüchten, dass die Regierung die Zinssätze erhöhen und gegen kreditfinanzierte Spekulation vorgehen würde, zusammenbrachen.4 Im Zuge der Regierungsmaßnahmen gegen die Auswirkungen der globalen Wirtschaftskrise nach 2007 wurde der Finanzsektor ausgeweitet, insbesondere durch ein enormes – mit Krediten staatlich kontrollierter Banken finanziertes – Konjunkturprogramm.5 Im weiteren Verlauf der Krise wuchsen auch die Schattenbanken, die weitgehend außerhalb staatlicher Kontrolle agieren und für die Finanzierung sowohl privater Unternehmen als auch der Entwicklungsprojekte von Kommunen eine wichtige Rolle spielen.6

Schulden und Abkühlung

Seit 2008 wurden weitere staatliche Konjunkturprogramme aufgesetzt, vorwiegend mit Investitionen in den Bau- und Infrastrukturprojekte. In der Folge stiegen die Gesamtschulden von 158 Prozent des Bruttoinlandsprodukts (BIP) 2007 auf 282 Prozent 2014. Das schließt die hohen Schulden der Kommunen ebenso ein wie die der Staatsunternehmen, und diese Rückstände bremsen die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und das Wachstum.7 Um ausreichende Finanzmittel zu beschaffen, die für weiteres Wachstum und implizit auch die Verhinderung sozialer Proteste und politischer Instabilität benötigt werden, will die Regierung den Finanzsektor weiter liberalisieren. 2013 wurden neue Maßnahmen beschlossen, wie die Schaffung einer neuen Freihandelszone in Shanghai, Schritte zur Internationalisierung der Währung renminbi und eine weitere Deregulierung der Börsen in Shanghai und Shenzhen.8

Die Anzeichen einer wirtschaftlichen Abkühlung nehmen jedoch zu. Nach zwei Jahrzehnten mit Wachstumsraten des BIP von durchschnittlich etwa zehn Prozent im Jahr hat sich das Wachstum seit 2013 auf unter acht Prozent verlangsamt und schwankt in diesem Jahr zwischen sechs und sieben.9 Die Regierung hat die wirtschaftliche Entschleunigung bereits offiziell anerkannt und definiert die Situation seit 2014 als "Neue Normalität" (xin changtai). Der Begriff zeigt den beabsichtigten Wechsel des Entwicklungsmodells, von einer schnell wachsenden Exportwirtschaft zu einer ausgeglicheneren Ökonomie, aber er zeugt auch von dem Versuch der Regierung, die wirtschaftlichen Akteure zu beruhigen, welche die Auswirkungen des Übergangs fürchten10 Die Symptome der Abkühlung sind jedoch zahlreich und extremer als erwartet, und die Regierung hat Schwierigkeiten, die Auswirkungen im Griff zu behalten. Der Binnenkonsum ist weiterhin chronisch niedrig (trotz steigender Löhne), ebenso die Investitionen der Privatwirtschaft. Die Lohnentwicklung hat zu höheren Lohnstückkosten beigetragen, sodass einige chinesische Wirtschaftssektoren an Wettbewerbsfähigkeit verloren haben.11 In der Folge wurden Teile der Industrieproduktion in Provinzen des chinesischen Binnenlandes mit niedrigerem Lohnniveau verlagert, einige arbeitsintensive Kapazitäten gar ins Ausland.12 Außerdem sind die Profite in der Industrie zurückgegangen,13 und einige Sektoren leiden unter Überkapazitäten, die auf die hohen – und oft staatlich geförderten und "verschwendeten" – Investitionen zurückgehen.14 In letzter Zeit stagnierten die Exporte oder gingen gar zurück.15

Infusionen und Blasen

Um weitere Schulden und deren Auswirkungen auf Wachstum und Entwicklung zu umgehen, braucht die KPCh-Regierung neue finanzielle Mittel. Die riesigen Devisenreserven – Ergebnis der Handelsüberschüsse – stehen nicht mehr im selben Maße zur Verfügung, weil die Handelsbilanzen schwankten und die Reserven bereits zurückgegangen sind.16 Abhilfe könnten die immensen Sparvermögen der Mittelschicht schaffen,17 wenn diese als finanzielle Infusionen zum Beispiel für die verschuldeten Staatsunternehmen oder die defizitären Renten- und Krankenversicherungskassen verfügbar wären.18 Mit dem Umleiten dieser Sparvermögen in die Börsen könnten Schulden in Kapitalanlagen überführt und das ökonomische Anlagerisiko an Privatanleger weitergereicht werden.

Vor diesem Hintergrund führten mehrere Maßnahmen und Ereignisse zur Überhitzung der Aktienmärkte: Erstens lockerte die Regierung 2014 Beschränkungen kreditfinanzierter Aktienkäufe (margin trading). Zweitens wurde mehr "billiges" Geld verfügbar, nachdem die chinesische Zentralbank die Zinsraten am 21. November 2014 gesenkt hatte.19 Drittens waren Immobilien im letzten Jahrzehnt ein wichtiger Faktor für die Generierung von Wachstum, aber die Immobilienpreise sind seit 2012 stagniert oder gefallen, ein Zeichen, dass die Immobilienblase, die seit Mitte der 2000er Jahre entstanden war, Luft abließ. In der Folge waren 2014 größere Teile der Mittelschicht bereit, in Aktien statt in Immobilien zu investieren, um ihr Vermögen zu vermehren20 Viertens startete die Regierung im Herbst 2014 eine Medienkampagne für private Investitionen an den Börsen. In der Folge vertrauten die privaten Investoren der Regierung, ihrem Willen, den Kursanstieg zu unterstützen und ihrer Fähigkeit, den Markt zu kontrollieren. Mehrere Zehnmillionen Aktienportfolios sind seitdem eröffnet worden, und viele Aktienkäufe wurden in Erwartung steigender Kurse und hoher Gewinne mit Krediten finanziert.20

Die früher entstandene Immobilienblase wurde so von einer Aktienblase abgelöst. Die ersten Probleme und ein möglicher Kursabsturz deuteten sich bereits im Frühling 2015 an, und sogar die chinesischen Medien sprachen monatelang von einer "Blase" (pao mo). Aber erst Mitte Juni, nachdem die Regierung Schritte zur Einschränkung kreditfinanzierter Aktienkäufe angekündigt hatte, die Kurse daraufhin gesunken und erste Eingriffe zur "Rettung des Marktes" (jiushi) gescheitert waren, wurde aus Vertrauen Angst und aus Angst Panik, sodass viele Investoren Aktien zu immer niedrigeren Preisen verkauften.

Wendepunkt

Der Börsencrash geschieht in einer Zeit, in der das chinesische Entwicklungsmodell einen Wendepunkt erreicht hat, und der finanzielle Tumult spiegelt tieferliegende strukturelle Probleme der Wirtschaft und soziale Veränderungen und Spannungen in der Gesellschaft insgesamt wieder. China ist seit Anfang der 1990er Jahre zur zweitgrößten Wirtschaft der Welt und zur Zugmaschine globalen Wachstums geworden und steht heute für 15 Prozent des weltweiten BIP.21 Erstens wurde der Boom seit den frühen 1990er Jahren jedoch durch den Export von Konsumgütern angetrieben, die mithilfe "billiger" Wanderarbeit hergestellt wurden, und die Fundamente dieses Arrangements zerbröseln seit einiger Zeit. Exporte, also Erlöse durch den Verkauf von Waren an Wirtschaftsakteure in anderen Ländern, sind weiter ein wichtiger Faktor, aber sie sind nicht mehr die wichtigste Triebkraft. Seit der Krise ab 2007 und dem Konjunkturprogramm spielen vielmehr Investitionen in Infrastruktur und Immobilien diese Rolle – und die gründen auf Kredit und haben zum erwähnten rasanten Schuldenanstieg geführt.

Zweitens hat sich die soziale Zusammensetzung hinter dem Boom ebenfalls verändert. Die dynamischsten Wirtschaftssektoren Chinas – industrielle Fertigung, Bau und Dienstleistungen – sind immer noch auf die Arbeit der etwa 280 Millionen Wanderarbeiter_innen angewiesen. Der Mechanismus des Auffüllens vakanter (städtischer) Jobs durch "billige" Wanderarbeiter_innen und deren Rückkehr aufs Land in Zeiten von Krise und Arbeitslosigkeit – wie 1997/8 und 2008/9 – ist teilweise blockiert, weil viele Wanderarbeiter_innen sich mittlerweile dauerhaft in der Stadt niedergelassen haben. Zudem verlassen weniger Leute das Land, weil China inzwischen den sogenannten Lewis-Wendepunkt erreicht hat: der Überschuss an ländlicher Arbeitskraft – Quelle der Migration – kommt an sein Ende.22 Das hat zu einer Zunahme regionaler Arbeitskräfteknappheiten geführt, die bereits seit zehn Jahren auftreten.

Drittens fordern die zweite und dritte Generation der Wanderarbeiter_innen lautstark die Verbesserung ihrer Lebensbedingungen. Sie haben mehr Erfahrungen mit Organisierung und Protest und sind in der Lage gewesen, die Arbeitskräfteknappheit auszunutzen. Im Ergebnis ist die Zahl von Kämpfen der Wanderarbeiter_innen seit Mitte der 2000er Jahre deutlich gestiegen – mit der Folge kontinuierlicher Lohnerhöhungen.23 Das Billiglohnmodell ist zwar nicht verschwunden, aber es ist "von unten" unter Druck durch die gestiegene Macht der Wanderarbeiter_innen.

Viertens will die KPCh-Regierung indessen ihr Regime stabilisieren und braucht dafür weiteres Wirtschaftswachstum. Um den Anstieg der Arbeiterproteste zu stoppen, ist es bereit, materielle Zugeständnisse zu machen.24 Es propagiert die Transformation der Wirtschaft von einer, die auf Billigarbeit, Vertragsherstellung und Exporten beruht, zu einer, die von hoher (Hightech-)Wertschöpfung (upgrading) und einem großen Binnenmarkt angetrieben wird und weniger von Exporten abhängig ist (rebalancing).25 Die mit dieser Transformation verbundene wirtschaftliche Abkühlung war also erwartet worden und ist Grundlage der kürzlich verkündeten Politik der "Neuen Normalität". Entsprechende Bemühungen begannen jedoch bereits in den 2000er Jahren, wurden im Zuge des 12. Fünfjahresplans (2010–15) intensiviert und werden wohl auch das Thema des 13. Fünfjahresplans (2016–20) sein, an dem die KPCh derzeit arbeitet. Dies ist jedoch ein laufender Prozess mit offenem Ausgang, der weitgehend von (globalen) Krisen, den sozialen Kämpfen in China und den Versuchen der Regierung, diese zu managen, bestimmt wird.26

Wirtschaftliche Auswirkungen

Wir müssen abwarten, inwieweit der Aktiencrash Chinas Stellung in der Weltökonomie und den Prozess des "upgrading" beeinflussen wird. Trotz Crash und Abkühlung scheint die chinesische Wirtschaft nicht am Rande eines Kollaps zu stehen. Zeichen wirtschaftlicher Schwäche gibt es in verschiedenen Sektoren – wie Deflation in Folge von Überproduktion –, und eine "harte Landung" ist immer noch möglich, aber bisher zeigen die meisten Wirtschaftsindikatoren einen langsamen und kontinuierlichen Rückgang und keinen freien Fall.27 Die Finanzmärkte Chinas und der renminbi sind immer noch abgeschottet, und das gibt der chinesischen Regierung inmitten einer Krise mehr Kontrolle als Regierungen anderer Länder. Darüber hinaus sind die chinesischen Börsen und der Anteil von Vermögen, der in Aktien angelegt ist, im Vergleich zu den USA oder Europa relativ klein, sodass finanzielle Verluste und die Auswirkungen auf die sogenannte Realwirtschaft geringer ausfallen dürften, als die panischen Berichte zum Crash unterstellen.28

Der Crash wirkt sich jedoch auf die Funktion der Finanzmärkte in China aus. Chinesische Unternehmen und kommunale Projekte werden immer noch über die (staatlich kontrollierten) Banken finanziert, also über Schulden und nicht über die Börse. Der Versuch, private Vermögen in die Börse umzuleiten und so Schulden durch Anlagen zu ersetzen, ist erst einmal gescheitert. Die chinesischen Börsen sind zu Zombie-Märkten geworden, weil die Regierung sie mit Geld vollpumpt und so am Leben erhält, obwohl sie bereits scheintot sind und kaum mehr als Märkte funktionieren. Ausländische Investoren haben schon viel Kapital abgezogen – nicht nur im Zusammenhang mit den fallenden Börsenkursen.29 Es ist nicht klar, ob die Regierung in der Lage sein wird, das Vertrauen von in- und ausländischen Investoren wiederzuerlangen, die an marktgetriebenen Börsen spekulieren wollen. Die Probleme mit der Mobilisierung finanzieller Mittel für die Staatsunternehmen oder Sozialversicherungsfonds und mit dem Schuldenmanagement insgesamt mögen so noch zunehmen.

Macht und Legitimität

Die politischen Auswirkungen des Crashs könnten immens sein. Berichten zufolge ist die Position gewisser "Reformer" in der KPCh, die eine weitere Vermarktlichung wollen, durch den Börsencrash geschwächt, während die von "Konservativen", welche die starke Rolle des Staates und der Staatsunternehmen verteidigen, gestärkt wurden. Andere Beobachter sehen einen Fraktionskampf um Macht und Einfluss innerhalb des gegenwärtigen Regimes zwischen den sogenannten "Prinzlingen" hinter Präsident Xi Jinping, der strukturelle Reformen der "Neuen Normalität" verfolgt, und den "Populisten" um Premierminister Li Keqiang, der hinter der Aktienrallye stehen soll, mit der das Wirtschaftswachstum nach dem Platzen der Immobilienblase angekurbelt werden sollte.30 Die KPCh-Führung als Ganzes ist jedoch weder gegen weitere Liberalisierungen noch gegen strukturelle Reformen – nur für eine verlangsamte Geschwindigkeit, falls nötig –, und Rivalen und Störenfriede innerhalb der KPCh riskieren durch die kürzlich intensivierte Antikorruptionskampagne hinweggefegt zu werden.31

Bemerkenswerter sind die Auswirkungen des Crashs und der Reaktion der KPCh auf einen der Grundpfeiler der KP-Herrschaft. Die meisten privaten Anleger kommen aus der Mittelschicht – Fachkräfte, staatliche Angestellte, Geschäftsleute u.a.m., die Geld angelegt haben, das sie für die Ausbildung ihrer Kinder oder den Wohnungskauf oder die Altersversorgung zurückgelegt hatten. Diese Mittelschicht hat von zwei Jahrzehnten des Booms profitiert und deswegen seit den 1990er Jahren das Regime weitgehend unterstützt. Jetzt könnte die KPCh Legitimität einbüßen, weil Zweifel zunehmen an ihrer Fähigkeit, die Wirtschaft zu managen und der Mittelschicht Möglichkeiten der Bereicherung zu bieten. Ein Teil der Mittelschicht zeigt sich zudem durch die genannte Antikorruptionskampagne verunsichert, die zunehmend geschäftliche Transaktionen gefährdet und Behörden paralysiert, deren Beamte Säuberungsaktionen fürchten müssen. Die Auswirkungen des Börsencrashs und der Antikorruptionskampagne – wie auch der offensichtliche Abgrund von Korruption und Dilettantismus im Zusammenhang mit der Explosion gefährlicher Chemikalien im Hafen von Tianjin am 12. August 2015 32 – könnten die Position der KPCh schwächen und ihre Fähigkeit einschränken, in der Konfrontation mit den zunehmenden Protesten den sozialen Frieden durchzusetzen.

 

Endnoten

1. Dieser Artikel geht auf ein Interview mit der italienischen Webseite http://www.infoaut.org von Anfang September 2015 zurück: http://www.infoaut.org/index.php/blog/approfondimenti/item/15426-crashing-stocks-la-trasformazione-cinese-arriva-ad-un-punto-di-svolta. Die deutsche und die englische Fassung sind auf http://www.gongchao.org abrufbar.

2. http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user3303/imageroot/2015/07/20150708_chinavol1.jpg

3. Trotz des enormen Rückgangs lagen die chinesischen Kurse Anfang September immer noch um 40 Prozent höher als Ende August 2014. Zur Entwicklung des Shanghai Shenzhen CSI 300 Index siehe http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/SHSZ300:IND; Beobachter sehen die Entwicklung als überfällige "Korrektur":

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/3/b6b826c8-1c08-11e5-a130-2e7db721f996.html

4 .http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/02/business/worldbusiness/02yuan.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-02/27/content_5780066.htm

5. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/world/asia/10china.html; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/09/AR2008110900701.html

6. Zu den Schattenbanken siehe http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_351-400/WP375.pdf. Die Kommunen hatten Unternehmen gegründet, sogenannte "Local Government Financing Vehicles" (LGFV), um Kredit aufnehmen zu können, und wandten sich zunehmend an Schattenbanken: http://www.ibtimes.com/chinas-local-government-financing-vehicles-lgfv-7-things-you-should-know-about-chinas-local-debt; die Schattenbanken stehen für 30 Prozent aller neuen Kredite seit 2007: http://www.mckinseychina.com/putting-chinas-debt-into-perspective

7."China hat sich verschuldet, bevor das Land reich geworden ist": http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/895604ac-10d8-11e4-812b-00144feabdc0.html; http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2015/03/05/is-chinas-1929-moment-coming; http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2014/07/china-s-debt-gdp-level

8. www.bloombergbriefs.com/content/uploads/sites/2/2014/09/EN-China_Financial_Data.pdf

9. Nach offiziellen Angaben; andere Schätzungen liegen noch niedriger, siehe http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-08-26/china-stunner-real-gdp-now-negative-11-evercore-isi-calculates

10.Zur "Neuen Normalität" siehe http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-11/09/c_133776839.htm; http://en.people.cn/n/2014/1110/c90883-8807112.html

11. Zum Beispiel Bereiche der Textilproduktion. Zur Lohnentwicklung siehe http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/05/23/seeking-help-for-chinas-labor-market

12. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2010-07/06/content_10069557.htm; http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2013/07/12/this-is-why-the-textile-industry-is-relocating-to-places-like-bangladesh

13. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-27/china-s-industrial-profits-fall-most-since-2011-as-economy-slows; http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/07/27/uk-china-economy-profits-idUKKCN0Q102M20150727

14. Zu "verschwendeten" Investitionen, also der Fehlallokation von Kapital, siehe http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/002a1978-7629-11e4-9761-00144feabdc0.html; http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/1842793/solution-chinas-industrial-overcapacity-setting-more-factories

15. Um die Exporte anzukurbeln, hat die chinesische Regierung am 11. August 2015 die eigene Währung abgewertet: http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/aug/11/china-devalues-yuan-against-us-dollar-explainer; http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/11/business/international/china-lowers-value-of-its-currency-as-economic-slowdown-raises-concerns.html?_r=0. Die Analogien zur Entwicklung in Japan in den 1980er Jahren und danach sind bemerkenswert: staatliche Konjunkturprogramme, Schulden, Überkapazitäten, Deflation, Stagnation, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8d5eb8ae-5241-11e5-b029-b9d50a74fd14.html

16. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/baee0b5c-b1b1-11e4-8396-00144feab7de.html

17. Die chinesische Sparquote gehört mit über 50 Prozent zu den höchsten der Welt. Der globale Durchschnitt liegt bei 20 Prozent: http://en.people.cn/90778/8040481.html

18. Gleichzeitig versucht die Regierung, den immensen Schuldendruck der Kommunen zu lindern, indem diesen erlaubt wurde, eigene Anleihen auszugeben und die Finanzierung über Schulden durch die durch Anleihen zu ersetzen: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/21/us-china-debt-swap-idUSKBN0O60P220150521; http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-14/china-said-to-consider-adding-1-trillion-yuan-debt-swap-quotas

19. Zum ersten Mal seit 2012, und die Zinssätze wurden seitdem noch mehrmals gesenkt: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-27/china-cuts-interest-rates-reserve-ratio-in-bid-to-stem-slowdown; http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/26/business/international/china-interest-rates-stock-market-distress.html?_r=0

20. Die Immobilienblase geht auf die Wachstumsförderung lokaler Regierungen zurück, die Bauern auf dem Land Flächen billig abkauften und an Bauträger weiterverkauften, die dort Cluster von Wohnblöcken bauten. Nachdem sich die Immobilienpreise seit Mitte der 2000er Jahre vervielfacht hatten, hatte selbst die städtische Mittelschicht Probleme, Immobilien zu kaufen. Die Regierung ergriff ab 2011 Maßnahmen, um den Markt abzukühlen. Die Preise haben seitdem stagniert und sind zum Teil sogar gefallen: http://www.businessinsider.com/real-estate-crash-in-china-2012-5?IR=T. Ein weiterer Grund für die Abkühlung des Immobilienmarktes ist der demographische Wandel: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ca218cbc-7c63-11e4-9a86-00144feabdc0.html

21.Zu Chinas Wirtschaftsleistung siehe http://blogs.ft.com/ftdata/2014/10/08/chinas-leap-forward-overtaking-the-us-as-worlds-biggest-economy

22.Offiziell leben noch 48 Prozent der Bevölkerung auf dem Land, aber Schätzungen zufolge arbeiten nur noch 20 Prozent der Arbeitskräfte in der Landwirtschaft – und die meisten von ihnen sind in mittlerem Alter oder älter. Zudem altert die gesamte Bevölkerung, eine Folge der Ein-Kind-Politik, die Anfang der 1980er Jahre begann, und jedes Jahr treten weniger Menschen neu auf den Arbeitsmarkt: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/767495a0-e99b-11e4-b863-00144feab7de.html; siehe auch http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/tide-turns-sichuan-rural-labourers-find-opportunities-closer-home

23. Zu den Kämpfen siehe http://www.gongchao.org/en/texts/2014/new-strikes-in-china; http://www.gongchao.org/static/pdf/CHEN_2013_Arbeiterproteste-in-China_gongchao-org.pdf. Die chinesische Regierung spürt den Druck spürt und versteht, dass sie die Kämpfe mithilfe einer Kombination aus Repression und Konzession kontrollieren muss. Sie hat die Mindestlöhne seit 2009 um mehr als zehn Prozent jährlich angehoben und plant weitere Steigerungen: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/01/us-china-salary-idUSBREA3004H20140401

24.Es ist wichtig zu betonen, dass die Regierung auch mit verstärkten Repressionsmaßnahmen reagiert hat, die unter anderem gegen Streikende und ihre Unterstützer_innen, Nichtregierungsorganisationen in den Bereichen Arbeit und Ökologie sowie gegen Feministinnen gerichtet sind, abgesehen von dem bekannten Vorgehen gegen "Menschenrechtsanwälte".

25. Zu den Problemen des Wiederausgleichs (rebalancing) siehe http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f8ed7dd8-841d-11e3-b72e-00144feab7de.html. Die chinesische Wirtschaft hat sich bereits verändert. Der Dienstleistungssektor umfasst 48 Prozent der gesamten Wirtschaftsleistung, industrielle Fertigung und Bausektor 43 Prozent, die Landwirtschaft nur noch 9 Prozent: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/eab80bda-5508-11e5-8642-453585f2cfcd.html

26. Hier endet die Analogie zu Japan, weil die Erwartung weiterer Verbesserungen höher und die Kampfentschlossenheit der Arbeiter_innen in China größer zu sein scheint als die der Arbeiter_innen in Japan in den 1990er Jahren.

27. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/26/opinion/false-alarm-on-a-crisis-in-china.html, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/14/chinese-economy-western-markets-china. Einige Berichte erwähnen mehr Krisenanzeichen und zeichnen ganz andere Bilder, als diejenigen, die sich aus offiziellen Regierungsangaben ergeben: "der Patient ist krank" in http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2015/08/28/2138656/guest-post-trying-to-throw-our-arms-around-the-sick-chinese-economy; http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-17/how-china-s-slowdown-is-worse-than-you-think. Andere Quellen diskutieren eine Art "quantitative Verknappung" (quantitative tightening) durch Kapitalflucht und den Rückgang der Devisenreserven in Folge der Währungsabwertung, die wiederum zu neuen Problemen führt: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-07/china-s-foreign-exchange-reserves-fall-in-august-on-yuan-support, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a8c9b500-555a-11e5-a28b-50226830d644.html, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/baee0b5c-b1b1-11e4-8396-00144feab7de.html

28. Zudem ist die Zahl von Aktiengesellschaften in China relativ klein, und ein großer Teil der Aktien (85 Prozent) wird von etwa 90 Millionen Kleinanlegern gehalten, von denen die meisten erst in den letzten zwei Jahren auf dem Aktienmarkt aktiv wurden. Somit besitzen weniger als zehn Prozent der chinesischen Haushalte ein Aktienportfolio (gegenüber 55 Prozent in den USA), und diese investieren einen kleinen Teil ihres Vermögens (etwa 15 Prozent) in Aktien: http://uk.businessinsider.com/statistics-on-chinese-invested-in-stock-market-crash-2015-7; http://uk.businessinsider.com/chinese-households-invest-little-in-stocks-2015-7?op=1?r=US&IR=T; http://uk.businessinsider.com/most-chinese-investors-and-corporations-are-not-invested-in-stock-market-2015-7?r=US&IR=T#ixzz3fPbUftPM

29.  http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/19/chinas-flight-of-capital-causes-global-ripples; http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1b7ae16e-4ff7-11e5-8642-453585f2cfcd.html

30. http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2015/07/27/chinas-collapsing-stock-market-underlines-need-for-new-normal-reforms

31. Bisher sind nicht nur mehr als einhundert Kader vom Provinzgouverneur aufwärts bestraft worden, sondern auch Hunderttausende unterer Ränge, die eine wichtige Säule der KP-Herrschaft bilden: http://www.scmp.com/topics/xi-jinpings-anti-graft-campaign; http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/yw/201502/t20150212_51324.html

32. Eine Analyse der Explosion und ihrer Bedeutung findet sich unter http://chuangcn.org/2015/08/tianjin-explosion

 

Original: gongchao.org  &  infoaut.org

Der Beitrag China Crash (englisch/deutsch) erschien zuerst auf non.


Dispositiv II: Unterworfenes, verarbeitetes und aufgelöstes Wissen

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Eine längere Fußnote zu „Das deutsche Dispositiv“

Wir stellen uns seit geraumer Zeit das Wissen nicht mehr als eine „objektive“ oder auch nur konsistente Sache vor, welche „die Menschheit“ erwirbt und damit sich selber verändert. Wissen mag mehr oder weniger modellhaft ein unumkehrbares und (mehr oder weniger) unleugbares narratives Gut sein – die „Tatsache“ (der Begriff selbst ist eine Praxis des Wissens vom Wissen), dass die Erde rund ist und sich um die Sonne dreht, ist nicht mehr zu leugnen (außer von Paranoikern oder Schriftstellern, die etwa, wie Terry Pratchett eine „Scheibenwelt“ erfinden), ansonsten aber gilt es, so wie die alten Griechen zwischen dem Leben an sich, und dem gelebten Leben (bios) unterschieden, zwischen einem Wissen an sich (das, wie das Leben an sich eher transzendental zu verstehen ist) und dem wirkenden Wissen zu unterscheiden, das sich in einem unentwegten Anwendungs- und Transformationsprozess befindet.

Wissen – eine Funktion der Macht

Dieses Wissen ist weder an bestimmte Diskurse noch an bestimmte Sprachen noch an bestimmte Medien gebunden, wohl aber an Interessen, an Hegemonien und Strukturen. Das Wissen, mit einem Wort, ist in erster Linie eine Funktion der Macht. Dadurch unterwirft sich nicht nur sein „Inhalt“, sondern auch seine „Gestalt“. Nicht zuletzt wird, wenn es um die Realisierung von Macht geht, aus dem diskursiven Wissen das Bild oder das Narrativ. Und umgekehrt wird auch das unterdrückte und „verbotene“ Wissen in die Form von Bildern, Erzählungen, Riten usw. gebracht. Man kann dabei, zumindest als Sonderfall, mit Michel Foucault von „unterworfenem Wissen“ sprechen.

Foucault definiert das unterworfene Wissen auf der einen Seite als „Verschleierung“ – „Inhalte, die verschüttet, in funktionalen Zusammenhängen oder in formalen Systematisierungen verschleiert wurden“[1] – und auf der anderen Seite als „nicht-begriffliches Wissen, als unzureichend ausgearbeitetes Wissen, als naives Wissen, als hierarchisch untergeordnetes Wissen, als Wissen unterhalb des Niveaus der Erkenntnis oder der erforderlichen Wissenschaftlichkeit disqualifiziert fanden“[2].

Vereinfacht und drastisch gesehen gibt es also ein unterworfenes Wissen, das in der Begrifflichkeit und in der Verwaltung eingeschlossen ist, und ein unterworfenes Wissen, das aus Begrifflichkeit und Kontrolle ausgeschlossen ist. In gewisser Weise können wir also auch hier eine Teilung erkennen, die der von Beute und Gespenst in den Dingen entspricht.

Ganz nebenbei lässt sich so erkennen, dass es ein Wissen als Fundus, Repertoire, Lager oder Archiv nicht wirklich gibt; jedes Wissen muss auf eine spezielle Weise erobert und befreit werden. Das jedenfalls ist das Aktivum.

Das Passivum hingegen besteht in einer steten „Wiederkehr des Wissens“; es taucht gleichsam in immer neuen Verkleidungen, Auflösungen und Maskierungen an unerwarteten Stellungen – eben als „Gespenst des Wissens“ – wieder auf. Das Wissen als Beute kann nicht beliebig verwaltet und angewandt werden, und schon gar nicht unter den Verwertungsbedingungen des Kapitals. Denn so wie das Objekt, die Natur und schließlich auch das Subjekt verwandelt sich auch das Wissen zuerst in eine Ware (und konnte unter anderem dadurch der Emanzipation des Bürgertums dienlich sein) und dann in ein Element des Finanzmarktes, das sich bewegt, um Profit zu generieren.

Das Wissen, das zunächst eine feste Form in den Bibliotheken, den Universitäten und den Archiven annahm, eine subjektive Form in den „großen Geistern“ (einschließlich der kritischen Geister am Rand), das sich schließlich verflüssigte in den Diskursen und im Wissen über die Grenzen und die Widersprüche des Wissens, nimmt nun eine gleichsam gasförmige Gestalt an.

Das von der Macht bzw. den Mächten zurückgehaltene, verwaltete und begrifflich eingesperrte Wissen, und das von der Macht bzw. den Mächten verbreitete, aufgelöste und transformierte Wissen (in der verbraucherfreundlichsten Form von Entertainment schließlich) bewegen sich immer weiter auseinander. Das einzige, was sie phänotypisch aneinander bindet, ist das Wachstum.

Märkte des Wissens

Ist das Wissen als nicht nur ökonomisches Gut, sondern als Element der Kapitalisierung erkannt, muss zum „natürlichen“ Wachstum des Wissens, das wir einem menschlichen Wissensdrang zuordnen, den unsere Erzählungen fälschlich dem „Menschen an sich“ andichten, ein zyklisches, angeheiztes und manipuliertes Wachstum kommen. Diesem Wachstum entspricht eine ständige Ausdifferenzierung und Neustrukturierung der Märkte des Wissens. Und wie auf den anderen Märkten, erkennen wir auch auf den Märkten des Wissens nicht nur Formen inkludierender Attraktion (Wissen, das verspricht, gut zu sein für die Karriere, für den Status, für das Wohlbefinden etc.), sondern auch des Ausschlusses. Unnütz zu sagen, dass solcher Ausschluss nun nicht mehr unbedingt mit den Formen der alten Disziplinargesellschaft verwirklicht wird, sondern in einer Mischung aus ökonomischem Druck und kultureller Auflösung. Die soziale Maschine der Unterhaltung verwandelt die makrosoziale Mechanik des Ausschließens vom Wissen in eine mikrosoziale „Befreiung“: Das Wissen, das ich nicht bekomme, verwandelt sich in ein Wissen, das ich nicht brauche, in einem Bild bzw. einem Narrativ, das mir erklärt, um wie vieles leichter und besser ich ohne dieses Wissen lebe, welches sich in den Händen von uncoolen, komischen und erfolglosen Menschen befindet, oder in fernen Festungen des Wissens gut verwahrt ist.

Unterhaltung verweigert nicht einfach Wissen, sondern verwandelt es in die zweite Form von Foucaults „unterworfenem Wissen“. Oder anders gesagt: Unterhaltung verwandelt Diskurse in Dispositive.

Ausgehend von Foucaults Gebrauch des Begriffs Dispositiv fasst Giorgio Agamben zusammen:

„a) Es ist eine heterogene Gesamtheit, die potentiell alles Erdenkliche, sei es sprachlich oder nichtsprachlich, einschließt: Diskurse, Institutionen, Gebäude, Gesetze, polizeiliche Maßnahmen, philosophische Lehrsätze usw. Das Dispositiv ist das Netz, das man zwischen diesen Elementen herstellen kann.

b) Das Dispositiv hat immer eine konkrete strategische Funktion und ist immer in ein Machtverhältnis eingeschrieben.

c) Als solches geht es aus einer Verschränkung von Macht- und Wissensverhältnissen hervor.“[3]

Man könnte noch hinzufügen, dass das Dispositiv auf eine bestimmte Art mit „Positivität“ aufgeladen ist („Positivité“ als Begriffssvorläufer bei Foucault), das heißt die „Gestimmtheit“ zu einer Akzeptanz, einer Bereitschaft, einer ihrer selbst nicht gewahren Bewegung, entsteht aus einer Bejahung, man könnte vielleicht sogar sagen aus einer unbewussten Erwartung einer „Belohnung“. Das Dispositiv erzeugt eine Zustimmung, die ihrerseits auf Zustimmung hoffen darf. Die sich verstärkende Zustimmung verschleiert immer weiter das ursprüngliche Wissen, auch das ursprüngliche Nicht-Wissen natürlich. Positivität meint in diesem Fall aber auch eine (immerhin vage) Vorstellung von Fortschritt oder Verbesserung in der Geschichte. Oder etwas derb gesagt: Wer einem Dispositiv folgt, meint immer, vorwärts zu stürmen und nicht zurück zu weichen (auch dann wenn die Legitimierung durch ein Zurück zu alten Werten erzeugt werden mag). Aber diese Positivität ist, zweifellos und nicht beliebig zu kaschieren, auch ein Zwang. Zwar mag dieser Zwang nicht mehr in der gewaltsamen und hierarchischen Weise erlebt werden, wie es in der „Positiven Religion“ nach Hegel der Fall ist (und die sie fundamental und nicht unabscheulich von einer „natürlichen Religion“ unterscheidet), aber er ist noch im „unverbindlichsten“ Dispositiv (sagen wir: in einer Werbekampagne, die bestimmte, etwa haushälterische Eigenschaften mit Glücksversprechen durch den Gebrauch einer bestimmten Ware verknüpft) ausgeprägt genug, um ein Neben-Empfinden des Unbehagens – und damit das Gespenstische – zu erzeugen.

Wenn das Dispositiv nun in der Tat mit dieser Form der Positivität verbunden ist, das heißt also auch: mit einem Zwang, in der Biographie und in der Geschichte fortzuschreiten, dann enthält es automatisch nicht nur den Zwang gegenüber sich selbst, sondern auch den gegenüber anderen. Das Dispositiv weiß zwar nicht genau wo es herkommt, aber durchaus, wo hin es muss. Und so wie jede positive Religion den doppelten Zwang enthält, sich selbst zu unterwerfen und andere zu unterwerfen, so enthält das Dispositiv den doppelten Zwang, das eigene Wissen und das Wissen der anderen zu unterwerfen.

Die Herrschaft der Dispositive weitet sich also zwanghaft aus.

Als einfaches Modell eines Dispositives, scheinbar „harmlos“ insofern seine Auswirkungen begrenzt sind und „der guten Sache“, nämlich dem „Markt“, dienen, kann man die Werbekampagne ansehen. Sie erfüllt alle die Kriterien, die Agamben zusammengestellt hat. Alles, Bilder, „wissenschaftliche“ Diskurse, Gebäude, Mythen, Sprechweisen etc. können von ihr benutzt werden. Die doppelte konkrete strategische Funktion liegt auf der Hand: Der Absatz von Waren einer bestimmten Marke und die positive Veränderung des Status dieser Marke nicht nur auf dem Markt, sondern auch in der Kultur. Und schließlich ist die „Verschränkung von Macht- und Wissensverhältnissen“ nur allzu evident. Jede Werbekampagne ist die Entfaltung von unterworfenem Wissen.

Beim Übergang von der Disziplinar- in die Kontrollgesellschaft verwandeln sich immer mehr Diskurse (die Aushandlungen und versuchten Festschreibungen dessen, was als gut, richtig, wahr, vernünftig, wertvoll usw. angesehen wird und was nicht) in Dispositive („Werbekampagnen“, die keine Waren oder Dienstleistungen, sondern positive Gestimmtheiten in politischer, ökonomischer und kultureller Praxis vermitteln). Im Dispositiv weiß man nicht, wo die Macht und das Wissen herkommen, und wie sie sich verschränken, aber man bewegt sich in die „richtige“ Richtung.

So einfach es nun sein mag, eine Werbekampagne und was nach ihrem Vorbild von allerlei „spin doctors“, Image-Beratern, Media Experten etc. „gefahren“ werden kann, als Modell – vielleicht auch als Karikatur – eines Dispositivs anzusehen, so schwierig ist es dennoch, sich eine Gesellschaft unter der Herrschaft der Dispositive vorzustellen.

Macht und Wissen

Soviel jedenfalls ist klar: Das Dispositiv als Erbe und als Technik der Positivität will eine gesellschaftliche Situation nicht stabilisieren, sondern verändern. Ein einfaches, der „unsichtbaren Hand“ des Marktes abgeschautes Modell freilich könnte beschreiben, wie ein allgemeines „Brodeln“ der Dispositive eine Gesellschaft zwar wärmen aber doch auch homogenisieren würde. Denn, um zu den Werbekampagnen zurück zu kommen: Auch Dispositive stehen ja untereinander in Wettbewerb, begrenzen und neutralisieren sich gegenseitig. Die Dispositive, mit anderen Worten, spiegeln auch die Macht- und Wissensverhältnisse wider, die sie miteinander verknüpfen.

Eine „Herrschaft“ der Dispositive, wie sie eine kritische Haltung nun fürchten kann, ist demnach abhängig von der Verteilung von Macht und Wissen in der Gesellschaft, so wie aber zugleich jedes Dispositiv Macht, Wissen und ihre Verschränkung verändert.

Was ist es, was sich verändert? Durch die Dispositive und vermittels ihrer? Es ist die Funktion des Staates gegenüber „seiner“ Gesellschaft, die Realisierungsmöglichkeiten von Macht, die Techniken des Regierens und nicht zuletzt die Darstellungs-, die Repräsentationsformen von Herrschaft. Warum müssen sie sich ändern? Man kann dies aus den Krisen der nationalen Demokratien ebenso erklären wie aus den Transformationskrisen des westlichen Kapitalismus zum globalen, digitalen Neoliberalismus. Ebenso könnte man sagen, dass die Kapitalisierung der Politik eine neue Verschränkung von Macht- und Wissensverhältnissen benötigt. All dies würde sich decken mit Agambens zweitem Punkt, nämlich der „konkreten strategischen Funktion“ des Dispositivs.

Aber gerade mit dieser Funktion erlegen wir dem Dispositiv vielleicht eine Begrenzung auf, die es gar nicht hat, nämlich indem wir ihm immerhin überwiegend einen rationalen Einsatz durch ein traditionelles Subjekt von Macht und Wissen zuschreiben. Wie aber, wenn sich beides selbst im Zustand einer dispositiven Auflösung befänden? Wenn sich, zum Beispiel, das Dispositiv nicht im Sinne von „Kapitalisten“, nicht einmal im Sinne des Kapitals, sondern im Sinne einer Kapitalisierung entfaltete, und wie, wenn es nicht allein mehr oder weniger neues Instrument des Regierungshandelns würde (bis zu den Techniken des „Nudging“ als staatliche Form der Verhaltens-Werbekampagnen) sondern Regierungshandeln in gewissem Sinne auch ersetzte? Denn, wohlgemerkt: Die Rede ist am Ende nicht von der Herrschaft durch Dispositive, sondern von der Herrschaft der Dispositive.

Was an Macht und Wissen im Dispositiv zusammenkommt hat kein zentrales Steuerungs- und kein (demokratisches) Kontrollorgan. Der neoliberale Protagonist würde wohl auch hier sagen: Das regelt der Markt (wissend oder nicht, dass dieser Markt Schimäre, Narrativ, „religiöses“ Gespinst ist). Tatsächlich immerhin ist das Dispositiv durch das bestimmt, was an Macht und Wissen investiert wird. Wenn wir nun davon ausgehen, dass Macht und Wissen selber kapitalisiert sind, also Profit erwirtschaften, indem sie auf der einen Seite Reichtum und auf der anderen Seite Armut erzeugen, indem sie immer weiter Kapital auf- und Arbeit abwerten, dann können wir wohl annehmen dass „Herrschaft der Dispositive“ nichts anderes bedeutet als Herrschaft der Kapitalisierung.

Das Dispositiv, das wir in unserem Zusammenhang hergeleitet haben als Fortsetzung, Erweiterung und Ersetzung von Regierungshandeln und Markteroberung, und das wir in Widerspruch gesetzt haben zum Diskurs (dem Aushandeln und Abwägen, der „Meinungsbildung“ etc.) hat aber auch einen technischen und einen jurstischen Aspekt. So beschreibt der Duden „dispositives Recht“ als

„gesetzliche Regelungen, von denen im Einzelfall durch Vertrag (in den Grenzen, die durch die guten Sitten gezogen sind) abgewichen werden kann. So können z. B. die Parteien eines privaten Kaufvertrages abweichend von den gesetzlichen Gewährleistungsrechten in § 437 BGB einen Haftungsausschluss für Mängel der Kaufsache vereinbaren. Andererseits können die Rechte eines Käufers aber auch gegenüber den BGB-Regelungen verstärkt werden, z. B. durch eine Verlängerung der Verjährungsfrist oder durch Einräumung einer Garantie. Gegensatz: zwingendes Recht (lateinisch Ius cogens).“[4]

Dispositives Recht, mit anderen Worten, ist eines, dessen Regeln den Parteien, vor allem denjenigen mit der entsprechenden Macht, zur Disposition stehen. Man könnte wohl auch sagen, dispositives Recht sei eines, das nach Maßgaben von Macht, Wissen und ihrer Verschränkung dehnbar oder nutzbar sei. Noch einmal drastischer gesagt: Dispositives Recht ist das Recht der Macht, gegen die das „zwingende Recht“ (eben jenes, das für alle gleich gelten soll) schützen müsste. Dispositives Recht hebt also den „Zwang“ mitnichten auf, sondern verlagert ihn vielmehr außerhalb des Gesetzes, weshalb es uns auch kaum weiter verwundern kann, dass dieses dispositive Gesetz vor allem im Wirtschaftsrecht zur Anwendung kommt.

In einer Maschine ist das Dispositiv jene Anordnung der Elemente, die eine Steuerung und ihre Kontrolle ermöglichen. Die Anzahl der Dispositive also gibt Auskunft über die Steuerbarkeit, und damit die Produktivität und die „Kreativität“, welche in und an einer Maschine möglich sind. Auch hier haben wir es letztlich wieder mit einer strategischen Verwirklichung von Macht und Wissen in einem Bewegungsablauf zu tun.

Und wenn man schon bei der „Strategie“ ist, dann darf auch die militärische Bedeutung des „Dispositivs“ nicht fehlen. Dort nämlich beschreibt der Begriff den Status der Soldaten, die einer Armee zur Verfügung stehen, oder schlicht die „Kampfbereitschaft“ in technischer (wie auch „moralischer“) Hinsicht. In offiziellen Statements wird angesichts einer äußeren Gefahr stets vom „glaubwürdigen“ militärischen Dispositiv gesprochen, man könnte es mithin wohl auch als realisierbares Drohpotential begreifen.

Der soziologische Begriff des Dispositivs ist also nur auf den ersten Blick tiefgreifend vom juristischen, militärischen und technischen Begriff unterschieden. Die „strategische Absicht“, die „Verschränkung von Macht und Wissen“ sowie eine „heterogene Gesamtheit“ sind indes in allen vier Bereichen gleich. Nur die Grammatik wird im gesellschaftlichen, politischen und ökonomischen Bereich ungleich komplizierter, weil man es, im Gegensatz zu den anderen Bereichen, nicht so sehr mit zuvor entmachteten und an sich widerstandsunfähigen Objekten und klar definierten Subjekten der Macht und des Wissens zu tun hat, sondern mit polymorphen und dynamischen Elementen. Das Dispositiv kann nicht einfach Elemente benutzen und organisieren (so gern es dies auch täte); Dispositiv trifft auf Dispositiv.

Mythos und Dispositiv

Was also ist denn nun ein Dispositiv und wie zum Teufel konnte es zur „Herrschaft“ gelangen? Bei Foucault finden wir etliche Beispiele für Dispositive: das soziale Geschlecht, die Kontrolle des Wahnsinns, die Ecole Militaire als architektonisches Dispositi … Heißt das etwa, alles, was an Schnittstellen von Macht und Wissen in einer Gesellschaft aktiv sei, könne „Dispositiv“ werden – so wie alles, was in ihr gedacht, geträumt, gesprochen und erzählt würde, zum Mythos werden könne?

Tatsächlich erscheint der Zusammenhang von Mythos und Dispositiv, den, wie es scheint, bislang niemand in Augenschein nehmen wollte, von zentraler Bedeutung. Recht einsichtig wird das, wenn wir erst einmal wieder zu unserem Beispiel der Werbekampagne zurückkehren: So wie die soziale Absicht einer Werbekampagne ist, etwas zu verkaufen (und sei es ein Kandidat in einem Wahlkampf), so ist die semantische Absicht die Kreation eines Mythos. Der Mythos, der sich im Sinne von Roland Barthes über einem unauflöslichen Widerspruch (des Wissens oder/und der Macht) bildet und auf die Frage „Warum ist das so?“ die Antwort gibt: „Weil es immer so war, und weil es immer so sein wird“. Barthes selbst hat in „Mythen des Alltags“ einige Werbekampagnen als Produktion von Mythen beschrieben, aber auch „Dinge“ wie den Citroen DS (gesprochen De-esse, also „Göttin“).

Wenn also die „Positivität“ und im Anschluss daran das Dispositiv den Menschen dazu zwingt, eine direkt oder indirekt gewalttätige Bewegung in Geschichte und Gesellschaft auszuführen (geleitet von einer Verbindung von Macht und Wissen), dann vollzieht der Mythos als legitimierende Begleitung genau den entgegengesetzten Vorgang, nämlich die Projektion ins Über-Geschichtliche und Über-Gesellschaftliche. Beides trifft sich nur in eben jenem Zwang, der sich als solcher nicht erkennt. Beides entsteht aber auch aus demselben Grund. Nämlich der Reaktion auf unauflösbare Widersprüche in der gesellschaftlichen Praxis und in der kulturellen Deutung, oder, anders gesagt: Der Mythos wie das Dispositiv entstehen aus unauflösbaren Widersprüchen von Macht und Wissen (in einander und unter einander).

Dreieinigkeit und göttliche „oikonomia“

Aber sowohl Dispositiv als auch Mythos sind eigentlich nur Vorformen, Potentiale einer weiteren Lösung der Widersprüche. Diese „eigentliche“ Lösung können wir „oikonomia“ nennen, eine (neue) Ordnung des Hauses, wie wir sie von Aristoteles kennen. Diese oikonomia ist nicht die Ökonomie späterer Zeiten mit ihren Märkten und Lohn-Preis-Profit-Relationen, sondern eine durchdachte Zuordnung aller Objekte und Arbeitsabläufe zum Zwecke einer systemischen Perfektion. (Kein Wunder also, dass für die alten Griechen eine solche oikonomia immer auch etwas mit Schönheit zu tun hatte.) Oikonomia ist mithin immer eine äußere Ordnung, die einer inneren entspricht. Giorgio Agamben setzt die Einführung der „göttlichen“ oikonomia in die christliche Theologie mit der Entstehung eines unlösbaren Widerspruchs auf, nämlich mit dem Konzept der Dreieinigkeit Gottes (das im übrigen seinerseits notwendig wurde, um auf die Mensch / Gott-Widersprüche in der Christus-Figur zu reagieren – beides mithin, Dreieinigkeit und göttliche oikonomia notwendige Bestandteile eines monotheistischen Dispositivs, das dringlich von der natürlichen zur positiven Religion gewandelt werden musste). Um den Rückfall in die Mehrgötterei zu verhindern, dem sich starke Fraktionen entgegenstellten, musste zwischen den drei disparaten Erscheinungsformen, Vater, Sohn und Heiliger Geist, eine unauflösliche Bindung hergestellt werden. Sie sollte nach dem Willen ihrer Vertreter in eben der „oikonomia“, der Ordnung des göttlichen Hauses (als geschlossenes System) bestehen. Man versuchte, derb gesprochen, in einem paranoid gewordenen Himmel die Ordnung wieder herzustellen, indem man alles drei einsetzte: das Dispositiv (das Christentum musste sich ausbreiten, um glaubhaft zu bleiben), den Mythos (das ins Bild gebannte Gleichzeitige von Drei-Sein und Eins-Sein, unter anderem durch die ikonographische Zusammenführung verschiedener Abbildungscodes: Zeichen – Heiliger Geist, Symbol – Gottvater, Realität – der Mensch gewordene Gottessohn), und oikonomia (das Ordnung schaffende Arrangement). Das Dispositiv wurde zur strengen Kirche (einschließlich eines Kriegs- und Tötungsapparats), der Mythos zum Dogma, und die oikonomia wurde zur Ökonomie, in der sich nach und nach Schuld durch Schulden und Erlösung durch Zinsen ausdrücken ließ.

Es bleibt zu erwähnen, dass diese Transformation zwar eine ungeheure historische und kulturelle (und natürlich nicht zuletzt ökonomische) Dynamik entfaltete, letzten Endes aber nie wirklich „funktioniert“ hat. Einerseits handelte man sich auf jeder der drei Ebenen mit temporären Lösungen auch wieder neue Probleme ein. Im Dogma spukte das neue unauflösbare Widerspruchspaar von Sein und Handeln Gottes, aber damit auf fatale Weise auch des Menschen, die Kirche musste sich, da sie sich nicht erneuern konnte, spalten, und die oikonomia wurde als Ökonomie nicht bloß Abbild sondern auch Widerpart des Christentums. Schon die Kirche scheiterte, wie Jahrhunderte später die Demokratie auch, an einer Bändigung oder Bindung der Ökonomie im Stadium des Kapitalismus. (Wobei wir in beiden Fällen beim Scheitern auch eine Portion der Komplizenschaft mitdenken.)

Dispositiv, Mythos und Ökonomie

Denken wir uns also nun, die von Foucault und Agamben beschrittenen Pfade frech verlassend, eine andere Form der Dreieinigkeit, die von Dispositiv, Mythos und Ökonomie. Denken wir uns weiter, alle Elemente, alle Ideen, Maschinen, Interessen, Mächte, Bilder, Dienstleistungen und Waren, alle Gebäude, Kleidungen und Kunstgegenstände seien nicht durch Vernunft, nicht durch Natur oder Kultur, sondern durch das Zusammenwirken eben dieser dreieinigen Techniken von Macht und Wissen bestimmt. Was ist den dreien, außer dass sie alle aufgrund unlösbarer Widersprüche entstanden sind, außer, dass sie immer wieder neue Verbindungen von Macht und Wissen erzeugen, außer, dass sie historische, kulturelle und ökonomische Dynamik erzwingen, noch gemein? Man könnte es das Prinzip der Ausschließung nennen. Was Dispositiv, Mythos und Ökonomie erzeugen, duldet keinen Widerspruch und keine Alternative. Obwohl alles drei nicht durch das Dekret, nicht durch den einen Spruch des einen Herrschers, nicht durch die eine Erkenntnis und nicht einmal den einen Glauben entstanden ist, sondern sich, unter Berufung auf die heteronome Entstehung als „natürlich“ ausgeben können, als gewordenes und gewachsenes, erzeugt es den einen Weg, erzeugt es die eine Zukunft, hier als „Vorsehung“, dort als „Fortschritt“, und da eben als „Natur“.

Dispositiv, Mythos und Ökonomie sind nicht voneinander getrennte Elemente eines Systems, sondern in einander eingeschrieben, aus einander entwickelt, mit einander verbunden. Tatsächlich wurde ja die göttliche oikonomia, wie Agamben betont, als „dispositio“ ins Kirchenlatein übersetzt, dem Stamm des Begriffs „Dispositiv“.

„Der Terminus Dispositiv bezeichnet also etwas, in dem und durch das ein reines Regierungshandeln ohne jegliche Begründung im Sein realisiert wird. Deshalb schließen die Dispositive immer einen Subjektivierungsprozess ein, da sie ihr Subjekt selbst hervorbringen müssen“ (Agamben)[5]. Auf einer eher pragmatischen Ebene kann das, als Beispiel, bedeuten, dass das Dispositiv nicht zur Lösung eines Problems sondern zur Bearbeitung eines Widerspruchs benutzt wird. Nehmen wir den Widerspruch zwischen Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit in einer demokratischen und kapitalistischen Gesellschaft, vielleicht sogar den Widerspruch zwischen Demokratie und Kapitalismus selbst. Da sich weder der eine noch der andere Widerspruch politisch und diskursiv auflösen lässt, „helfen“ nur die drei beschriebenen Elemente, die Verwandlung des Diskurses in das Dispotiv (was einerseits bedeutet: weniger „sichtbares“ Regierungshandeln, andererseits aber auch „unbedingteres“, der Legitimierung und sogar Legalisierung entzogenes Regierungshandeln), der Mythos (das ideale Subjekt löst den Widerspruch, und mehr noch kann es die „Marke“ als Mythos, so als wäre die einzig mögliche Antwort auf den Widerspruch zwischen Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit ein Automobil der Marke Volkswagen) und die Ökonomisierung: Auf einem Markt, auf dem sowohl Freiheit als auch Gerechtigkeit eine „Ware“ bzw. eine Ressource sein kann, werden die beiden, sagen wir in Form von Bewegungs- und Reglementierungsfreiheit (die „negative Freiheit“ des Neoliberalismus) und in Form einer ökonomischen Akkumulation (dem Ausgleich von Wettbewerbsnachteilen) miteinander tauschbar. Unnütz zu sagen: Dispositiv (den Widerspruch zwischen Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit ertragen ohne zu revoltieren), Mythos (den Widerspruch zwischen Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit in einem Bild von trans-realer Bedeutung auflösen) und Ökonomisierung (den Widerspruch zwischen Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit als Tauschvorgang im System von Lohn, Preis und Profit fassen) bleiben untereinander widersprüchlich und „funktionieren“, insofern sie gleichzeitig wirken aber nichts voneinander wissen. Zwischen ihnen vermittelt indes eine neue Form der „oikonomia“, die wir, weit gefasst und zunächst wenig präzis, „die Medien“ nennen. Damit unterstellen wir einer weiteren „heterogenen Gesamtheit“, dass sie, während es auf der Ebene der Diskurse nach wie vor und mehr denn je um die Anrichtung eines „Scherbenhaufens“ geht, wie Hans Magnus Enzensberger einst in Bezug auf das damalige Medium der „Wochenschau“ im Kino urteilte,[6] auf der Ebene von Dispositiven, Mythen und Ökonomisierungen (einschließlich der aktuellen Kapitalisierungen) Ordnung(en) schafft. Eine semantische oikonomia in der neuen Dreieinigkeit der Macht, eine oikonomia, das heißt „eine Gesamtheit von Praxen, Kenntnissen, Maßnahmen und Institutionen, deren Ziel es ist, das Verhalten, die Gesten und die Gedanken der Menschen zu verwalten, zu registrieren, zu kontrollieren und in eine vorgeblich nützliche Richtung zu lenken“ (Agamben).[7]

Dispositiv, Ökonomisierung und Mythos stehen in einer Geschichte; was sich gleich bleibt, das sind vor allem der Umstand ihrer Heterogenität und gewisse Techniken der Bearbeitung. Alles kann Mythos werden, sagt Roland Barthes, aber nicht alles wird Mythos; doch alles, was Mythos wird, wird es aus ähnlichen Gründen (die unauflösbaren Widersprüche) und zu ähnlichen Zwecken (eine Akzeptanz, die der Macht dient und unter anderem der Unterwerfung des Wissens nutzt). Alles kann ökonomisiert werden und alles kann kapitalisiert werden, und doch ist es für Ökonomie und Kapital stets notwendig, ein „außen“ zu haben, etwas, das sich für eine äußere oder eine innere Landnahme eignet. Daher wird wohlweislich nicht alles ökonomisiert, oder es werden neue Objekte und Areale (wie die Kunst, wie das „Dispositiv der Kreativität“) erzeugt, die sich wiederum ökonomisieren lassen. Und schließlich kann alles Dispositiv werden, doch selbst in einer Herrschaft der Dispositive wird nicht alles Dispositiv sein, da die „alten Formen“ der Ordnung, der Glaube, die Repräsentation der Herrschaft oder die Legitimierung und Rationalisierung von Macht in der Demokratie, nicht einfach verschwinden (es sei denn, man befände sich in dystopischer Science Fiction). So werden wir „Neoliberalismus“ beschreiben können als einen Wandel von Dispositiv, Mythos und Ökonomisierung.

Neoliberalismus – ein „Systemwechsel“

Damit wird, nebenbei, vielleicht auch klar, warum wir uns so schwer damit tun, den Neoliberalismus als „Diskurswechsel“ oder sogar als „Systemwechsel“ politischer und ökonomischer Regierung zu beschreiben, obwohl beinahe jeder, Opfer wie Nutznießer, ahnt, dass es genau auf dies hinausläuft. Nämlich auf die Umwandlung des Konsum-Kapitalismus in einen oligopolistischen Finanzkapitalismus und dann die Umwandlung der Demokratie zunächst zum Zwischenstadium der Postdemokratie und dann neue heteronome Regierungsformen, die partialfaschistische ebenso wie medienpopulistische, technokratische, terroristische und sogar anarchistische Elemente aufsaugen wird. Wir sehen augenblicklich, einigermaßen ohnmächtig, der Erzeugung von Dispositiven, Mythen und Ökonomisierungen zu, welche diesen Übergang geschmeidig vermitteln und beschleunigen. Um ihren Zweck zu verstehen, ist es hilfreich, die unlösbaren Widersprüche der „alten“ Systeme, Demokratie und Kapitalismus, zu analysieren und auf der anderen Seite die Interessen der neuen, sich gleichsam rasend akkumulierenden und transformierenden Mächte zu betrachten. Umwandlungen sind a/. notwendig und werden b/. nicht nur im Interesse sondern auch mit den Mitteln der neuen ökonomisch-politischen Herrschaft oder Hegemonie durchgeführt. Beides ist durchaus Gegenstand von Kritik, Dissens und mehr oder weniger wissenschaftlicher Behandlung. (Das Wissen rebelliert auch, was dies anbelangt, doch immer wieder gegen seine Unterwerfung.) Doch ein großer Teil der Bevölkerung ist offenbar bereit, diese Umwandlung mitzutragen, und es handelt sich dabei nicht einfach nur um eine verblödete, verrohte und manipulierte Masse, die sich zur „Tyrannei der Mehrheit“ aufgefordert fühlt. Möglicherweise kann man einen „klammheimlichen“ Diskurs ausmachen, in dem man sich, ohne es explizit zu formulieren, darüber einigt, dass der Tausch weniger Demokratie für mehr Sicherheit ebenso in Ordnung geht wie weniger Demokratie für mehr ökonomische Kraft. Mindestens ebenso wahrscheinlich aber ist es, das Wirken von Dispositiven, Mythen und Ökonomisierungen am Werk zu sehen, was in der Tat Kritik und Aufklärung vor neue Aufgaben stellte, denn dann wäre eine rationale Widerlegung des Nutzens der beiden Gleichungen des Demokratie-Abbaus kaum erfolgreich.

 

[1] Michel Foucault: Kritik des Regierens. Schriften zur Politik. Berlin 2010. S.13

[2] ebd.

[3] Giorgio Agamben: Was ist ein Dispositiv? Zürich/Berlin 2008. S. 9

[4] Stichwort „dispositives Recht“ in: Duden Recht A-Z. Fachlexikon für Studium, Ausbildung und Beruf. 2. Aufl. Mannheim 2010.

[5] Agamben a.a.O. S. 24

[6] Hans Magnus Enzensberger: Die Welt als Scherbenhaufen. In: Einzelheiten. Frankfurt/M 1962

[7] Giorgio Agamben a.a.O. S. 24

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Der Beitrag Dispositiv II: Unterworfenes, verarbeitetes und aufgelöstes Wissen erschien zuerst auf non.

Saal 6 – 1

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Aus einem pinkfarbenen, jericholauten Spielzeugklavier, das zwischen Arm und Brustkorb eines blondgelockten siebenjäh-rigen Jungen steckt, der die ganze Zeit mit seinem ebenfalls blondhaarigen Zwillingsbruder mit luftdicht verpackten Jelly Bean Bonbons auf den schachbrettartig angeordneten Boden-fliesen des Kundenberatungszentrums der Esperanto Bank eine Art Monopoly spielt und ab und zu das Klavier direkt an sein rechtes Ohr hält, um eine scheinbar stur eingeübte Disco-tanznummer innerhalb eines Radius von vier Metern abzuzie-hen, dringt eine zu nervenaufreibendem Leiern reduzierte Instrumentalversion des Popklassikers Saturday Night Fever der Gibb Brüder. Mike, der schon hoch aufgeschossen und für sein Alter entsetzlich dick ist, trägt ein Basecap mit Rammstein-Logo, einen knielangen, warm wattierten Wetter-schutzmantel von Jack Wolfskin und gelbe Gummistiefel, er artikuliert oder akzentuiert andauernd hochfrequent Ge-räusche, als kämen sie von einem knurrenden Hund, reibt sich periodisch mit den Handflächen die averculine Nase, während die Mutter – praktisch immun gegen (non)konversationale Standardablenkungen ihrer beiden Kinder – ein (nervenauf-reibendes) Gespräch mit einer Bankangestellten führt; Mikes Speicheldrüsen über fluten seine Mundhöhle, seine Lippen liegen beidseits um ein Jelly Bean Bonbon mit Blaubeer -

weiterlesen: saal6-1

Der Beitrag Saal 6 – 1 erschien zuerst auf non.

Marx’s Value Theory Revisited. A ‘Value-form’ Approach

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The above analysis may be summarised as follows:
 
a) Marx formulated a monetary theory of value; this theory constitutes a radical critique of (a rupture from) the Ricardian theory of value (conceived as ‘labour expended’). It constitutes the Marxian economic theory par excellence, which shall be further developed by Marxists, as it is te only theory that can critically interpret contemporary capitalism.
 
b) The dominant interpretation of Marx’s theory by Marxists is ‘Ricardian’, in the sense that it ignores Marx’s monetary approach, it misinterprets Marx’s elaborations on the abstraction level of ‘surplus-labour’ (forgetting Marx’s warning that ‘capital has not invented surplus-labour’), and focuses on the weak points of Marx’s writings, like, e.g., the ‘transformation of values into prices of production’.
 
c) The existence of ambiguities or contradictions should be expected not only for Marx but also for any theory that emerges as a radical theoretical critique of an established system of thought.
 
d) Marxian theory is attenuated when Marxists do not comprehend Marx’s ambivalences towards Political Economy, i.e. the existence of conceptual contradictions and, much more important, of a second, non-Marxist, discourse in his writings. Every ‘sanctifying’ attitude towards Marx, presenting him as the blameless master who never made a single false step, practically obscures the scientific substance of Marx’s main Discourse, his Critique of Political Economy. It thus fetches up a ‘Ricardian Marxism’, which means nothing less than the displacement of Marxist theory by alien to it theoretical discourses (Classical Political Economy or other forms of bourgeoisie theoretical discourse). The duty and role of the Marxist theoretician should be, among other things, to clarify these dead ends in Marx’s work, in the course of further developing Marxist theory.
 
full  text  here
 

Der Beitrag Marx’s Value Theory Revisited. A ‘Value-form’ Approach erschien zuerst auf non.

The Transcendental Force of Money. Social Synthesis in Marx.

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Instead of defining money as a means or tool for social communication and exchange, Marx determines money as the really existing universal and as existing form of an abstract social mode of domination. His conception is the consequence of transforming Kant’s concept of “thinghood” into a social and material concept, which most scholarship overlooks. As such, it confronts us with the problem of how we should think of really abstract social relationships and a form of social reproduction that is itself abstract because social reproduction depends upon the money form. In this paper I first analyze Marx’s early concept of money as the thing itself, after which I reconstruct how this aspect is finally turned into a social concept in the Grundrisse.

pdfThe Transcendental Force of Money final draft

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Der Beitrag The Transcendental Force of Money. Social Synthesis in Marx. erschien zuerst auf non.

Blog-Post for Cyborgs

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We are all cyborgs now. To the point where this reality no longer appears at all striking. As so perfectly pictured in Alex Rivera’s film Sleepdealer (2008), we are biological machines strapped to information machines which together function as war machines. It is remarkable how much of our cyborg existence Donna Haraway anticipated. In this essay, I want simply to extract some pertinent themes from four of her books and from an extended interview conducted by Thyrza Nichols Goodeve. I will stress her connection to Marxist thought, not to deny her significance as a feminist writer, but to supplement it.

Donna Haraway was born in the forties, trained as a biologist, and radicalized during the Vietnam war years. Lodged at the History of Consciousness program at the University of California, Santa Cruz in 1980, Haraway is, on her own admission, a product of both cold war techno-science and the struggle in and against its imperial consequences.

One thing that distinguishes Haraway from many other progressive intellectuals of her time is that her background is in the sciences rather than the humanities or social sciences. While she occasionally makes use of Marcuse, I think a more profound influence on her work is that of Joseph Needham, the English Marxist biologist, to whom she devoted a fair chunk of her doctoral thesis and subsequent first book. Needham might stand in here for a lost tradition of intersections between critical theory and the natural sciences, whether of a Marxist or feminist bent.

Feminism diverted her from the life sciences. Haraway: “Feminists re-appropriate science in order to discover and to define what is ‘natural’ for ourselves. A human past and future would be placed in our hands. This avowedly interested approach to science promises to take seriously the rules of scientific discourse without worshipping the fetish of scientific objectivity.” (SCW23)

Science? Technology? Goddess preserve us! There are plenty of feminisms that try to take their stand against techno-science from without. Haraway: “Feminist theory has repeatedly replicated this ‘natualizing’ structure of discourse in its own oppositional constructions.” (PV257) A useful attribute of feminist science studies is that it tends not to make the assumption that there is something inherently radical about philosophy, or culture, or play or poetry over and against the scientific and technical. It does not take sides in advance within the existing intellectual division of labor.

It is, among other things, a practical critique of that division of intellectual labor. “Destabilizing the positions in a discursive field and disrupting categories for identification might be a more powerful feminist strategy than ‘speaking as a woman.’” (PV310) It retains a sort of double discomfort, asking critical questions in a scientific zone, and speaking knowledgeably about actual sciences in a humanities zone.

This is irritating, and usefully so. Feminist science studies persistently recasts the objectivity claims of the sciences, and does so, to make it worse, without dismissing the scientific endeavor. This is irritating in another way as well. Haraway: “Marx insisted that one must not leap too fast, or one will end up in a fantastic utopia, impotent and ignorant. Abundance… is essential to the full discovery and historical possibility of human nature. It matters whether we make ourselves in plenty or unfulfilled need, including need for genuine knowledge and meaning.” (SCW68).

There can be no retreat into the superstructures when there is no food, shelter or safety. The production and reproduction of our species-being, whatever it may be, has to be a central concern of any critical knowledge. Given the rising inequality, poverty and hunger in twenty-first century California, to which the state has responded by mirroring its great universities with a series of equally great prisons, questions of material need return at the heart of the empire.

Haraway’s California is that part that is still a land of surplus, where some more complex questions about food arise other than its insufficiency. Haraway tells some archetypal California stories about food. One involves a religious studies professor who prepares a meal for the department party, the centerpiece of which is a feral pig he shot with an arrow. Complex debates ensue about ritual, ethics, impossible ecologies, and so on.

Such stories are like metonymic fragments of Marx’s metabolic rift. Molecules – in this case proteins – lack enclosing loops back through any sort of dynamic equilibrium. Haraway eschews any easy answers on either of these questions, and makes a wry nod to “the contradictory, thick quality of what we mean when we say ‘California.’” (HLL42)

They are all the same real questions. Here in a contemporary, ramified form, is what Alexander Bogdanov called the tragedy of the totality, a vast yet molecular process that only reveals its contours when something goes wrong, when there is a metabolic rift, of which there are now many, from feral pigs to feral carbon.

Haraway has on occasion described herself as an illegitimate daughter of Marx, and “something of an unreconstructed and dogged Marxist.” (MW8) She remains attentive to how relations congeal into apparently natural things. “Property is the kind of relationality that poses as the thing-in-itself, the commodity, the thing outside relationship, the thing that can be exhaustively measured, mapped, owned, appropriated, disposed.” (MW134) As we shall see, this becomes in her work a useful starting point for understanding how distinctly twenty-first century modes of property and technology are organized.

Unlike many other Marxists, Haraway insists on including nonhuman actors in what would be an otherwise relentlessly human category of that-which-labors. “The actors are not all ‘us.’” (HR66) Techno-science explodes the already wobbly partition between object and subject, nature and culture, apparatus and labor.

Marx may have shown how the commodity is full of labor, but the categories of chimerical objects, those mash-ups of flesh-tech, has much expanded, even if there is still a tendency for the fetish of the thing to obscure the relations of its making. Hence the world can now appear as a vast accumulation not just of commodities or spectacles but of ‘big data’ or ‘selfish genes.’

Haraway tries to keep in view the relations of production that the fetish of the commodity obscures. “I believe wealth is created by collective practice, figured by Marx as labor, but needing a messier metaphoric descriptive repertoire.” (MW94) There is a fetishism in Marx of labor itself – man-with-hammer – that needs attending to as well. If one takes the labor point of view to be what is central to Marx’s work, then what, in the age of techno-science, might now constitute such a point of view?

If Marx proceeded through a critique of the dismal science of political economy, Haraway works through a rather more lively if no less difficult science – biology. “I have always read biology in a double way – as about the way the world works biologically, but also about the way the world works metaphorically.” (HLL24) One of the many functions of biology is defining the limits of what can be said about the potentials of the human, about our species-being. Is there a ‘human race’, or are some races not fully human? And if all races are human, what might the human become?

It is not that biology is reducible to culture and politics. Rather, “the material-semiotic tissues are inextricably intermeshed.” (MW218) Haraway expands the object of critique from political economy to the life sciences, which are no less implicated in the production of the infrastructural givens of the contemporary commodity-world. This adds an essential dimension, if critique is going to grasp – such a primate metaphor! – Marx’s no less full-bodied metaphor of metabolic rift, and flesh it out.

There have been three basic metaphors of causality of the human in the modern period: race, population and gene. Each has its dissenters, critics and utopian or dystopian writers. Each has its genuine scientists caught up in substitutions drawn from social organization which color and overshoot the process of producing evidence. Each also has its ideologues and moral entrepreneurs.

Race causality held that accumulated cultural differences are somehow carried in the blood. Even among progressives, the very category of race could create a fear of race mixing. Haraway: “The evolution of language, the progress of technology, the perfection of the body, and the advance of social forms seemed to be aspects of the same fundamental human science. That science was constitutively physiological and hierarchical, organismic and holist, progressivist and developmental.” (MW233)

A common response is a welter of attempts to categorize and characterize the races, arranged in some sort of hierarchy. Differences of culture or power become expressions of an order of nature. Haraway: “No wonder universal nature has been a less than appealing entity for those who were not its creators and its beneficiaries.” (MW237)

To which one might add that the temptation to overcome a supposed biological destiny of race, by severing the social from biological being altogether, is and remains a powerful temptation. It has the unfortunate side effect of cutting critical thought off from thinking biology as a techno-science with powerful and perhaps increasing abilities to create new unequal relations for the production and reproduction of life.

While popular racialism lives on, the substituting of racial for other kinds of difference did not survive in biological science. In the postwar years, after the debacle of racialized Nazi biology, and in the wake of new research methods, the basic metaphor of population causality arose in its place. A population is a semi-permeable group within a species. There may be as much variation within a population as between. Each may nevertheless be a pool which contain adaptations that are more or less successful.

Populations are not types in a hierarchy; nor are they sets. Each is constantly in flux in changing environments. The metaphysical shift is from a hierarchy of self-same types, where miscegenation at the boundary produces less viable instances, towards a different way of figuring difference and similarity. Populations are internally differentiated but formally equivalent in relation to each other.

Population became a central figure in the modern synthesis, which brought together naturalists, geneticists and experimentalists in a new kind of biological science and culture. Haraway: “This was a scientific humanism that emphasized flexibility, progress, cooperation, and universalism.” (MW238) It broke with the language of race and blood. It stressed the flexible and plastic nature of the human condition, and its capacity to change through education. The human can be socially self-constructing. Actual differences in power, such as the colonial relation, are elided by what ought to be: the ‘family of man.

The organizational challenges of post-war capitalism put on the agenda the question of the limits to the adaptive nature of the human. Primate studies became a way of conducting experiments and building theories aimed at the adaptation of the human to the rising complexity of technics and organization.

Primate researchers focused on two linked topics: sex and dominance. The male primate fights with other males for access to reproduction. Alongside interest in observing primates in their ‘natural’ setting, were experiments on the primate as an embodiment of drives to sex and power, to see how adaptable its species-being was to the office politics of living in cages and pressing levers for food.

The primate was an experimental subject who could yield insights into techniques for regulating sexuality and power in the modern world for human primates too. Rather than repressing desire or the will to power, technologies and therapies could help the human primate adapt. It’s a small step from the study of primate behaviors to the hormones that supposedly regulate them, and then on to the construction of a techno-science of intervening in the hormonal regulation of primate sexuality – particularly that of humans. The contraceptive pill is here the great techno-science success story.

Population causality naturalized the patriarchal family. Its origin myth is of man the hunter. It is man who is assumed to be the maker of tools, the inventor of elaborated social organization and hence of language. It is man who is curious, who explores, while woman is home yanking yams from the dirt with babies on her teats. This figure was supplemented rather belatedly by woman the gatherer, in some cases as a result of the work of feminist researchers.

Haraway has paid particularly close attention to the role of field studies of natural primate populations in legitimating some elements of the family of man story. The figures of the headman, the sexual division of labor, woman as burdened by children, all pass back and forth from science to culture as substituted figures. Through a study of the basic metaphor of biological economy, Haraway hones her critique on the foundations of postwar American liberalism.

That liberalism’s finest hour was its efforts to overcome, in both science and culture, the benighted effects of the category of race. Haraway wants to push on from that self-congratulatory ethos. “I believe that this capacity of reproducing the Same, in culpable innocence of its historical, power-charged specificity, characterizes not just me but people formed like me, who are liberal, scientific, and progressive…” (MW242)

The problem with the liberal family of man is that “what’s not collected in a reproductive family story does not finally count as human. For all the… emphasis on difference, this is the grammar of indifference, or the multiplication of sameness.” (MW242) A functional causality reigns: that which survives is functional; that which is functional survives.

The liberal family of man gave way to the neoliberal ‘selfish gene’ of socio-biology, and the basic metaphor of gene causality. The population regime took as its units of thought individual bodies and their social groups. The gene becomes the controlling code which uses both bodies and groups for its own ends. The causal metaphor is still functional, but the unit to which it applies is now molecular: The gene that survives is functional because the function of the gene is to survive. “My genes, my self, my investment, my future. It’s much more strictly capitalist.” (HLL152)

Such a science is the product not only of a certain naturalizing of the exchange economy, but also of powerful technologies which produce the gene itself as an artifact in a database. Haraway: “something peculiar happened to the stable, family-loving, Mendelian gene when it passed into a database….” (MW244)

The gene becomes one of the units of currency of the era of ‘big data’. Genomics and informatics merge. The gene can exist in a variety of media, from software to wetware, and some in between. Nature starts to yield not the authoritarian causality of race hierarchies or patriarchal families, but the exchange causality of property in a purified form.

The genetic database is at once about the genes of specific individuals, but also sub-units of that code, and at the other extreme, about our species-being. The design of such a database shapes what can be compared, what kinds of labor can most easily be performed, but meanwhile the gene becomes a thing separated from a totality and accorded its own agency. Meanwhile sub-disciplines of biological science, such as genetics or population biology, start to fork off and coalesce around much more differentiated apparatus, practices and objects of knowledge.

The construction of the gene as an object of techno-science is just one component in an important shift in the practices of substitution between organizational levels. Haraway: “Nineteenth century scientists materially constituted the organism as a laboring system, structured by a hierarchical division of labor, and an energetic system fueled by sugars and obeying the laws of thermodynamics. For us, the living world has become a command, control, communication, intelligence system… in an environment that demands strategies of flexible accumulation. Artificial life programs, as well as carbon-based life programs, work that way. These issues are about metaphor and representation, but they are about much more than that.” (MW97)

Ideology is productive. The shift from thinking organization as energy systems alone to a combination of energy and information systems, enables not only new kinds of science, and technology, and power, but also opens up a space for their critique. Interestingly, some of the new modes of substitution producing both ideology and knowledge might no longer be metaphorical so much as algorithmic, a kind of software (Manovich) and database (Azuma) model of knowledge.

Haraway sees genetic code and computer code as a new kind of fetishism that are partly, but not entirely, legible to the old Marxist and Freudian versions. One might call it the fetish of the program, a new kind of code causality, of which gene causality is but one instance. It is not entirely reducible to either authoritarian or exchange causality, although it has features of both.

By way of illustration, Haraway points to an issue of Mamalian Genome journal which offered its readers a representation of the contents of the chromosomes of a mouse, under the headline, “the Complete Mouse (some assembly required).” (MW98) Code becomes the master layer in the stacked protocols by which an organization is managed. In genetics, code becomes the part via which a whole can be reductively understood. In place of messy bodies, the clean execution of command and control, although as we shall see there are code-based sciences where such a reduction is not easily made.

Commodity fetishism is when relations between people take on the features of relations between things. Collective labor is what hides behind of the commodity. But perhaps it is not so easy to separate labor and thing. Haraway wants to broaden the fetish concept a little. “Curiously, fetishes – themselves ‘substitutes’, that is, tropes of a special kind – produce a particular ‘mistake’; fetishes obscure the constitutive tropic nature of themselves and of worlds.” (MW136) A fetish is a naturalizing of the very thing whose ‘nature’ needs calling into question, but while it may be limiting, it may like ideology be peculiarly productive: “There are amazingly creative aspects to commodity fetishism.” (HLL92)

Gene technology is implicated in commodity fetishism, but maybe also in “another and obliquely related flavor of reification that transmutes material, contingent, human and nonhuman liveliness into maps of life itself and then mistakes the map that its reified entities for the bumptious, nonliteral world.” (MW135) Haraway’s détournement of the fetish repurposes it.

Rather than the commodity fetish, she asks about the corporeal fetish. How do bodies appear as autonomous things against a background of invisible non-bodies? In commodity fetishism, the apparent world of things, governed by the code of exchange value, obscures social relations among people and the production of use value. In corporeal fetishism, the apparent world of bodies, governed by the code of the gene, obscures the tangle of both human and nonhuman processes that produce life.

In corporeal fetishism, the gene becomes a source of value as a kind of thing-itself, or perhaps code-itself. “So the fetishist sees the gene itself in all the gels, blots, and printouts in the lab, and ‘forgets’ the natural-technical processes that produce the gene and genome as consensus objects in the real world.” (MW146)

An abstraction replaces the concrete; the map becomes the territory. “Gene fetishists ‘forget’ that the gene and gene maps are ways of enclosing the commons of the body – of corporealizing – in specific ways, which, among other things, often put commodity fetishism into the program of biology at the end of the Second Millennium.” (MW148)

Just as the commodity fetish makes all things property to be exchanged, so too the corporeal fetish makes all of life a thing to be commodified through ownership of its code. “Genomics ‘globalizes’ in specific ways. Species-being is materially and semiotically produced in gene-mapping practices, just as particular kinds of space and humanity were the fruit of earlier material-semiotic enclosures.” (MW163) Private property produces the split between commodities and the labor that makes it; Intellectual property produces the split between the gene and the organism that makes it.

What was in Needham’s day biology’s commons of research materials becomes increasingly commodified. The ‘mutation’ of the private property form into strictly controlled ‘intellectual property’ makes whole new classes of things available for commodification. “Like the stigmata of gender and race, which signify asymmetrical, regularly reproduced processes that give some human beings rights in other human beings that they do not have in themselves, the copyright, patent and trademark are specific, asymmetrical, congealed processes – which must be constantly revivified in law and commerce as well as in science.” (MW7) Intellectual property grounds a new kind of class power.

A patent defines what is nature and what is not. An artifact of ‘nature’ cannot be patented. For that to happen, nature has to be mixed with labor. Patent is a site of struggle over what counts as subject and what as object. Haraway’s famous example is DuPont’s OncoMouse, the first patented mammal, specifically engineered for the study of breast cancer. (And now itself an obsolete, discontinued ‘product’).

All sorts of organisms are now integrated into a strange techno-nature meant to support human life, or at least those parts of it that can be commodified. Not only mice but dogs and all sorts of other beings are our ‘companions’ within techno-science. In place of the liberal-humanist family, quite another kind: “the technoscientific family is a cyborg nuclear unit, ”now that “life as a system to be managed.” (MW152)

What kind of critical agency is possible in the world of OncoMouse? Do lab rats belong to the working class? Should battery hens be unionized? Should one have the right to share in the surplus produced by one’s cells, even when those cells are not in you body? Consider the case of Henrietta Lacks, an African-American tobacco worker who died of cervical cancer. Cells taken from her body, without her knowledge or consent, were cultured and used in all kinds of research long after her death, from the polio vaccine to AIDS treatments and gene mapping. Those cells proved not only useful for research but profitable for medical business, while her descendants could not even afford health insurance. How is one to think the molecular agencies of such a story?

The figure which it famously proposed as a node of agency is the cyborg, in her ‘Manifesto for Cyborgs.’ “Like any important technology, a cyborg is simultaneously a myth and a tool…” (PV139) It is not the labor point of view, as if labor existed independently of the apparatus with which it is entangled. It is not women’s point of view, as if one could speak of it as a universal subjective perspective, existing prior to the social and technical relations in which it meshes.

Cyborgs are affinities rather than identities, hybrids of human and other organics, information systems, ergonomic laboring, producing and desiring. Cyborgs are monsters, or rather demonstrations, in the double sense of to show and to warn, of possible worlds. “As monsters, can we demonstrate another order of signification? Cyborgs for earthly survival!” (SCW4)

In place of the “god-trick” of speaking as if one had access to a portal to the absolute, the cyborg is a kind of ironic myth, a heretical counter-story to the human as pre-given. “Blasphemy protects one from the moral majority within, while still insisting on the need for community.” (SC149) Like the Marxist-feminist critic inside the research university, the cyborg is always an insider and outsider to techno-science, which after all is pretty much the case now for all of us. “I think the way I work is to take my own polluted inheritance – cyborg is one of them – and try to rework it.” (HLL103)

The cyborg isn’t an innocent figure. “The main trouble with cyborgs, of course, is that they are the illegitimate offspring of militarism and patriarchal capitalism, not to mention state socialism. But illegitimate offspring are often exceedingly unfaithful to their origins. Their fathers, after all, are inessential.” (SCW152) Cyborgs are a kind of orphan, even if in a more troubling sense that parentage is not lost or forgotten but never quite existed, even though “the cyborg… doesn’t have a mother, but it does have a matrix.” (SCW129) The cyborg is a contemporary kind of conceptual personae.

Haraway: “Too many people, forgetting the discipline of love and rage, have read the ‘Manifesto’ as the ramblings of a blissed-out, technobunny, fembot.” (HR3) Surely this stems from the persistence of the ideological pull of the figure of nature, and an inability to think and feel through the emerging forces of production as anything other than poisoned product of techno-science.

Haraway: “From One Dimensional Man (Marcuse 1964)…. the analytic resources developed by progressives have insisted on the necessary domination of technics and recalled us to an imagined organic body to integrate our resistance…. But a slightly perverse shift of perspective might better enable us to contest for meanings, as well as for other forms of power and pleasure in technologically mediated societies.” (SCW154) Perhaps it would be possible to sense a web of human and nonhuman agents, more a mechanically and digitally reproducible compound eye than a single labor point of view.

Perhaps this point of view could be broader than that of labor, and not separate out in advance production from reproduction. Perhaps it could also include something a bit distinct from either, a kind of activity that neither produces nor reproduces, but proposes other means of doing either, or neither, or both. Could it even include the hacker class as a distinctive point of view not entirely reducible to labor? One might start here with the notion of organization, rather than production, as a ‘basic’ level of analysis, but look aslant at its unquestioned functionalism.

There is no real traction to be gained from trying to base a critique on nature versus culture, or the human versus the machine, nor is there leverage in play versus labor. In an era where there is money to be made from all sorts of effort people put in to voluntarily creating and sharing information, then labor itself is an unstable category. Haraway: “we are living through a movement from an organic, industrial society to a polymorphous, information system — from all work to all play, a deadly game.” (SCW161)

Information is more than a powerful metaphor extended via substitution into an explanatory causality for the world, or even for the cosmos. It becomes a powerful means of organizing worlds. Haraway: “communications science and modern biologies are constructed by a common move – the translation of the world into a problem of coding, a search for a common language in which all resistance to instrumental control disappears and all heterogeneity can be submitted to disassembly, reassembly, investment, and exchange.” (SCW164)

It’s a matter of seeing this as at once an actuality, as an ensemble of real phenomena, and yet also as historical, as the product of certain kinds of labor, or more specifically of techno-science as a central way that power works in this stage of the commodity economy – whatever it might be.

It was prescient of Haraway to notice, and early on, that “the new communications technologies are fundamental to the eradication of ‘public life’ for everyone.” (SCW168) The reduction of a wide range of processes, and not just labor, to a thing, or in this case to code, supports a vast extension of private property relations.

The monstrous omens Haraway detected in the late twentieth century came to pass: “A major social and political danger is the formation of a strongly bimodal social structure, with the masses of women and men of all ethnic groups, but especially people of color, confined to a homework economy, illiteracy of several varieties, and general redundancy and impotence, controlled by high-tech repressive apparatuses ranging from entertainment to surveillance and disappearance… The only way to characterize the informatics of domination is as a massive intensification of insecurity and cultural impoverishment, with common failure of subsistence networks for the most vulnerable.” (SCW169-172) And so it came to pass, only it came to be called, by Franco Berardi and others, precarity.

Creating any kind of knowledge and power in and against something as pervasive and effective as the world built by postwar techno-science is a difficult task. It may seem easier simply to vacate the field, to try to turn back the clock, or appeal to something outside of it. But this would be to remain stuck in the stage of romantic refusal.

Just as Marx fused the romantic fiction that another world was possible with a resolve to understand from the inside the powers of capital itself, so too Haraway begins what can only be a collaborative project for a new international. One not just of laboring men, but of all the stuttering cyborgs stuck in reified relations not of their making.

God is dead, and so too is the Goddess. The disenchanting corrosion of all that is solid into the molecular abrades more than one way. If there is no thing-in-itself, no scientific-realist absolute, then there’s no prior and originary subject for a social movement, either. We are always and already insiders.

Haraway: “Feminisms and Marxisms have run aground on Western epistemological imperatives to construct a revolutionary subject from the perspective of a hierarchy of oppressions and/or a latent position of moral superiority, innocence, and greater closeness to nature. With no available original dream of a common language or original symbiosis promising protection from hostile ‘masculine’ separation, but written into the play of a text that has no finally privileged reading or salvation history, to recognize ‘oneself’ as fully implicated in the world, frees us of the need to root politics in identification, vanguard parties, purity, and mothering. Stripped of identity, the bastard race teaches about the power of the margins…” (SCW176)

What needs reworking is the struggle of labor in and against nature. Haraway: “Humanistic Marxism was polluted at the source by its structuring ontological theory of the domination of nature in the self-construction of man and by its closely related impotence to historicize anything women did that didn’t qualify for a wage. But Marxism was still a promising resource in the form of epistemological feminist mental hygiene that sought our own doctrines of objective vision. Marxist starting points offered tools to get to our versions of standpoint theories, insistent embodiment, a rich tradition of critiques of hegemony without disempowering positivisms and relativisms, and nuanced theories of mediation.” (SCW186)

The cyborg point of view is shaped in part by social movements around labor, race, gender, sexuality and indigenous rights. The cyborg point of view is shaped in part by the sciences, by struggles to produce objective knowledge of the world, complete with substitutions transposed into it from the dominant forms of organization.

The cyborg point of view has at least one other component: the point of view of the apparatus itself, of the electrons in our circuits, the pharmaecuticals in our bloodstreams, the machines that mesh with our flesh. The machinic enters the frame not as the good or the bad other, but as an intimate stranger. Apparatus, like sensation, is liminal and indeterminate – an in-between. It is an inhuman thing, neither object nor subject.

One of its special qualities as such may however be to generate data about a nonhuman world. The apparatus renders to the human a world that isn’t for the human. An apparatus is that which demonstrates some aspect of a monstrous, alien world. An apparatus yield aspects, particular monstrosities, which never add up to that consistent and absolute world that is remains the God, or Goddess, of all realists.

An apparatus affords the real, material and historical form of mediation. I take up the significance of this in Molecular Red through a reading of Haraway’s colleague Karen Barad and former student Paul Edwards, who show the centrality of thinking the cyborg-apparatus for understanding techno-science today. Elsewhere I follow the same line of thought to Paul B Préciado. For while there has been a turn towards a revival of scientism and claims for the virtues of a universal rationality, these bypass the more difficult business of grasping how science is actually produced.

Hence the centrality today of Haraway’s work, in which thinking the messy business of making science fully embraces its implication in nets of corporate and military power, its processing and reinforcing of metaphors not of its making, and its dependence on a vast cyborg apparatus. The strength of her work is in not abandoning the struggle for knowledge under such difficult conditions and retreating into mere philosophy.

References

PV Donna Haraway, Primate Visions (Routledge 1990)

MW Donna Haraway, Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium (Routledge 1997)

HLL Thyrza Goodeve, How Like a Leaf: An Interview with Donna Haraway (Routledge, 1999)

HR The Haraway Reader (Routledge, 2003)

SCW Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs and Women (Routledge 2013)

 

taken from here

Der Beitrag Blog-Post for Cyborgs erschien zuerst auf non.

Capitalism in the Web of Life: an Interview with Jason W. Moore

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Partway through Capitalism in the Web of Life, Jason W. Moore provides the imperative for a complete theoretical reworking and synthesis of Marxist, environmental, and feminist thought by asserting: “I think many of us understand intuitively – even if our analytical frames lag behind – that capitalism is more than an “economic” system, and even more than a social system. Capitalism is a way of organizing nature.”

Kamil Ahsan spoke with Moore about his book Capitalism in the Web of Life (Verso), released last month, to grapple with his new challenges to old assumptions.

Kamil Ahsan: What was the impetus for Capitalism in the Web of Life?

Jason W. Moore: I wanted to come up with a framework that would allow us to understand the history of the last five centuries in a way that was adequate to the crisis we face today. For the past four decades, we’ve had a “Green Arithmetic” approach to crisis. When we’ve had an economic or social crisis or any other kind of crisis, they all go into one box. Then we have an ecological crises – water or energy or the climate – that go into another box.

So for roughly the past four decades, environmentalists and other radicals have been raising the alarm about these crises but never really figured out how to put them together. Environmental thinkers have been saying one thing and then doing another – they claimed that humans are a part of nature and that everything in the modern world is about our relationship with the biosphere, but then when they got around to organizing or analyzing, it came down to “Society plus Nature,” as if the relationship was not as intimate and direct and immediate as it is.

KA: The premise of this book is that we need to break down the “Nature/Society” dualism that has prevailed in so much of Red and Green thought. Where did this idea come from, and why is it so thoroughly artificial?

JWM: The idea that humans are outside of nature has a long history. It’s a creation of the modern world. Many civilizations before capitalism had a sense that humans were distinct. But in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, this very powerful idea emerged – that is embedded in imperialist violence and dispossession of peasants and a whole series of recompositions of what it meant to be a human, particularly divisions around race and gender—that there was something, in Adam Smith’s words, called “civilized society,” which included some humans.

But most humans were still put into this category of “Nature,” which was regarded as something to be controlled and dominated and put to work – and civilized. It sounds very abstract, but the modern world was really based on this idea that some group of humans were called “Society” but most humans go into this other box called “Nature” with a capital N. That’s very powerful. That didn’t come about just because there were scientists, cartographers or colonial rulers who decided it was a good idea, but because of a far-flung process that put together markets and industry, empire and new ways of seeing the world that go along with a broad conception of the Scientific Revolution.

This idea of Nature and Society is very deeply rooted in other dualisms of the modern world: the capitalist and the worker, the West and the rest, men and women, white and black, civilization and barbarism. All of these other dualisms really find their taproots in the Nature/Society dualism.

KA: What is the importance of breaking this dualism, especially in terms of how you reconceptualize capitalism as being “co-produced,” as you say, by human and extra-human natures?

JWM: It is important to understand that capitalism is co-produced by humans and the rest of nature, especially in order to understand the unfolding crisis today. The usual way of thinking about the problems of our world today is to put social, economic and cultural crises into the rubric of “social crises” – and then we have ecological crises and that’s climate and everything else. Today, we’re increasingly realizing that we can’t talk about one without the other, but that’s actually been the reality all along.

We need to overcome this dualism so we can build our knowledge of the present crisis, a singular crisis with many expressions. Some, like financialization, look to be purely social, and others, like the potential sixth extinction of life on this planet, appear to be purely ecological. But in fact those two moments are very closely linked in all sorts of interesting ways.

Once we understand that those relations are central, we begin to see how Wall Street is a way of organizing nature. We see the unfolding of problems today – like the recent turbulence in Chinese and American stock markets – as wrapped up with bigger problems of climate and life on this planet in a way that even radical economists are not willing to acknowledge. This has an impact on our politics. We are seeing today movements – such as food justice movements – that say we need to understand this transformation and it has to do with a right to food in an ecological sense, but also a cultural and democratic sense, and these cannot be separated out.

The problem with the “Green Arithmetic” of “Society + Nature” is this weird separation of environmental justice from social justice, environmental sustainability from social sustainability, ecological imperialism from regular imperialism – even though anyone who knows the history of imperialism knows that it is always about “who are we going to value” and “what groups of society are we going to value?” Once we stop this adjectival promiscuity, we see that imperialism was always about how humans and the rest of nature were wrapped up with each other.

I think then we can practically start to make new alliances with different parts of the world’s social movements that are disconnected – between peasant movements and workers’ movements, between women’s movements and the movement for racial justice. There is a common root. The reason why putting together what I call a “singular metabolism” of humans in the web of life is so crucial – it allows us to start making connections between social moments and ecological moments.

KA: In direct opposition to the Nature/Society binary, you pose a new synthesis, the “oikos.” What is that and how does that take us to a deeper analysis of capitalism?

JWM: At the core of radical thought is something that violates our emphasis on history and relations between humans and the web of life. What happened is this core idea of Nature as outside of human relations as pristine, as nature without a history. That leads to this sense of Nature is there and we need to protect it because if we don’t, the apocalypse is coming. It gets part of what’s going on correct, but it does what radicals have otherwise always been good at: naming the system wrong.

Radicals talk about the interaction between humans and the rest of the nature, but don’t name the relation of life-making that produces both environment and species. Humanity evolves through a series of environment-making activities that transforms not only landscapes but also human biology. For instance, the harnessing of fire allowed human ancestors to develop smaller digestive systems and treat fire as a sort of external stomach.

One of the big ideas in this book is that Nature in general has many patterns that are relatively constant—the Earth rotating in an orbital pattern around the Sun—but Nature is also historical.

With the oikos, we are talking about a relation of life-making, and we are naming this relation that gives rise to multiple ecosystems that include humans. Humans are always making their environments and in the process, making their relationships with each other and their own biology. The structures of power and production, and crucially of reproduction, are part of that story of how we go about making landscapes and environments, and how those environments are making us. However, our vocabulary and concepts are hard-wired in this dualism. We need to crack this dualism and offer some new concepts.

KA: Very early on in the book, you cite Marx’s observation that industrialization was turning “blood into capital.” You go on to talk about this terrifying transformation of the work of all forms of nature into value. What forms of Nature has capitalism historically appropriated and what is capitalism’s trend with previously unexploited natures?

JWM: Capitalism is a weird system, because it’s not really anthropocentric in the way that Greens usually talk about. It’s anthropocentric in a narrow way which is that humans work within the commodity system, which is based on exploitation: the worker works four hours to cover his or her own wages and then another 4-10 hours for the capitalist. That’s one dimension that Marx focused on. But he was aware of a wider set of dimensions.

Capitalism treats one part of humanity as social – the part of humanity that is within the cash nexus and is reproduced within the cash nexus. But –  and this is the counter-intuitive part – capitalism is also an island of commodity production and exchange within much larger oceans of appropriations of unpaid work/energy. Every work process of say, a worker in Shenzhen, China, or in Detroit 70 years ago in an auto plant, depends on appropriating the unpaid work/energy of the rest of nature. Capitalism is, above all, a magnificent and destructive system of  “the appropriation of women, nature and colonies,” to use Maria Mies’ great phrase.

The problem of capitalism today is that the opportunities of appropriating work for free – from forests, oceans, climate, soils and human beings – are dramatically contracting. Meanwhile, the mass of capital floating around the world looking for something to invest in is getting bigger and bigger. The view of capitalism in this book speaks to something that is dynamic about the present situation and will feed into an increasingly unstable situation in the next decade or two. We have this huge mass of capital looking to be invested and a massive contraction of opportunities to get work for free. This means that capitalism has to start paying its own costs of doing business, which means that opportunities for investing capital are shrinking. There’s all this money that nobody has any idea what to do with.

What happened in the radical critique is two parallel lines. One, the world is coming to an end, which is the planetary apocalypse view of John Bellamy Foster. Then there’s the other view of capitalism, that it has an underconsumption or an inequality problem. But each of these two arguments is incomplete without the other, and they need to be put together. And when you bring together the ecological into the theory of economic crisis or the analysis of social inequality, the terms of understanding economic boom and bust and inequality begin to change, and vice versa. Part of that is that the core issues of social inequality, along class, race, and gender lines, have everything to do with how capitalism works in the web of life.

KA: Let’s turn to the labor process, the cornerstone of capitalist exploitation in classical Marxist thought. You argue that Marx felt that it’s not just wage labor but the unpaid work and energies of both humans, especially women, and extra-human natures that has been central to capitalism. And you also note that we live in a world where increasingly, we seem to pit wages and jobs against the climate, which is a false dichotomy. How do we begin to move away from this binary you’re trying to break?

JWM: I went to the core of Marxist thinking to tease out a new interpretation that is consistent with how Marx thought about it. Value is one of the most boring things that any Marxist can talk about – to utter the words “the law of value” certainly makes my eyes glaze over. But all civilizations have a way of valuing life. That’s not unique to capitalism. What capitalism does is say that well, labor productivity within the cash nexus is what counts and then we’ll devalue the work of women, nature, and colonies. This turns inside-out the usual Marxist argument. There is a kind of law of value in capitalism that is a law of “cheap nature” or a law of devaluing the work of humans along with the rest of nature in order.

I grew up in the Pacific Northwest while this kind of politics was unfolding. On one side you had conservationists who, rightly so, wanted to protect old-growth forests. And on the other side, you had the bourgeoisie but also labor unions which said, well, we need jobs.

This is changing. It’s becoming clear, even for many big businesses, that climate change is going to fundamentally alter the conditions of making a profit. We can see this around food. The modern world is built on cheap food, which you can get if you have a very regular climate, lots of soil, cheap labor – then you can grow calories for relatively cheap. But we see the food sovereignty movement emerging which says there aren’t any jobs anyway, and there’s no way to get nature to work for free any more than it already is, because now we’re seeing all the bills coming due of treating the global atmosphere as a dumping ground for pollution.

We also see the situation in California, for instance, where the drought has become so severe—the worst in 1200 years, we’re told—that the center of North American cash crop agriculture might just disappear over the next few decades. So in a lot of ways, the acceleration of historical change is making that “jobs vs. environment” discourse obsolete.

KA: You talk a great deal about capitalism’s modus operandi being the appropriation of socially necessary unpaid work, and Green and Red thought has generally tended to ignore that. What are some examples?

JWM: The first thing we need to be aware of is that the most powerful organizing myth of Green thought and environmental activism over the past four decades has been the Industrial Revolution—this is the argument of the “Anthropocene” today, which says that everything bad about environmental change goes back to England around 1800 with the steam engine and coal. That’s not really true, but that idea is ingrained in how we learn about the modern world and especially how we think about environmental crisis.

In fact, the rise of capitalism can be seen most clearly in the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries in the ways that landscapes and humans on those landscapes were transformed. There was a revolution in environment-making that was unprecedented in scale, speed, and scope between 1450 and 1750.

The most dramatic expression of this was the conquest of the Americas, which was far more than merely military conquest and genocide, although that was a big part of it. The New World became a proving ground for industrial capitalism in every sense. The origins can be seen in sugar plantations. A close second was silver mining in Potosi, in Bolivia today, in Spain, Mexico today. There were very large production operations, lots of machinery, money flowing in, workers who were regimented by time and by task – and it was all premised on appropriating the work of nature for free or very low cost and turning it into something that could be bought and sold.

That destroyed soils and the mountainous zones of the Andes, for instance, which were completely denuded of trees, causing terrible soil erosion. But it was also devastating for the humans involved. In the viceroyalty of Peru in the 16th and 17th centuries, the Castilians, the Spaniards, for example, had a special word for indigenous people which was “naturales.” These workers and indigenous people were considered part of nature.

The same sort of dialogue went on around African slavery. The African slave trade was a conjoined reality with the sugar plantations, which tells us something important – not only were New World soils appropriated and exhausted and forests cleared, but also African slaves were treated not as humans or part of society, but as part of nature. The work of Africans was appropriated, and the work of soils and forests was appropriated. It was on this basis that a new relationship with nature started to emerge, and it had to do with the economy.

Every time new empires went out, the Portuguese to the New World and the Indian Ocean, the Dutch, the Spaniards, the first thing they did was start to collect all the natures they could find, including the humans, and to code them and rationalize them. Finally there were extraordinary processes of mobilizing unpaid work in service of commodity production and exchange. The first thing any capitalist wanted, or any colonial power wanted, was to put down a little bit of money, and get a lot of useful energy back, in the form of silver, sugar, and then later tobacco and then cotton with the advent of the Industrial Revolution. It was the same process that every act of technological breakthrough – the steam engine or before that, innovations in ship-building – was premised on: getting new ways of nature to work for free or a low cost on a mass scale. It’s the same thing in the past century with oil.

KA: What is your critique of the Anthropocene and how do you feel it glosses over real historical analysis of capitalism?

JWM: We need to distinguish between two uses of the term. One is the Anthropocene as a cultural conversation, the kind of conversation with friends over dinner or at the watercooler. In this sense the Anthropocene has the virtue of posing an important question: how do humans fit within the web of life? But the Anthropocene cannot answer that question, because the very terms of the concept are dualistic, as in the famous article “The Anthropocene: Are Humans Now Overwhelming the Great Forces of Nature?” That isn’t a great question if you believe humans are a part of nature.

The Anthropocene argument in its dominant form, on the other hand, is an absurd historical model. It says more or less that everything starts in England in 1800 with steam engines and coal. There are all sorts of historical problems with that, which we talked about. Long before the steam engine, there was an order of magnitude increase in capitalism’s ability to transform the environment, in terms of scale, speed and scope.

I’m very concerned that the Anthropocene plays this old bourgeois trick which says the problems created by capitalists are the responsibility of all of humanity. That is a deeply racist, Eurocentric, and patriarchal view that presents a series of very real problems as the responsibility of humanity as a whole. On a deep philosophical level, we are all the same in the eyes of the Anthropocene. In a historical sense, that is some of the worst conceptual violence you can impose. It would be like saying race doesn’t matter in America today – anybody who said that would be laughed off the stage. But part of getting away with the Anthropocene idea is the Nature/Society dualism.

KA: Is capitalism today, in the final analysis, in developmental crisis? What prognostication does this new historical analysis give us?

JWM: Everything depends on how you think of capitalism. If you have a standard definition of capitalism committed to endless economic growth and maximizing profitability, you can say a lot of things about capitalism’s ability to survive. But if you say capitalism is dependent upon appropriating the unpaid work of humans and the rest of nature… then you start to have a different view of limits.

The core question of political economy is: how do great booms of capitalist investment and accumulation occur in the modern world, and what are the limits to them?

Even if climate change weren’t happening, these limits would be profound. Capitalists have always found their way out of crisis, something radicals and conservatives agree on. Both say the same thing because they are both nature-blind. Capitalism is above all a system of cheap nature, consisting of the four cheaps: labor power, energy, food, raw materials. Capitalism restores the cheapness of those natures by finding new parts of nature that have not been commodified or brought into the cash nexus. In the 19th century, that was South Asia and East Asia. Over the past 30 years, neoliberalism brought in China, India, the Soviet Union, and Brazil.

Then we have climate change. That feeds back in a way that slows whatever “cheap natures” are left. Climate change is the largest single vector of rising costs of business as usual. It will undermine the basis of capitalism’s whole relationship with nature by radically undermining the cheap nature strategy that it was based on.

KA: You mention that environmental and social movements are slowly coming to the realization that the Nature/Society binary is false, possibly because of the real threats on both Nature and Society and capitalism, particularly with large-scale extractive drilling projects that are encroaching on a Nature of which humans are a part.

JWM: I think some movements are seeing Nature and Society as inextricably linked. I think the next step is to move into the heartland of questions of race, gender, and inequality to point out that these issues are intimately about how Nature and Society get imagined in the modern world. If you ask a simple question, like why do some human lives matter more than other – so we think about Black Lives Matter – or why do some genocides matter more than others, you start to see that there are very powerful presumptions of Nature and Society that go in there.

I think movements around the tar sands or the Keystone XL pipeline present the kind of social movement organizing that fits very well with the arguments of this book. Movements for justice cannot be placated anymore through a new distribution of reward, in part because capitalism doesn’t have the surplus that it used to have. You see these conversations especially around energy, fracking, oil, and extractive projects in Latin America. And of course, in Latin America, many indigenous groups never believed in this dualism to begin with. They were always ahead.

But there are still too many on the Left, especially in North America, who view Nature as out there, as a variable, or a context, which will be a complete political dead end. We need to bring Nature into capitalism, and understand capitalism in Nature.

is assistant professor of sociology at Binghamton University, and coordinator of the World-Ecology Research Network. He writes frequently on the history of capitalism in Europe, Latin America, and the United States, from the long sixteenth century to the neoliberal era. Presently, he is completing Ecology and the rise of capitalism, an environmental history of the rise of capitalism, for the University of California Press.

is a freelance writer and a PhD candidate in developmental biology at the University of Chicago.

published in  Viewpoint Magazine

Der Beitrag Capitalism in the Web of Life: an Interview with Jason W. Moore erschien zuerst auf non.

“On Destroying What Destroys You”

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Hostis-600x369

An interview with Thomas Nail.

Thomas Nail is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Denver and author of The Figure of the Migrant (Stanford University Press, 2015) and Returning to Revolution: Deleuze, Guattari, and Zapatismo (Edinburgh University Press, 2012). His publications can be accessed at: udenver.academia.edu/ThomasNail

Hostis: One may see the aims of Hostis and feel a tinge of moral discomfort when it begins to asquestions regarding the status of migrants, of refugees, and of exiles (1) if only for the very reason that there remains some commitment on our part to the idea that to be content with a politics of recognition and a strategy of representation perpetuates the illusion of emancipation when all that can be achieved is Statist inclusion. In other words, once recognition as political strategy is exhausted, the very people who are indexed by this representation are left wanting. In this same vein, then, we might say that the question of representation, recognition, and the figure of the migrant forces us to go one step furtherto say that “the real content of the demand ‘citizenship papers for all!’ could also be formulated as: everyone must have citizenship papers so that we can all burn them.” (2) How does your concept of “migrant cosmopolitanism deal with the potential merits and many shortcomings of this exhaustive and truncated application of Statist inclusion?

Thomas Nail: Historically, there have been numerous figures of the migrant. For example, the nomad, the barbarian, the vagabond, and the proletariat are four major kinds of migratory figures. For me, the figure of the migrant is not a class or identity; it is a vector (a position in motion). As such, anyone can move into and out of it as territorial, political, juridical, and economic factors change. This position is one defined by the primacy of movement and can be formulated in the following way: the figure of the migrant is the political figure who is socially expelled or dispossessed as a result, or as the cause, of their mobility. The migrant is the collective name for all the political figures in history who have been territorially, politically, juridically, and economically displaced as a condition of the social expansion of power.

Migrants are the true movers of history and political transformation, but this does not mean their movements are immune from cooptation by states, capital, or other forms of expulsion. In fact, it is their captured motion that is the very condition of social power in the first place (slavery, serfdom, waged labor, and so on). In this sense I think it is too simplistic to say that all of their movements are either antistate or reformist, in part because the difference between reformist acts and revolutionary acts is not an essential or formal one, it is a contingent and material one. An act is revolutionary when it results in revolution. Burning passports may or may not be revolutionary; it depends on the collective effects.

However, what is interesting to me about the figure of the migrant is that it has produced some pretty incredible collective effects that are completely outside territorial, statist, juridical, and capitalist circuits of social motion (slave and maroon societies, vagabond collectives, workers communes, and so on). If we want to think seriously about the possibilities of some kind of social organization distinct from the reactionary forces of territorial nation-states and capitalism, then we should start with those historically invented by migrants. Cosmopolitanism is the name often taken by the reactionary forces of states toward “including” migrants. This is not the worst thing that could happen, but it also does not accurately describe the tendency of what I am calling “migrant cosmopolitanism” to create nonexpulsive social structures outside such structures of representation.

 

H: Do you see “migrant cosmopolitanism as something distinct from more reformist and liberal notions of seeking the inclusion of, and the granting of rights to undocumented persons? The occupation of the Saint Bernard church, which you have thought a lot about and which lasted from June 28 to August 23, 1996, strikes one as being something more than a politics of recognition. You also mention the No One Is Illegal migrant justice group based in Toronto as embodying the subversive and more radical aspects of the struggles around immigration, political refugees, and exiles. Obviously the tenacity of these struggles came from their level of self-organization and their ability to gain various forms of popular support, both materially and symbolically. What is it about these examples of migrant struggles that point beyond the shortcomings of a type of liberal approach to piecemeal reformism?

TN: What is so exciting to me about these movements is that they are not just asking for rights, they are demanding the abolition of citizenship altogether in a very specific way: by creating autonomous communities open to anyone regardless of their status. The slogan “Status for All” can be interpreted in two ways: “Everyone who lives here should have legal status within the juridical nation-state” or “If everyone has status, no one has status.” The latter is consistent with No One is Illegal’s demand for the abolition of nation-states and borders. Universal status undermines the territorial and national aspects of the state, and therefore undermines the state tout court. I have written elsewhere about the details of their Solidarity City campaign in Toronto. (3) The aim of this campaign is to bypass the state altogether and organize migrants, social service providers, and allies into mutually supportive relations, regardless of status. Another example I have written about in Returning to Revolution is the Zapatistas. (4) The Zapatistas are indigenous people in Mexico expelled from their land. As migrants in their own country, they have decided to not simply demand rights from the state or migrate to the United States, but to build autonomous communes with their own nonexpulsive social structure.

 

H: Between 2008-2010 there was some publicity around the notion of migrant struggles taking up the idea of “demanding the right to stay home.” (5) This idea of trying to force a situation on the State where migrants don’t have to leave, don’t have to live the vicissitudes of migration itself also strikes us as something of interest, primarily for two reasons. First, the demand is situated in terms of an initial refusal to migrate, the demand to not be forced to live the life and fate of migrants moving from the global south to the global north; and second, because this initial refusal also refuses what capitalism has increasingly gained ahold of, namely, public imagination and a people’s way of investing and/or desiring a certain future. As Guattari said, “In my view, this huge factory, this mighty capitalistic machine also produces what happens to us when we dream, when we daydream, when we fantasize, when we fall in love, and so on.”(6) So this initial refusal of being forced into the life of a migrant also acts as a refusal of investing in a future that coincides with whatever capitalism codes and reformulates as a desirable life for everyonemoving to a Western country, living a suburban lifestyle, replicating the heteronormative narratives found in Hollywood/Blockbuster cinema in one’s own personal life, or what have you. Simply put, this “demand for the right to stay home fights at the level of “forms-of-life, and not simply at the level of Statist recognition of certain rights. What, if anything, has your work on these issues helped you clarify for yourself and others regarding this difference between struggling for State inclusion versus struggling for a ‘form-of-life’? Or do you perhaps find this distinction unhelpful, outdated, conceptually ineffective, and so on?

TN: This is a great example and I deal with it at more length in The Figure of the Migrant.(7) But in short, let me make two points. First, the “right to stay home” is a migrant movement and not the rejection of migration. Most folks involved in this movement are people who have already been expelled from their homes at one point or another. “The right to stay home” could just as easily be called “the right to return home” since most are already migrants. Take for example the millions of Mexican migrants in the United States who would much rather be back home in Mexico with their families. Or think of the millions of indigenous people around the world who are being expelled from their land by the capitalist accumulation of agricultural land. Even if they are not yet territorially expelled, they are already juridically, politically, and economically expelled from their social status in order to facilitate their geographical displacement. Even if some people are allowed to stay, what does this mean if everything around them has been destroyed by mining companies, monocrop farms, hydroelectric dams, and so on. One can become a migrant even if it is only the environment that changes.

Second, the idea of a migrant social movement around the right to stay or return home is a very old one. This strategy was the invention of the ancient figure of the migrant: the barbarian. The ancient world (Sumer, Greece, Egypt, Rome) is absolutely filled with slave revolts by captured barbarians, only a fraction of which were recorded in any detail, unfortunately. The primary demand of almost all of these revolts was the same: to return home or find a new home. In fact, this is the etymological meaning of the world “revolt” in the context of mass slavery: to return home. There is a fascinating reason why this becomes the dominant form of counterpower in the ancient world. For me this is less an issue of “form-of-life” than the “form-of-motion” proper to the migrant.

 

H: In Means Without End, Agamben presents the refugee as a figure of the threshold. Agamben’s other chosen figures are quite tragic, the most famous being Bartleby and the muselmann of the camp. This is all to say that theoretical takes of the refugee routinely associate them with the power of incapacity. We’re curious about why popular media seems all too ready to also characterize them in this way. Most high-profile news events, such as the recent migrant boat disasters in the Mediterranean, depict them as helpless. What is the form of power you find most useful in your analysis?

TN: Ah, yes. Agamben has this great line in his essay “Beyond Human Rights” that is very inspiring to me. He says, “It is even possible that, if we want to be equal to the absolutely new tasks ahead, we will have to abandon decidedly, without reservation, the fundamental concepts through which we have so far represented the subjects of the political (Man, the Citizen and its rights, but also the sovereign people, the worker, and so forth) and build our political philosophy anew starting from the one and only figure of the refugee.”(8) It’s too bad he never followed up on this claim. I agree with the spirit of his point but I disagree about the content and method of this claim. This quote is one of the reasons I wanted to write The Figure of the Migrant. Agamben is on the right track, but he does not see the refugee as only one among many other figures of the migrant as I do, and therefore as part of a much larger philosophical project focusing on political motion and migrant counterpower.

But to your question: The refugee is an ancient figure of the migrant related to the barbarian. The two emerge at roughly the same time in history in the context of widespread slave revolts. Only when there is barbarism and slavery can there be the escaped slave who seeks asylum. The refugee (from the Latin word fugere) is the one who reflees: first being forced to flee one’s homeland as a captured slave, and then having to flee one’s captor in favor of the refugium, or ἄσυλον (asulon, asylum). But the political limit of the figure of the refugee is that it does not follow the same imperative to revolt or “return home” as with barbarians like Spartacus, the Goths, and others who tried to fight their way to freedom. Instead, the refugee remains tied to the refugium. In this way the refugee was simply bound to a new master: the god, temple, and priests that managed all the first refugee asylums for escaped slaves in the ancient world.

Of course, I do not want to say that this means all refugees are helpless! My point is simply that the political figure of the refugee has a long genealogy that is still active today and tends to imply in its genealogy someone who is simply looking for a new master, a new nation-state, church, or refuge. Nation-states prefer dealing with this figure and would like to keep this historical meaning. Compare this to the refugee’s historical twin, the barbarian! The barbarian is wild, chaotic, destructive, mobile, active, powerful, and so on: the destroyer of civilization. Historically, the barbarian is to be feared and the refugee is to be pitied by the gods. On this point I am against Agamben and on the side of Nietzsche, Benjamin, Hardt, Negri, and many of the anarchists of the nineteenth century: we need a new barbarism.

 

H: We are quite inspired by migrants’ penchant for burning down the detention centers in which they are held captive. High-profile events include riots where inmates have taken over or destroyed large parts of facilities, as in Texas, Australia, and across the EU. Most political commentators have nothing positive to say about these events, though sometimes a litany of abusive practices come to light. Hostis is happy to celebrate these moments as a collective demonstration of the anarchist principle “destroy what destroys you.” What do you see in this insistent desire to rebel?

TN: This brings us to another figure of the migrant: the vagabond. The masterless men and women of the Middle Ages (serfs, peasants, beggars, witches, rogues, and so on) significantly developed the migrant art of rebellion in its strictly etymological sense: turning back in direct violence. Since barbarians are kidnapped from their home, their counterpower is related to their desire to return home. All violence is a means to the ends of escape. While barbarian slaves could potentially escape the limits of their empires, by the Middle Ages there were fewer and fewer places left to flee outside the jurisdiction of some lord or another. Thus, vagabonds increasingly began to directly confront authority from within, by rebelling. This is not to say that there were not also raids or revolts of some kind, or that direct violence was missing from raids and revolts in previous ages, but simply that during the Middle Ages the primary goal of most migrant counterpower was less about supplies (raiding) or radical escape (revolt) than about direct assassination, political murder, burning, revenge, and desecration from within society without the goal of leaving it. Today the figure of the vagabond persists in migrant attacks on detention centers, the burning of passports, squatting, theft of electricity, property destruction, violent battles with police, and so on.

 

H: To hazard a deceptively straightforward postcolonial question: what does the migrant tell us about ourselves?

TN: Well, for one, we are all becoming migrants.(9)People today relocate to greater distances more frequently than ever before in human history. While many people may not move across a regional or international border, they tend to change jobs more often, commute longer and farther to work,(10) change their residence repeatedly, and tour internationally more often. (11) Some of these phenomena are directly related to recent events, such as the impoverishment of middle classes in certain rich countries after the financial crisis of 2008, subsequent austerity cuts to social welfare programs, and rising unemployment. The subprime mortgage crisis led to the expulsion of millions of people from their homes worldwide, 9 million in the United States alone. Foreign investors and governments have acquired 540 million acres since 2006, resulting in the eviction of millions of small farmers in poor countries; and mining practices have become increasingly destructive around the world, including hydraulic fracturing and tar sands. This general increase in human mobility and expulsion is now widely recognized as a defining feature of the twenty-first century.(12) “A specter haunts the world and it is the specter of migration.”(13)

However, not all migrants are alike in their movement.(14)For some, movement offers opportunity, recreation, and profit with only a temporary expulsion. For others, movement is dangerous and constrained, and their social expulsions are much more severe and permanent. Today most people fall somewhere on this migratory spectrum between the two poles of “inconvenience” and “incapacitation.” But what all migrants on this spectrum share, at some point, is the experience that their movement results in a certain degree of expulsion from their territorial, political, juridical, or economic status. Even if the end result of migration is a relative increase in money, power, or enjoyment, the process of migration itself almost always involves an insecurity of some kind and duration: the removal of territorial ownership or access, the loss of the political right to vote or to receive social welfare, the loss of legal status to work or drive, or the financial loss associated with transportation or change in residence. For all these reasons, the migrant is becoming the political figure of our time.

 

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Endnotes

1. For instance, in the CFP for issue 2 we begin by asserting the following: “Seeking recognition is always servile. We have little interest in visibility, consciousness raising, or populist pandering.”

2.Tiqqun, Untitled Notes on Immigration
3. Thomas Nail, “Building Sanctuary City: No One is Illegal–Toronto on Non-Status Migrant Justice Organizing,” Upping the Anti: A Journal of Theory and Action no. 11 (2010): 149–162.
4.Thomas Nail, Returning to Revolution: Deleuze, Guattari, and Zapatismo (Edinburgh University Press, 2012).
5. See David Bacon’s 2008 article ‘Immigration and the Right to Stay Home’ (http://www.alternet.org/story/92639/immigration_and_the_right_to_stay_home) & his 2010 piece ‘All Over the World, Migrants Demand the Right to Stay Home’ (http://inthesetimes.com/article/15793/all_over_the_world_migrants_demand_the_right_to_stay_at_home)
6. Félix Guattari, Molecular Revolutions in Brazil
7. Thomas Nail, The Figure of the Migrant (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015).
8. Giorgio Agamben, “Beyond Human Rights” in Means Without Ends (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 16.
9. With the rise of home foreclosure and unemployment people today are beginning to have much more in common with migrants than with certain notions of citizenship (grounded in certain social, legal, and political rights). “All people may now be wanderers”: Zygmunt Bauman, Globalization: The Human Consequences (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 87. “Migration must be understood in a broad sense”: Nikos Papastergiadis, The Turbulence of Migration: Globalization, Deterritorialization, and Hybridity (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2000), 2.
10. World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2005: Section 3 Environment, Table 3.11, http://www.worldmapper.org/display.php?selected=141.
11.International annual tourist arrivals exceeded 1 billion globally for the first time in history in 2012. World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), “World Tourism Barometer,” vol. 11, 2013, http://dtxtq4w60xqpw.cloudfront.net/sites/all/files/pdf/unwto_barom13_01_jan_excerpt_0.pdf.
12. I use the word “expulsion” here in the same sense in which Saskia Sassen uses it to indicate a general dispossession or deprivation of social status. See Expulsions: Brutality and Complexity in the Global Economy (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014), 1–2. Many scholars have noted a similar trend. For an excellent review of the “mobilities” literature on migration, see Alison Blunt, “Cultural Geographies of Migration: Mobility, Transnationality and Diaspora,” Progress in Human Geography 31 (2007): 684–94.
13.Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 213.
14. Bauman, Globalization.

 

published on Hostis

Der Beitrag “On Destroying What Destroys You” erschien zuerst auf non.


Drei Tage poetische Einheit. Eine virtuelle Führung.

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Der Trick der Marketingveranstaltung für die »Operation Deutschland« besteht darin, die Logik des Marktes mit dem Mythos vom Frachter (Baudrillard) zu ergänzen (der Transport zum totalen Überfluss, von dem auch die Refugees träumen). Sehen Sie doch, wie diskret, wohlwollend, zurüchhaltend und selbstlos die Werbung für die »Operation Deutschland« sich gibt. Bild, das Organ der Bürgerfabrik. […]

Der Beitrag Drei Tage poetische Einheit. Eine virtuelle Führung. erschien zuerst auf non.

What is 21st Century Photography?

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whatistwentyfirstcenturyphotography7

Fifty years before photography was officially unleashed unto the world, in answering the question ‘What is Enlightenment?’ (1784) Immanuel Kant wrote: ‘Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity’. Kant was writing this at a time when thousand years of Feudalism were ending, and he strived to define the emerging world order based on scientific method rather than religion, representational democracy rather than autocracy and market economy rather than bartering.

Enlightenment meant a clean break from the dark ages and a resounding turn towards reason, logic, and rationality. This rupture with the past and the launch of a new era of science, capitalism and democracy, was summarised by Kant in the motto ’Sapere Aude!’ – ‘have courage to use your own understanding!’ The invention of photography that flowed from this scientific revolution cemented the final break with the medieval iconography of saints and cherubs.

The photo-graphic image combined some of the key attributes of the Enlightenment: rational method capable of producing identical results under controlled conditions, industrial processes that replace physical labour with mechanised production, and the delirium of mass-replication that mimics the infinite circulation of commodities in a capitalist market. In other words, the technical image captured the key scientific, political and ethical tendencies of industrial capitalism and presented them to the eye as an image, inaugurating along the way the age of aesthetic modernism.

The reason photography was the most suitable visual form to reflect on the changing face of society, as it was reshaped by industrialisation, is that it is itself the product of the same industrial process that replaced human and animal muscles with motors and pistons, accelerated movement to ultrasonic speeds and exchanged craftsmanship with mass-production. Photography emerged out of this melting pot of bodies, energies and machines as the visual figuration of a social order that made representation and subjectivity the cornerstone of its scientific, political and economic activities. A photograph of a cat represents a real cat according to the same logic that maintains that paper money represents gold bullion (gold standard), a member of parliament represents her constituents and H2O represents water.

However, in the 21st Century this representational world order inaugurated by Newton’s laws of motion, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, parliamentary (representational) democracy and the photographic camera has already came to an end, and even if some parts of it are still visible, they are in a state of advanced decay, maintaining a holding pattern while they are being transformed by a new set of forces. The ‘Age of Information’ is characterised by the emergence of another kind of machine, one that replicates the activities and the processes not of the human body, but of the brain.

Just as during the previous ‘Industrial Age’, machines replaced physical labour not by copying animal locomotion (airplanes don’t flap their wings like birds) but by utilising different sources of energy (petroleum) and different processes (internal combustion), the new machines that we refer to as ‘computers’ do not operate within the categories of human reason, such as dialectics, subjectivity, and representation. Quantum physics did not obliterate Newton’s laws, but showed that these laws apply only to a narrow segment of reality. Quantitative easing did not obliterate paper money, but annulled any possibility of money representing gold bullion or any real assets. The Arab Spring did not obliterate representational democracy, but exposed a connection between the democratic vote and fundamentalism, and computers did not obliterate reason and representation but augmented them with fuzzy logic, undecidability, artificial intelligence and the paradoxes of Turing machines.

In this new age of thinking machines, algorithmic processing, and vast computational speeds, a dramatic change is happening to the visual field. The industrial age was an age of universal visibility, as Foucault demonstrated by offering the examples of the school, the factory, the hospital and the barracks, which operated in the same visual order of perspectival hierarchy. Photography had a clear-cut role in this optical regime, as Susan Sontag noticed: ‘cameras define reality in the two ways essential to the working of an advanced industrial society: as a spectacle (for masses) and as an object of surveillance (for rulers)’.

The only thing that remained unrepresentable under the Western eye was, in Marx’s phrase ‘the hidden abode of production’: the secret of profit making remained classified. Even photography was unable to shine the disinfecting power of sunlight onto this secret, because the process that produces capital is also the very process by which photography itself is produced, for as we have seen, photography and capital operate by means of technology, mass delirium, reproduction and infinite exchange. The demise of the industrial age is at the same time curtains for the spectacle of representation: visual surveillance is replaced with predictive policing, industrial processes replaced with trading algorithms, armies replaced with remote controlled killer robots and perspectival geometry replaced with the flat topology of the computer screen.

These changes do not mean that suddenly what we have in front of our eyes does not matter, but that many more things that matter are outside our human field of view. The question is, what becomes of photography when the locus of power shifts from the optical nerve to the fibre-optic cable? What becomes of the public space – the heart of any European city – when it is invisibly but relentlessly morphed by multinational capital into privately owned space with public access, and when sovereignty, citizenship and autonomy find themselves under threat from multinational corporations and when – as Andrea Philips wrote – the changing concept of the public (space) reconfigures how we understand the performance of truth, judgement and rights?

Sadly, the answer has to be ‘not much has changed’. As a recent visit to photography graduates exhibition confirmed, photography is still, above all else, the universal face of representation. To this day photography’s carte-de-visite proudly proclaims that it can take any aspect of the world and present it to the eye as an image. Indeed, is there anything that cannot be shown in a photograph? The surface of a comet? Check. Someone’s pale ass reflected in the bathroom mirror? Check. A puddle of urine under a hospital bed in a shantytown? Check. Teenagers on the beach looking wistfully into the distance? Triple check! 

But this is not all, identical images also pressing upon us from bus stops, magazines, mobile phones, notice boards, tablets and bags of cat food, to such an extent that it is often hard to know if you are looking at a gallery wall or at the shop window of Primark. The astonishing diversity of subjects, events and situations that photography is able to attend to, suggests at first sight that its scope is unlimited and its reach universal. And yet, these ostensibly Technicolor riches hide their own dark secrets, best summarised by drawing an analogy to Henry Ford’s remark that ‘you can have the Ford T in any colour as long as it’s black’. In the context of photography, this means that you can have any photography you like, on any device, topic and subject, as long as it is a representation of something or other.

The problem is that in a post-Fordist society the locus of political agency and of cultural relevance has shifted from the object - as visually arresting as it might be – to the processes that (re)produce and distribute the object. Processes, however, by their own nature, are less visible and less representational than objects. For that reason, it seems to me that if photography mainly concerns itself with representations of objects in space, it is losing its relevance in a world in which speed, acceleration, distribution and self-replication acquire a significance that overshadows the visual appearance of spaces.

In the 20th Century photography existed on a printed page, mimicking in the perspectival organisation of its elements the hierarchical organisation of a centrally governed society with its focal point located in the subjectivity of the observer. In the 21st Century this arrangement is just as quaint as piecemeal production in the age of conveyer belt assembly. The photographic print disappeared everywhere apart from some galleries and nostalgic photography departments. In its place there is now a luminous screen that has its one side facing the human, bathing her in blue light and screening from the immediate surroundings, and its other side remotely plugged into an unimaginable stream of data that is constantly worked and reworked by algorithms that keep being written and re-written by invisible and unknown puppet masters – our real rulers.

From time to time these algorithms pluck a few data packages out of this interminable stream and give them a visual form that resembles what we used to call ‘a photograph’. But this resemblance is superficial to say the least. The four horsemen of the photographic apocalypse: Index, Punctum, Document, and Representation can no more account for this process than a printed page can explain the operation of a computer screen. This is not to suggest that the algorithmic image is somehow immaterial or inhuman, but rather to propose that both materiality and humanity must be re-evaluated in the light of these bio-techno-political developments.

And yet, there is still an image, and the image can be of something or other, for example a cat, a politician or a beheading, and this image can still be fascinating as we know many images to be. But in a meta-critical sense – a sense beyond the manner in which we normally consider and criticise images – this fascination appears to be the defining quality of photography, precisely because the word ‘photography’ today names not another visual form of representation, but an immersive economy that offers an entirely new way to inhabit materiality and its relation to bodies, machines and brains. Johnny Golding christened this new materiality ‘Ana-materialism’ and we can simply call it ‘The Now’.

Within this absorbing ‘always-on’ and ‘everywhere at the same time’ ana-materiality, the world does not come before the image, nor is it produced by the image. Rather, photography is the visual figuration of a new layer of consciousness – in which new relationships to space and time, and therefore new categories of thought, play, art, and agency are emerging.

It would be hasty therefore to dismiss photography as a heritage practice from the industrial age. Above all else, photography, as the visual incarnation of the algorithm, is shaping our world everywhere, and from time to time we can even glimpse the workings of this process in the images that it throws up. But just like the pebbles scattered by an ocean wave, these images are simply the by-products of a crushing force that acts according to a logic of its own. There is, however, no need to read too much into the shapes created by these pebbles, but instead consider that the urgent task is to learn how to surf this wave. As Gilles Deleuze said: ‘There is no need for fear or hope, only to look for new weapons’.

21st Century photography is this wave, characterised as a continuous process of reshaping visual forms out of data. it has little in common with prints in black frames, these coffins of photography. It will not be found in the ’60 inches from the floor to the center of the image’ rule that still passes for curating in some quarters, nor in the ‘eye level’ arrangement on the walls, that reinforces the rhetorical tropes of perspectival painting inherited from the Renaissance. And it has nothing in common with the hypocritical moralism of the post-colonial document that relies on the same representational paradigm that made colonialism possible. In short, 21st Century Photography is not the representation of the world, but the exploration of the labor practices that shape this world through mass-production, computation, self-replication and pattern recognition. Through it we come to understand that the ‘real world’ is nothing more than so much information plucked out of chaos: the randomized and chaotic conflation of bits of matter, strands of DNA, sub-atomic particles and computer code. In photography one can glimpse how the accidental meetings of these forces are capable of producing temporary meaningful assemblages that we call ‘images’. In the 21st Century photography is not a stale sight for sore eyes, but the inquiry into what makes something an image. As such, photography is the most essential task of art. 

Dr Daniel Rubinstein is the course leader of MA Photography at Central Saint Martins and editor of the Journal ‘Philosophy of Photography’

taken from here

Der Beitrag What is 21st Century Photography? erschien zuerst auf non.

Digitale Arbeit und Dividuum

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high-frequency-trading

Man muss heute nicht allzu lange rästeln, um das spekulative Geldkapital und die moderne Finance als perfekte Maschinen auszumachen, welche die soziale Materie unablässig deterritorialisieren und/oder recodieren. So wird der Trading-Raum einer großen Bank heute von diagrammatischen, digitalen Maschinen beherrscht, er wird durch Bildschirmwände trassiert, die allesamt an globale Computernetzwerke angeschlossen sind, um in Realtime die Aufwärts- und Abwärtsbewegungen der Preise an den Finanzmärkten zu visualisieren. Dafür muss man ganz verschiedene Semiotiken mobilisieren: a) impotente Zeichen, die nur die historischen Preisbewegungen dokumentieren, b) Macht-Zeichen, welche die aktuellen Preisbewegungen stimulieren und zukünftige Verläufe prognostizieren, und c) diagramatische Zeichen, die das Reale transformieren. Mathematische Systeme, Datenbanken, Netzwerke - all diese Relationen sind heute als Operatoren, Teile und Funktionen eines ökonomischen Systems zu verstehen, welche die Subjektivität des Traders konstituieren, regeln und navigieren. Und ihre Verkettungen, die über sich beschleunigende Algorhythmen prozessieren, erzeugen bei den Dividuen immer öfters spasmische Rhythmen und infolgedessen einen insistierenden Stress, wobei sich die verschiedenen Formen des Wettbewerbs zwischen den Dividuen und die Beschleunigung der Geldkapitalströme gegenseitig hochschaukeln können. Das maschinische Environment sollte man vielleicht weniger mit der Ankopplung oder der Interpenetration der Dividuen mit den Maschinen in Verbindung bringen, sondern es vielmehr mit Kategorien wie Umhüllung oder Kokonisierung beschreiben.

In den kapitalistischen Arbeitsverhältnissen gilt es von vornherein die zeitlichen Normierungen des Arbeitstages zu beachten. Schon in den 1960er Jahren gab ein französischer Arbeiter in einem Interview zu bedenken, dass man in der Fabrik nicht unbedingt isst, wenn man mal gerade hungrig ist, sondern, wenn das elektronische Gehirn eine Lücke in der Produktion entdeckt und den Arbeiter auffordert, gefälligst zu essen. Die (zwangsweise) Delegation der eigenen Bedürfnisse an die Maschinen, die die Kapitalisierung exekutieren, ist Teil einer symbolischen/semiotischen Repräsentation im Kontext der maschinellen Codes. Dabei prozessieren die Produktionsprozesse mit einer Sprache/Semiotik, die nicht nur den Arbeiter, sondern längst auch den Programmierer oder kognitiven Arbeiter codiert. Und es sind längst nicht mehr die von der Uhr gemessenen Sekunden und Minuten, in denen sich der Wettbewerb zwischen zwei Arbeitern anzeigen muss (als ob es sich, wie Marx schreibt, bei ihrer Arbeitsleistung um die Geschwindigkeiten von zwei Lokomotiven handelt), sondern es sind heute teilweise schon Millisekunden, Zeiten des digitalen Codes, die in den Produktionsräumen des finanziellen Kapitals die Operationen der Angestellten triggern und auch entscheiden. Diese Prozesse erzeugen zunehmend gerade bei den Büroarbeitern der mittlere Ebene eine systematische Müdigkeit, deren landläufige Symptome Depressionen und Burnouts sind, in der Baudrillard aber auch eine letzte Form der widerständischen Aktivität erkennen wollte, während die Leader und Manager für Baudrillard die wahren passiven Agenten sind, die eine "frischfröhliche Konformität mit dem System" betreiben.

Es gilt an dieser Stelle eine Reihe von Frage zu stellen: Auf den ersten Blick ist die Arbeit am PC im positiven Sinne etwas verwirrend, ist sie deshalb aber gegenüber der Arbeit am Fließband befreit? Vielleicht, aber besitzt der Arbeitende am PC auch die Macht, um im Kollektiv die Arbeit niederzulegen und mit dem Management zu verhandeln? Diess natürlich nicht. Die Arbeiter stehen sich in den dezentralisierten Produktionsräumen nicht länger face to face gegenüber, sie kennen ihre Stimmen nicht, höchstens vielleicht noch ihre Email Adressen.

Infolge der neoliberalen Kapitalisierung und der damit zusammenhängenden diskontinuierlichen Entwicklung des Technologischen kommt es zu einer permanenten Umstrukturierung der Arbeitsmärkte, ihrer Agenten und deren verschiedenen Qualifikationstypologien. Auf internationalisierten Arbeitsmärkten ist das Humanmaterial in gegliederte Arbeitskräfte (und zerstreute Konsumenten) aufgeteilt, wobei sämtliche historisch vorfindbaren  Exploitationsmethoden gleichzeitig Anwendung finden. Es kommt zur Liquidation von veralteten Berufsidentitäten, während bestimmte Berufsstände wie Rechtsanwälte, Ärzte und Lehrer quasi als Relikte bürgerlicher Produktionsverhältnisse überleben, gleichzeitig aber auch zunehmend in die postindustriell-maschinellen Systeme und deren Konkurrenzmechanismen eingebunden werden. Man denke nur an den Arzt und den Reparturbetrieb Medizin, der mit immer stärker hochgerüsteten Apparaten die mechanischen und psychischen Dysfunktionalitäten der kranken Massen zu regulieren und korrigieren versucht. Parallel zur apparativen Neuromedizin wird die Evaluierung von Eignungen und Fähigkeiten mit Hilfe von Psycho-Tests, Coaching und Casting vorangetrieben, um die Nutzbarkeiten von Körpern, Psychen und Kognitionen zu überwachen und zugleich anzuheizen. Gleichzeitig entstehen neue Kreativindustrien und eine internationale meritokratische Mittelklasse, die - online- und konsumgetrieben - ihr intellektuelles Kapital einzusetzen versucht, um sich an den Märkten zu halten. An den Arbeitsmärkten bedeutet maschinische Indienstnahme, dass im Zuge der fortschreitenden Automatisierung die bisherigen beruflichen Qualifikationen und ihre identifikatorischen Muster dem ständigen Wandel unterworfen sind, der durch die statistischen Verfahren zur Evaluation der arbeitstechnischen Fähigkeiten, die das Können, Geschicklichkeit und Kenntnisse betreffen, überwacht, kontrolliert und reguliert wird. Diese Überwachungsprozeduren finden in Netzwerken statt, in denen das Humane als chemoelektrisch-endokrine Schaltstelle die Vermittlung maschineller Funktionen übernimmt.  Transnationale Konzerne erzeugenheute im Rahmen der innerbetrieblichen Arbeitsteilung selbst eine profitable Dividualität, wenn sie aus Kostengründen ihre Unternehmen in die Bereiche Marketing, Produktion, Finanzen, Logistik, Finanzen und Dienstleistungen unterteilen und die verschiedenen Sektoren auf verschiedene Länder oder Kontingente verstreuen. Es bedarf dazu der Herstellung und Anpassung von Industrienormen bzw. standardisierten Produkten oder Produktteilen, der geschmeidigen Modularisierung der Produktionsprozesse, sodass z.B. Automobile heute in bis zu zwanzig Ländern quasi-simultan zusammengebaut werden.

Jede mediale Maschine, die mit Übertragungen beschäftigt ist, setzt sich aus Kombinatoriken zusammen, mit denen zeiträumliche Differenzen in diskreten Schritten eines digitalisierten Maschinenkörpers prozessieren. Wie Michel Ser­res sagt, hat das Faktum Konnektivität längst die Kollektivität ersetzt. Es kommt schließlich zu einer Multiplizierung und Vermehrung von digitalen Automaten aller Art, selbstreferentiellen Maschinen, die bestimmte Funktionen mehr oder weniger gleichförmig wiederholen und von den humanen Agenten, die neben der Maschine stehen, schließlich nur noch überwacht werden. Industriesoziologen stellen hier die Substitution der kognitiven Arbeit durch die Maschinen in den Vordergrund. Dabei bleibt die Aktivität der Automaten längst nicht auf die Produktion beschränkt, stattdessen haben wir es mit selbstreferentiellen Verkehrs-, Konsumtions- und Lichtautomaten und Kriegsmaschinen aller Art in den Weltinnenräumen des Kapitals (Sloterdijk) zu tun. Automatisierung bedeutet in diesem Kontext die Vermehrung der Maschinen und die Adaption der Menschen an sie, wobei die dem Automaten gemäße soziale Konfiguration das technische Team ist, das keineswegs nur durch flache Hierarchien, sondern auch durch Typisierung, Normalisierung und vertikale Standardisierung geprägt ist.

Die gegenwärtige Organisation der Arbeit lässt sich ohne den Einsatz der a-signifikanten Semiotiken im Kontext von diagrammtischen Pragmatiken (Guattari) längst nicht mehr verstehen. Dabei werden die linguistischen Imperative, - Management-Kontrollen, Marketingkampagnen und Sprechhandlungen - durch a-signifikante Semiotiken - die nicht sprechen, sondern funktionieren – nicht nur supplementiert, sondern oft genug schon determiniert: Computerprogramme und -netzwerke, Statistiken, Charts, Datenbanken, Bilanzierung etc. bilden heute konstitutive Teile der betrieblichen Aussagesysteme. (Über die asignifikanten Logiken bzw. die maschinische Indienstnahme bemächtigt sich heute das Kapital selbst noch der Wünsche und der Begehrensaufladungen. Gleichzeitig kommt es parallel zu den vielfältigsten non-linearen Prozessen der eskalierenden Deteritorialisierung von Geschwindigkeit und Raum, die von asignifikanten Maschinen prozessiert werden, zu einer reterritorialisierten Reproduktion des Kapitals. Of course kann das Kapital auf die entsprechenden Reterritorialisierungen (Staat, Quasi-Ödipalisierung, Celebrity-Kulturen etc.) eben gerade nicht verzichten. (Am Ende der 1980er Jahre gewann die fraktale Geometrie eines Benoît Mandelbrot mit ihren Übergängen von Mikro- zu Makroscales zunehmend an Bedeutung - sie wurde von Deleuze/Guattari in ihrem Buch "Tausend Plateaus" zur Charakterisierung der glatten Räume benutzt - und sie wurde von den Tradern gewissermaßen adoptiert, um die Konturen der Turbulenzen der computerisierten finanziellen Netzwerke zu untersuchen und zu prozessieren. Chaos- und Komplexitätstheorien begannen als eine neue Form der gouvernementalen Logik spätestens in den herrschenden Diskursen der 1990er Jahre zu zirkulieren. Guattari beobachtete damals, dass die Kontrollgesellschaften durch eine Art kollektiven deterministischen Drives dominiert werden, der aber von der Affirmation minimaler Freiheitsgrade, Kreativitätsforen und Inventionen abhängig bleibt, die sicin den Bereichen von Wissenschaft, Technologie und Kunst finden lassen und ohne die das System in einer Art entropischer Trägheit kollabieren würde.) Und damit erfolgt die Kommunikation in den Betrieben vor allem durch Ansteckungen, welche von den a-signifikanten Semiotiken andauernd initiiert werden. Die digitale Arbeit ist fragmentiert; das Dividuum - selbst eine zelluläre Form - erfährt in den digitalisierten Produktionsprozessen eine rekombinante Fragmentierung in zellulären und zugleich rekombinierbaren Segmenten, die sich unter den Gesichtspunkten des finanziellen Kapitals als ein kontinuierlicher Flow von Geldkapitalströmen darstellen. Es geht hier nicht nur darum, dass die Arbeitsbeziehungen selbst prekär werden, sondern es kommt in ihnen fortwährend zu Teilungen, unter Umständen sogar zur "Auflösung" der Person als unifizierter produktiver Agent, als Arbeitskraft. Es ist ganz klar, als Zellen der produktiven Zeit können die Dividuen in punktuellen und fragmentierten Formen der Arbeitsprozesse ständig neu mobilisiert und rekombiniert werden. Wir haben es mit einem immensen Anwachsen einer depersonalisierten Arbeitszeit zu tun, insofern das Kapital immer stärker dazu übergeht, anstatt den Arbeiter, der acht Stunden am Stück arbeitet, verschiedene Zeitpakete zu mieten, um sie dann zu rekombinieren (Out- und Crowdsourcing) – und dies eben unabhängig von ihrem austauschbaren und damit mehr oder weniger zufälligen Träger. Das „Selbst“ fluktuiert als fluides Rest-Ego und wird in immer neuen Relationen rekombiniert, und diese Formierung vergleicht Bröckling mit einem Kaleidoskop, „das bei jedem Schütteln ein neues Muster zeigt.« Diese Art der weit über die Arbeitsbeziehungen hinausreichenden spasmischen Rekombination wird heute in den diversen Netzwerken geleistet.

Konnektivität und Prekariat sind heute als zwei Seiten derselben Medaille zu verstehen: Die Geldkapitalströme der semiokapitalistischen Produktion vereinnahmen und verbinden zelluläre Fragmente einer depersonalisierten Zeit, und dies impliziert zunehmende Unsicherheit für die unter diesen prekären Bedingungen Arbeitenden. Die sog. Zeitkristallationsmaschinen, welche nicht nur die Zeit, sondern selbst noch die individuellen Perzeptionsweisen und das Denken kristallisieren, wenn sie ihre eigenen Rhythmologien erzeugen, haben zudem längst die Arbeitsplätze verlassen und dringen in die verschiedenen alltäglichen sozialen und institutionellen Räume ein - Medien, soziale Netzwerke, Gemeinschaftseinrichtungen etc. Guattari schreibt: „Der Begriff des kapitalistischen Unternehmens muss um die Gemeinschaftseinrichtungen, um die staatlichen Institutionen, die medialen Apparate, die Arbeitsplätze und um die Mehrzahl der nichtbezahlten Aktivitäten erweitert werden. In gewisser Weise nimmt der Konsument/in im Supermarkt einen Arbeitsplatz ein, die Fernsehzuschauer/ in vor ihrem Schirm.“ Im Zuge einer statistisch qualifizierten Biopolitik wird also zunehmend auch die Lebenszeit in die ökonomischen Prozesse der Kapitalisierung hineingezogen, i.e. die mentalen und affektiven Kapazitäten der Dividuen unterliegen im Zuge einer statistisch ausgewiesenen Normalisierung der Ökonomisierung. Wir bekommen es mit der Kinematik der digitalen Mobilisierung eines teilweise schon pharmazeutisch stimulierten Wunsches zu tun, seiner Beschleunigung in der Infosphäre, die wiederum den Gebrauch der psychopharmazeutischen Stimulanzien als psychische Trigger benötigt, um die Flows der kognitiven Arbeit, die allerdings ohne Depotenzierung der Qualifikationen nicht zu haben sind, weiter anzuheizen. Die Figur des Wettbewerbs, der durch Ansteckung und nicht durch Kognition prozessiert, hat längst die Kompetenz ersetzt. Das souveräne und rationale Handeln, das durch die digitalisierte Arbeit in der Tendenz zerstört wird, muss ständig rekonstruiert werden, indem es simuliert wird, und zwar durch das Zusammenspiel zwischen signifikanten Semiologien, ansteckender Kommunikation und der sie ergänzenden Kognition, wobei dieses Spiel sich im Modus der Endlosschlfe vollzieht, die Kroker/Weinstein schon früh als Teil der postmodernen Ideologie folgendermaßen beschrieben haben: „“Ich könnte für immer hier bleiben und mit dir weiter reden.“ Das ist die Einstellung jener Leute, die bei MC Donald`s herumhängen: die ideale Sprechgemeinschaft, die es bereits gibt, aber von der „Kritischen Theorie“ übersehen wurde.« Von daher verbirgt der neoliberale Refrain (Kommuniziere! Verhalte dich als Unternehrmer! Werde ein Asset! Trage ein Risiko!) keine Realität, sondern er stattet die digitalen Arbeiter mit einer funktionalen, effizienten Relation aus, um in den kapitalisierten Raumzeiten und im Wettbewerb mit den anderen Mitspielern zu bestehen. Dieser Refrain befiehlt auf subtilste Weise, jede Art der Subjektivierung, die stets im Kontext kapitalistischer De- und Reterritorialisierung zu lesen ist, in den Dienst der effizienten Operativität zu stellen. Damit hat Adornos Abneigung gegenüber der Ideologie von Kompetenz und Leistung im Kapitalismus seine Relevanz nicht verloren. Er schreibt. »Es ist eine armselige Ideologie, daß zur Verwaltung eines Trusts unter den gegenwärtigen Bedingungen irgend mehr Intelligenz, Erfahrung, selbst Vorbildung gehört als dazu, einen Manometer abzulesen.« Der Verlust der Kompetenz hängt als ein Damoklesschwert noch über den hochqualifizierten Fachkräften, insofern in Zukunft auch ihre Kognitionsleistungen durch Maschinen weitgehend überflüssig gemacht werden könnten (siehe Industrie 4.0). Und längst besteht heute eine weit verbreitete Form der Arbeit in der des Arbeitsmannequins, das in bestimmten Zyklen die Tätigkeit des Wartens oder des getakteten Tastendrucks ausführt, der in Abhängigkeit von einer anderswo programmierten Abfolge eines maschinellen Feedback-Sytems erfolgt. So besteht die Wendigkeit, Cleverness und Schnelligkeit des heutigen Dividuums, oft schon ein Prozak und Ritalin-Mutant, vielfach auch im niederschmetternden Warten, im Warten darauf, den roten Knopf drücken zu dürfen, während die Entscheidung anderswo längst schon abläuft oder gefallen ist, nämlich in den rekursiven Schleifen des maschinellen System selbst.

Georg Friedrich Jünger hatte in seinen Schriften die Begriffsfigur des Automatendieners (Günther Anders) oder die des Arbeitsmannequins (Baudrillard) vorweggenommen, und dies muss man durchaus als eine anthropologische Revolution verstehen. Jünger betont in seiner Technikkritik sehr stark den Aspekt der Adaption des Menschen an die Technik, ohne den Gedanken der Optimierung des Menschen durch die Axiomatik des Technologischen näher ins Spiel zu bringen. Jünger scheibt: „Ich kann nicht im Auto fahren, ohne dass sich mein Sehen verändert, nicht ins Lichtspiel gehen, ohne daß Auge und Ohr sich verändern. Ich sehe, höre, denke kinetisch, ich bin einbezogen in die Bahn von Automatismus und Normung.“

Guattari wiederum akzentuiert das Beispiel des Autofahrens hinsichtlich der Subjektivierungsprozesse anders, wenn er etwa beschreibt, wie Subjektivität und Bewusstsein im maschinischen Angencement des Automobils funktionieren. (Guattari macht allerdings hier schon klar, dass er Subjektivität auf gar keinen Fall auf Affekte, intrasubjektive Momente oder intrasubjektive Beziehungen reduziert sehen will.) Die Komponenten Bewusstsein und Subjektivität sind in die technischen Mechanismen des Automobils eingebunden; man fährt zwar mit dem Auto, ohne allerdings noch massiv das reflexive Bewusstein einzuschalten, das vielleicht repräsentiert, was man da tut. Der Fahrer wird durch das und mit dem maschinisch-digitalen Gefüge des Autos sozusagen geführt, seine subjektiven Komponenten (Gedächtnis, Perzeption, Aufmerksamkeit) und seine Aktionen sind zummindest teilweise automatisiert, sind Teil des digitalen, hydraulischen und elektronischen Netzwerkes. Beim Fahren mobilisiert der Fahrer verschiedene Stufen der Verkettung seiner Aktionen, währenddessen – fast schon in eine Art Pseudoschlaf eingebettet - verschiedene Systeme des Bewusstseins parallel ablaufen, wobei manche in den Vordergrund treten und andere eben nicht. So konstituiert sich nicht nur eine Abhängigkeit von der Automaschine, die im Procedere eines konstanten an die Maschine-Angehängtseins, geradezu Sucht erzeugend wirken kann, sondern der Fahrer wird regel-gerecht mit der Maschine und ihrer Elektronik verschmolzen, von ihr umhüllt, indem er sie zunehmend nur noch ertastet. Hans-Dieter Bahr spricht hier von einer „machine Celibataire“, von einem „Fließbandarbeiter, der mit Händen und Füßen Hebel und Knöpfe bedient und diese eingeschliffenen Bewegungen „kontrolliert“, und dies die Augen und den Sinn, den Tod zu vermeiden.“ Zudem wird das Fahrzeug in weitgefächerte Maschinen- bzw. Verkehrssysteme eingefädelt, deren Funktionieren keinem noch so genialen Ingeniuer zu verdanken und dessen Quintessenz die Autobahn und ihr Netz ist, das die Gesteuerten, so schreibt im Gleichklang mit Bahr das Autorenkollektiv Tiqqun, mit einer kalkulierten und signalisierten Gleichförmigkeit zu ihrem Zielort gleiten lässt. In modernen Fahrzeugen ist die Anzahl der durch ECUs gesteuerten Funktionen extrem angestiegen. Selbstfahrende Automobile sind Maschinen, die durch Tausch, Kommunikation, Konnexion und Prozessualität der Daten-Ströme hin zur Selbstbewegung drängen. Zwar vermittelt man dem Fahrer weiterhin das Gefühl der souveränen Steuerung, zugleich regulieren sich jedoch sämtliche Komponenten, sei es Maschine, Mensch oder sozialer Verkehr, im Rahmen des maschinischen Trackings selbst.

Die Praktiken der maschinischen Indienstnahme verzahnen heute das permanente Online-Leben mit dem Imperativ des lebenslangen Lernens, und dies gemäß dem unauflöslichen Ineinanderfließen von individueller Unternehmensform und präindividuellen Affekten. Man ist nun immer stärker im Sinne eines komplexen Mit-Seins mit den medialen Maschinen vernäht, was immer stärker und regel(ge)recht Suchtverhalten induziert, das jedoch im Gegensatz zur Drogenabhängigkeit nicht den Selbstmord auf Raten befördert, vielmehr den Drang nach einem authentischen Leben auf Dauer mobilisiert. Wenn die Leute heute nach Intertnetsex, Teleshopping, Videogames und Automobilität (Jogging, Auto und Internet) süchtig werden, dann schießt der Wunsch nach Selbständigkeit und Authentizität mit der grandiosen Abhängigkeit von den medialen Maschinen zusammen. Man giert einerseits nach unbedingter Selbständigkeit, während man andererseits, wenn man auch nur eine Sekunde nicht mobil oder online ist, in eine totale Frustration verfällt, weil man gerade auch die Abgetrenntheit vom Netz als Abhängigkeit empfindet. So wird die reale Abhängigkeit nicht negiert, sondern sie wird gewissermaßen pervers und of course online ausgelebt. Gerade die Möglichkeit, seine Geschäfte, Handlungen und Affekte im selbständigen Geschwindigkeitsmodus und auf eigene Faust zu verrichten, wobei man allerdings weiß, dass die Befriedigung der eigenen Triebströme ohne das ubiquitären Anhängen an die medialen Maschinen gar nicht möglich ist, scheint im immensen Maße die seltsamsten Süchte hervorzubringen.

Schließlich geht es hier immer auch um eine Affektlogik, die aus Bescheidungen und Abhängigkeiten einen neuen Exzess macht. Längst ist das Begehren des Geizhalses libidinös besetzt (Geiz ist geil), wenn etwa das exzessive Ausgeben betrieben wird, um zu sparen bzw. den Rabatt einzuheimsen, was wiederum einen Anreiz dafüe bietet, immer weiter zu konsumieren. Demgegenüber erscheint das materielle Eindringen der technischen Maschine in den menschlichen Körper geradezu als ein Schreckensszenario zweiten Grades.

Der Beitrag Digitale Arbeit und Dividuum erschien zuerst auf non.

Grungy “Accelerationism”

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At a crucial turn in William Gibson’s Neuromancer, we’re introduced the Panther Moderns – a guerrilla subculture in a world where subcultures flicker by like disconnected frames of some montage film. The Panther Moderns specialize in hallucinatory simulations – in a world dipping into the “consensual hallucination” of cyberspace, they build hallucinations on top of it, subverting a reality that is already subjected to constant reconfiguration through digitalization, genetic body modification, and psychotropic drugs. If cyberpunk, as Lewis Call insists, picks up where Baudrillard’s delirious hysteria over the becoming-simulation, becoming-simulacrum of reality leaves off, figures like the Panther Moderns show the escape route. They embody the old ‘Mao-Dadaist’ slogan of the Autonomists rallied around Radio Alice: “false information produces real events.”

The political ramifications of the Panther Moderns, beyond the literary depiction of our very real world, did not go unnoticed. A group of theory-heads involved with ACT UP, a direct action/political advocacy group dedicated to revising awareness over the AIDs epidemic, read Neuromancer and took inspiration from the Panther Moderns. They christened themselves the Critical Art Ensemble, and began making waves with their elucidation of “tactical media” and their provocative stance that “as far as power is concerned, the streets are dead capital!” (i) Better to contest power right in the heart of its new ambiguity – the electronic flows that replace former sedentary masses. By being plugged into strange and wonderful history of tactical media, William Gibson finds himself embedded in a rhizomatic sprawl running back to the Dadaist and earlier and up to Occupy Wall Street and beyond – with a whole host of avant-gardes, freak scenes, reality hackers, and anonymous revolutionaries kicking around in between.

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The Panther Moderns, in Gibson’s world, are something of an avant-garde. With an array of practices and/or tactics hanging hazily between political action, artistic expression, and general trouble-making, their nihilistic surroundings finds their real world compliments in the industrialized Paris that so inspired the Decadents and the later Surrealists, the Saint-Germain scene that spewed out not only existentialism but the Situationists, or the avant-political networks that gave the world urban guerrilla commandos as much as it did Krautrock. What is it about the thin lines that exist between art, radical politics, and criminality? What makes these birds, seemingly of different species, flock together? And what do we make of the general atmosphere of radical urban transformation, encroaching poverty, and industrial ruination that spark them?

For now, I’d like to leave that up for others to untangle, and turn now to Accelerationism, that term so debate, celebrated, and reviled in equal terms. By two, some two years after Srnicek and Williams simultaneously equated accelerationism with left-wing technological development and dragged Nick Land and the CCRU out of the shadows that they hoped to resign them to, nearly every militant political moment has been brought together under the ‘Accelerationist’ label – almost to the point where the term hardly holds any meaning whatsoever. Marx encouraged technology’s ability to open up free time? Accelerationist. The Soviets looked towards computer automation to eliminate the traces of capitalist labor relations? Accelerationist. The Situationists wanted to turn cybernetics over to worker’s councils? Accelerationist. The ambiguities of communization theory? Accelerationist. Deleuze and Guattari, Lyotard, Baudrillard, Hardt, Negri – Accelerationism all the way down.

So ultimately, it’s not my goal to go indulge the adding of another name to the ever-expanding roster. That said, that’s precisely what I’m going to do – albeit with a little different spin.

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Over at the blog Obsolete Capitalism we find some rather unacknowledged information about the now-famous quote from Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, where they ask if Nietzsche was right all along and the decoding of flows (the capitalist processes of deterritorialization) needs to be accelerated – rather than the retreat into left-wing nationalism. Much has been made about the rejection of an important left-wing strategy deployed against multinational capitalism, and the way that accelerating capitalism’s expansion appears, at first glance, to be an odd veer into some sort of post-Marxist libertarianism (to deploy the term in contemporary parlance). Much less has been made about Nietzsche’s role in all of it – namely, where exactly did he say we had to accelerate decoding, and what did he mean by this? Obsolete Capitalism points us towards a fragment of Nietzsche’s titled “The Strong of the Future”, which was commented on at length in Pierre Klossowski’s Nietzsche and His Vicious Circle – a text that would come to bear an incredible influence over Deleuze, Guattari, Foucault and the other post-structuralist theorists. In fact, as Obsolete Capitalism points out, it was Klossowski’s decision to translate the term deployed by Nietzsche as “accelerate”, thus giving rise directly to Deleuze and Guattari’s interpretation.

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For Nietzsche, the levelling of society through modernizing forces will produce, as a sort of strange side effect or mutation that will affirm the dissolution of their traditionalist bonds and boundaries while carrying out an overcoming of the system that put them into play. Accelerationism, in the Nietzschean perspective, is less about pushing laissez-faire economics into apocalyptic overdrive or the unshackling of technology’s restraints. It’s about the fomenting of contrarian subjectivities – and in this sense it’s very much an affair of avant-gardes. The mad modernists wandering in the ruins, the leftist psychedelia of Vaneigem, the all-night jazz parties in Saint-Germain, the Autonomists celebrating the artificiality of simulation.

Hardt and Negri, who deploy the quote from Anti-Oedipus for their own ends (to invoke the multitude pushing Empire through to its other side, in a clear anticipation of Srnicek and Williams), also turn to Nietzsche as a figure to be hold clues to the future. Citing from The Will to Power (in which “The Strong of the Future” appears), they seize upon the figure of the barbarian, who will “come into view and consolidate themselves only after tremendous socialist crises.”(ii) Hardt and Negri stress that the barbarian “while escaping from the local and particular constraints of their human condition, must also continually attempt to construct a new body and new life.” In a footnote to this section of Empire they tell us that in cyberpunk fiction the barbarian find clues to its future beyond the rubble. A Panther Modern lurks in that direction.

Enter Semiotext(e), purveyors of what I would like to dub “grungy accelerationism”. It’s a dumb name, for sure, but I would like to clarify exactly what it means. Accelerationism here is used in the sense sketched about, as a sort of mutant subjectivity that begins (and ends) amidst the rubble of capitalism’s deterritorializing modernization processes. This also gives us a temporal space, marking the period prior to the inevitability of capitalism’s reterritorializing tendencies, which sorts through exactly what it’s made unhinged and puts it back together. Grungy, on the other hand, is a word that conjures up images of the 1990s – flannel shirts, bummed out kids, and the generalized ‘slacker attitude’ that prevailed in the underside of the Clinton economy. What’s more important, however, is what lurks behind these corporatized images: a sort of street nihilism where the punk mantra of “no future” becomes a way of life, and the conditions for new coordinates of living and do-it-yourself attitude fester and take root – all the while acknowledging the essential bullshit of the spectacle. And a caveat: this is not an attempt at periodization, or theory, or an excuse to canonize anything in orthodoxy. More than all, this is an excuse to point out a few – and maybe ultimately unimportant – aspects out there on the margins.

The origin of Semiotext(e) dates back to the early-to-mid 1970s, when Sylvere Lotringer – French immigrant and close friend to the celebrities of post-structuralism – got together with some of his students at Columbia University, where he taught courses on semiotics, to release a kind of underground ‘zine that would bridge the gap between French theory and the “downtown” arts culture that had weaved its way through New York City since the 1950s. Downtown culture was large and heterogeneous: it founds its origins in circles around the abstract expressionists (Jackson Pollock, Theodore Roszak, William de Koonig, etc) and the Fluxus artists (John Cage, Yoko Ono, George Maciunas, etc); it continued down through the minimalists (La Monte Young, Terry Riley, Philip Glass, etc) and Andy Warhol’s Exploding Plastic Inevitable and the Velvet Underground. It explored through punk rock (Richard Hell and the Voidoids, Television, the Ramones, etc) and later gave rise to no wave (Mars, DNA, Teenage Jesus and the Jerks, etc). It counted in its ranks innumerable poets, artists, painters, performance artists – and even more innumerable unclassifiable individuals who eschewed arts for a life near the bottom. It habituated in clubs and secreted away spaces like the Kitchen, Colab and the Mud Club; it has now given rise to an entire industry of retrospection.

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In the mid-1970s French theory was all but unknown – but its essential topics (subjectivity, power, rhizomes, nomadism, simulation, libidinal economics) seemed to Lotringer to speak not so much to the possibility of a revolution to come in Europe, but the actual practices being put into play in the United States. This is the usually accounted for origins of Semiotext(e); Lotringer’s own recounting of the publication’s founding hints towards what today is well known in critical circles as Accelerationism. Anti-Oedipus was the lynchpin, assimilating the demands of the desiring-revolution in May of 1968 with a new interpretation of how capitalism functions. Deleuze and Guattari, Lotringer says, were “upping the ante on Marx by observing that capital, far from being a purely repressive, ruthless mechanism meant to extract surplus-value, was constantly creating new values and new possibilities. And since capitalism absorbed everything, the trick was to counter it from within, redirecting its flows, ceaselessly moving ground.”(iii) Since France was dominated by heavy bureaucracy directed by cybernetically-minded socialists-turned-marketeers, this position was simply “science fiction”, while in America – and New York City in particular – it was immediately recognizable.

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In the issue of Semiotext(e) dedicated solely to Anti-Oedipus, published in 1977, these ideas are grounded even more firmly. In an essay section titled “Project for a Revolution in New York”, Lotringer writes that “The gamble of Anti-Oedipus is to reformulate revolutionary perspectives from the strong points, and the weak links, of capitalism.”(iv) Another essay in the issue, written by Lyotard with the name “Enurgumen Capitalism”, defines the revolutionary subject of Anti-Oedipus as the artist who struggles “to make himself inhuman”, and points towards its relationship with the flows of the libidinal economy that forever surpass their limits. In 2014 “Enurgumen Capitalism” would find its reprint – this time in the #Accelerationist Reader. “Nietzsche’s Return,” a Semiotext(e) issue from the same year, contains Deleuze’s essay “Nomad Thought”, where he quotes “The Strong of the Future” and adds “Faced with the decoding of our societies, the leaking away of our codes, Nietzsche is the one who does not endeavor to recode. He says: things still haven’t gone far enough, you are just children yet… In his writing as well as his thinking, Nietzsche pursues an attempt at decoding: not in the sense of a relative decoding which would consist in deciphering antiquated, current or future codes, but in the sense of an absolute decoding- the introduction of something that isn’t encodable, the jamming of all codes.”(v) A handful of pages later we find Lyotard again, this time celebrating Nietzsche’s projected decomposition of coordinates, and aligning this celebration on one hand with capitalism’s tendency towards dissolution, and the music of John Cage on the other.

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Across the 1970s, capital burned through a great many areas of New York City and left in its wake a hulking shell of what had once been a metropolis. Decades earlier Robert Moses, the so-called “Master Builder”, had went to work re-organizing the city’s urban space – crisscrossing it with highway and unmaking its neighborhoods in a grand vision of scale on par with Hausmann’s reconstruction of Paris under the watchful eye of Napoleon. But the city of the future would not be realized: the neighborhoods transformed by Moses’ top-down planning never recovered, and thanks to newly laid expressway systems were cut from the organic urban fabric. Compounded with corruption and mismanagement of public funds, the city teetering on the edge of bankruptcy by 1975. By this point, vast areas of the Lower East Side were empty, the streets lined with vacant lots and stores. Lydia Lunch recounted that “There were just blocks and blocks of abandoned buildings, set on fire nightly from people sleeping under tea lights,” while the filmmaker Scott B added “You could go to a building and take it over– steal electricity out of the lamp post and live in it for years.”(vi)

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In the eyes of Lotringer and Semiotext(e) this was becoming the staging ground for the emergence of “schizo-culture”, taking its cue from Deleuze and Guattari’s depiction of schizophrenia as a process of decoding and deterritorialization – not unlike capitalism but capable of making revolutionary breaks from the power it wields. In 1975 Semiotext(e) organized the Schizo-Culture conference at Columbia University, bringing together Deleuze, Guattari, Foucault and Lyotard with Cage, Burroughs and other members of this Downtown scene – but rather from being an academic success, it served to estrange Semiotext(e) from the university and push it into direct interaction with the street culture it sought to analyze. By the time the “Schizo-Culture” issue was released in 1978, the aesthetics of the magazine resembled a punk ‘zine more than anything, even if the first article is an interview with Foucault.

The notion of Schizo-Culture is precisely what I call grungy accelerationism – both move in the wake of capitalism’s flows and find their meanings to autonomy in the left-overs. A case in point was art “movement” of no wave, which grew in the abandoned districts of the Lower East Side and whose cacophony made the punk scene sound conservative. Bands like Teenage Jesus and the Jerks, Mars, DNA, James Chance and the Contortions, the Theoretical Girls and the Gynecologists took street nihilism as their launching pad, and used stake out a territory far beyond the co-opted, mass-produced culture of the 1970s. For the brief period of its existence, the no wave scene saw the collapse of boundaries between artistic disciplines – everyone was a musician, a sculptor, a painter, a writer, and a filmmaker. The hollowing-out of New York City allowed them to pursue these goals without resorting to wage labor. In a retrospective, Lydia Lunch recalled “Work? Are you nuts? Please. $75 per month– that was my rent when I got an apartment on 12th Street.” As in early avant-gardes, the line between arts and criminality blurred; many resorted to illegal means for money when it was necessary. In grungy accelerationism, life isn’t easy or pretty, but to quote Scott B “You can’t imagine the freedom that we had. The middle class had abandoned the place, and we just walked in and took it.”

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Semiotext(e) made its home in the no wave scene, with many of the artists taking part in putting the publications together. Take for example Diego Cortez, the director of the Mudd Club (the central locus of no wave music) and an organizer of a concert that brought together the downtown music scene with the concept artists from Soho, took helm on designing the lay-out several issues; his impact was felt on the immediate follow-up to schizo-culture, 1979’s “Autonomia: Post-Political Politics”. The purpose of this issue was to bring together the struggles of the Italian Autonomia with no wave, the two having emerged at the same time (albeit on different continents). Like their New York counterparts, the Autonomists took a strong line against labor, calling for a refusal of work and the glorification of idleness instead. Antonio Negri, in his classic text “Capitalist Domination and Working Class Sabotage” (a fragment of which can be found in the Semiotext(e) issue), channeled punk energy by asserting “We have a method for the destruction of work. We are in search of a positive measure of non-work, a measure of our liberation from that disgusting slavery from which the bosses have always profited, and which the official socialist movement has always imposed on us like some sort of title of nobility. No, we really cannot call ourselves ‘socialists’ for we can no longer accept your disgrace.”(vii)

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The Autonomia also held a certain debt to the French theorists, most specifically Deleuze, Guattari, and Baudrillard. The various tactics they deployed – pirate radio stations like Radio Alice, the refusal to work, the rejection of parliamentary politics, the usage of squats, and the bringing of the strange into everyday life (such as the case of the Metropolitan Indians, who wore face painted and prowled the streets of Rome, staging spontaneous urban) interventions such as impromptu concerts) – embodied the ideas of a schizoid revolution.  Guattari would agree in full, writing in a text titled “The Proliferation of the Margins” that in the case of the Autonomia, “the lines of flight merge with the objective lines of deterritorialization.”(viii) Again, we find the theme of revolution emerging in the wake of capitalism’s flows, a molecular uprising amongst the ruins.

Guattari pondered whether or not this molecular revolution could “take charge of not only local problems, but also administrative larger economic configurations”. The inevitable reterritorialization of capitalism’s flows took place instead. In the case of Italy, the Autonomia was dismantled under the state’s enacting of emergency laws. In New York City, the administrators had enacted a series of economic reforms following the near-bankruptcy of 1975; as the Reaganite 80s loomed, finance and real estate capital swept through the city, raising property rates across the boards and expunging the artists from their lofts. Flush with money, art patrons, rich collectors, and gallery owners turned their eyes to the concept artists, painters, and sculptors. Almost overnight the spontaneous immediatism of the downtown culture transformed into the affluent art market. Semiotext(e) rode this wave, shifting away from ‘zine-style publications to their “Foreign Agents” series – pocket-seized theory fragments bearing minimalist, black covers. The goal was to carry out the Situationist gesture of creating an “explosion in the heart of the commodity”, a sort of homeopathic antidote to the commoditization of all things radical and militant. One wonders, however, to the extent that “Foreign Agents” deviated from the spectacular wave of finance capitalism: with their aesthetic sheen and mobile nature, the books doubled as a fashionable accoutrement, something to be seen while reading in the subway or to show off to friends at a party. Case in point is the release of Baudrillard’s Simulation. Instead of throwing down the gauntlet, the ideas of hyppereality and simulacrum were stripped of their postmodern anarchist, cyberpunked potentials. It became the lingua franca of the art market itself, the new territory of the commodity sprawl.

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Now we turn to Autonomedia, a radically anarchist book publisher that became Semiotext(e)’s main distributor in the early 1980s. Best known for publishing works in the vein of Hakim Bey’s T.A.Z. and the militant writings of Ron Sakolsky, Autonomedia can be immediately contextualized in what is now commonly referred to as “post-left anarchism”. At the same time, I would argue that they – and the texts they print – embody what I’m referring to as grungy accelerationism. Instead of opting for a direct confrontation with the powers of capitalism, the bourgeoisie and the state (as Marxist-Leninism or communization theory might pose, in their own different routes), what was promoted instead was the construction of alternative, aesthetically experimental, DIY networks right in the midst of the ruins. John Cage, concept art and minimalist music mattered much less here than the ability to take theory out of its contexts and insert it into a gleeful, deviant intransigence.

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Autonomedia’s output is a small glimpse into a wider world, of which the downtown scene of New York City had been the recognizable tip of the iceberg. This was a world populated by anarchists, drop-outs, schisms groups, kooks, cranks, professional idlers, punks, nomads, parody mystics, vagabonds, and other figures that, to quote Anti-Oedipus, “know how to leave, to scramble codes, to cause flows to circulate…”(ix) This world had its own passcodes, rituals, and objects that circulated outside of commodity of relations. ‘Zines were an essential aspect of this circulation, as were cassettes of garage bands and noise music; mail art (with its own origins in the Fluxus movement) helped tie the whole network together.

Staying true to their insistence that the underside of America culture gave form to the abstract militancy of the French theorists, Semiotext(e) released in 1987 Semiotext(e) USA, edited by Jim Fleming (the editor of Autonomedia) and Peter Lamborn Wilson (better known as Hakim Bey). A dense compilation of writing, letters, comics, advertisements, and unclassifiable, Semiotex(e) USA performs a living archeology of this underground world. Like the Autonomia and the no wavers before them, a reoccurring theme is the refusal of work. Bob Black’s famous “Abolition of Work” appears next to anarcho-syndicalist propaganda material, detourned ads from women’s magazines calling on people to leave their careers, and comics suggesting that micropolitical revolution is no different that the so-called macropolitical transformations. The point is driven home clearly in a picture of a woman looking on wistfully, a wall clock ticking behind her. “So many revolutionaries without a revolution,” the thought bubbles above her head say. “I want a revolution without revolutionaries!”

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Semiotext(e) USA acts as a performative text. The last second of the book contains veritable classifieds section, full of addresses and advertisements for ‘zines, various fringe groups, ‘strange individuals’, and conspiracy nuts. A full page is dedicated to the Church of the Subgenius, a parody religion founded by Ivan Stang. Beyond the Church’s relationship to the postal avant-garde (through its connections to Neoism, cassette culture, and mail art writ large), the commonalities are clear: the Church preaches a gospel of ‘slack’ instead of work, and encourages the ‘followers’ to reach out and learn from every fringe subculture, conspiracy group, and religious sect imaginable. By providing a dialogue to these rhizomatic sources, Semiotext(e) USA invited the reader to participate directly in this world.

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Two years later, Semiotext(e) and Autonomedia unveiled their follow-up to Semiotext(e) USA – the aptly named Semiotext(e) SF. The topic here is accelerationist avant-lettre genre of cyberpunk and other mutant strands of science fiction. If USA was a cartography of the existing underground, SF aimed to show exactly grungy accelerationism was going – the editors (Peter Lamborn Wilson/Hakim Bey, Robert Anton Wilson and Rudy Rucker) note that made of the contributions they culled together “emerged largely from underground world of xerox microzines and American samizdat: writers so radically marginalized they could never be co-opted, recuperated, reified or bought out by the Establishment.”(x) When it comes to the well-known names of the genre (William Gibson, Bruce Sterling, etc.) the punk in cyberpunk is emphasized. “One imagines them,” they say of the authors, “as crazed computer hackers with green mohawks and decaying leather jackets, stoned on drugs so new the FDA hasn’t heard of them yet, word-processing their necropsychedelic prose to blaring tapes by groups with names like The Crucifucks, Dead Kennedys, Butthole Surfers, Bad Brains…”

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On the first page of Semiotext(e) SF we find the words “NO WAVE SF”. While this pointed isn’t elucidated, perhaps there is more going on there than an attempt to forge a bridge between the future and the past. Let’s take for our example Glenn Branca, who cut his musical teeth in the no wave band Theoretical Girls before releasing a series of extremely abstract works that blended rock guitar with the minimalist drone music of La Monte Young and Terry Riley – the culmination of an experiment launched by the Velvet Underground in 1966. Branca’s albums abound with references to Baudrillardian simulation and the Situationist critique of the Spectacle; it should not be so surprising, then, that he later could be found selling used copies of cyberpunk novels from his website. As James Reich puts it, there appears to be a distinctive – yet discrete – congruence between Branca’s liquid-metal guitar soundscapes. Describing the premier of his “Symphony No. 12” in 1997, he writes “For those of us that did not flee the auditorium covering our ears, Branca’s music possessed us (and continues to possess) with structures, planes, and hyperspaces, compelling a weird consensual hallucination in the distortion.”(xi)Rooting through the overlap between music and visual arts in New York City, he adds that “Branca the cyberpunk aficionado is… the link between artist Robert Longo whose work from the Men In The Cities series Branca used on the cover of his album The Ascension (1981) and Longo’s movie Johnny Mnemonic (1995) based on Gibson’s short story of the same name (1981)…”

An even more direct point of (sub)cultural connection comes with the Sonic Youth, the now-famous band that emerged at the tail end of no wave (with the first several of their albums produced by Branca. After a slew of releases following the no wave template – and bearing the usual no wave subject matter – they shifted gears and began peppering their music with references to the schizophrenic science fiction of Philip K. Dick and the cyberpunk of William Gibson. Their seminal Day Dream Nation, for example, boasts a track titled “The Sprawl” – the name of the dystopic super-city in Neuromancer and its sequels. The implication is that the underground New York City – the one that produced downtown culture, no wave, and the other elements in Semiotext(e)’s conception of “schizo-culture” is the real world equivalent of the strange spaces crafted by Gibson and his colleagues. This also marks, somewhat ironically, the transformation of grungy accelerationism into the grunge culture that swept the US in the 90s – as well as the promise of its eventual commodification through the ongoing process of reterritorialization.

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It occurs to me that this essay is far too long, and ultimately without any end in sight. In lieu of a conclusion proper, I just want to add a few extra thoughts. First of all, this small transhistory that has been traced here exists in a garden of forking paths, with plenty of other avenues to follow for those who are interested:

  • Absent here has been William Burroughs, Beat novelist-turned-science fiction writer-turned-(micro)political revolutionary. Described as the godfather of punk, Burroughs’ bestowed an immense influence over the no wave artists, while his writings can be found in numerous Semiotext(e) issues, including Schizo-Culture and Semiotext(e) SF. His literary tactics, such as the cut-up technique, are essential when tracing not only the lineage of tactical media strategies, but the development of cyberpunk as a genre.
  • After their dismantling by the Italian state, the Autonomists dispersed themselves through anarchic squats and social centers. It was here that Italian “political cyberpunk” took hold, as Autonomists poured over translations of Burroughs and Gibson and began looking to the computer and general access to technologies as the new terrain of social struggle. To deepen the eternal network, these autonomous cyberpunks operated in close proximity with the global mail art network.
  • Ignored here has been the industrial subculture, which hangs about midway between punk and cyberpunk. Through bands like Throbbing Gristle, Burroughs emerges as a figurehead here as well, with his ideas of cut-up being recast in the idea of technological body modification as a means of evading power’s processes of subjectivication.

And finally, I’d like to close with a quote from Nietzsche, by way of Hardt and Negri: “Who are our barbarians of today?”

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(i)Critical Art Ensemble Electronic Civil Disobedience http://www.critical-art.net/books/ecd/ecd2.pdf  

(ii) Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri Empire Harvard University Press, 2000, pg. 214

(iii) Sylvere Lotringer “Better Than Life: My 80s” Artforum, March, 2003, http://www.egs.edu/faculty/sylvere-lotringer/articles/better-than-life/

(iv) Sylvere Lotringer “Libido Unbound: The Politic of ‘Schizophrenia’”, in Semiotext(e) Anti-Oedipus: From Psychoanalysis to Schizopolitics, 1977, pg. 6

(v) Gilles Deleuze “Nomad Thought”, in Semiotext(e) Nietzsche’s Return 1977, Pg. 15

(vi) Marc Masters “No! The Origins of No Wave”Pitchfork January 15th, 2008, http://pitchfork.com/features/articles/6764-no-the-origins-of-no-wave/

(vii)Antonio Negri “Capitalist Domination and Working Class Sabotage”  https://libcom.org/library/capitalist-domination-working-class-sabotage-negri

(viii)Felix Guattari “The Proliferation of the Margins”, in Autonomia: Post-Political Politics Semiotext(e), 1979 pg. 109

(ix) Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari Anti-Oedipus Penguin, 1977, pg. 133

(x) Rudy Rucker, Peter Lamborn Wilson, Robert Anton Wilson, Semiotext(e) SF Semiotext(e), 1989 pg. 13

(xi) James Reich “Glenn Branca and the Lost History of Cyberpunk” Fiction Advocate, May 29th, 2009, http://fictionadvocate.com/2014/05/29/glenn-branca-and-the-lost-history-of-cyberpunk/

 

taken from Deterritorial Investigations Unit

Der Beitrag Grungy “Accelerationism” erschien zuerst auf non.

Connectivity as Inclusive Disjunction

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Abstractly, connectivity operates through inclusive disjunction, a process that puts otherwise foreign elements into communication with one another through an encounter that does not require those pieces to operate through a shared logic.(i) Rather than in-folding some common term, such as the introjection of an imperial dictate, The Metropolis unfolds. It exposes interiors through a mutual opening up (to name a few: the privatization of economic risk through increased debt obligation, the removal of tariffs that protect national industries, or the exemption of citizenship rights against government assassination).(ii) In this sense, those who condemn capitalism as a homogenizing force are incorrect – inclusion can spread through divergence. The Metropolis retains differential relations of parts by selecting “a particular zone that varies with each” that will make possible its integration of the “sum of infinitely tiny things.”(iii) Furthermore, by being more than inclusion based on a common term (the law, a nation, a people), disjunction is pure relation, a movement of “reciprocal asymmetric implication,” that expresses only difference itself (and not imposing equivalence, resolving into a general category, or synthesizing into a superior identity). (iv) The Metropolis hence shares Deleuze’s “most profound insight” that “difference is just as much communication, contagion of heterogeneities,” which means, “to connect is always to communicate on either side of a distance, by the very heterogeneity of terms.”(v) The effect of this contagion does not result in a unity, combination, or fusion; inclusive disjunction maintains a “politeness” – “an art of distances.”(vi)

Deleuze is pessimistic about connectivity. With Félix Guattari in What is Philosophy?, he argues for distrusting communication, as “commercial professional training” has made philosophy subservient to marketing and transformed concepts into advertising slogans.(vii) He ultimately argues that “continuous control and instant communication” constitutes a new form of power that must be evaded.(viii) This leads him to find refuge in “vacuoles of non-communication,” which can serve as “circuit breakers so we can elude control.”(ix)

Inclusive disjunction gives the Metropolis a categorically different relationship to difference. It spatializes difference, which allows the Metropolis to outmaneuver the traditional politics of difference, such as liberal freedom or multiculturalism. This is why many metropolitan spaces expand without what appears to be pre-given patterns or rules, such as The Third Italy or Australia’s Gold Coast.(x) The primary strategy of the Metropolis is thus to diffuse differences through inclusion rather than confront them through antagonism. Within this system of inclusion, difference is not a threat but the means by which contemporary power maintains a hold on the perpetual present. The effect of this temporal modulation is that historical time disappears as “contemporary events themselves retreat into a remote and fabulous realm of unverifiable stories, uncheckable statistics, unlikely explanations and untenable reasoning.”(xi) The accelerated speed of media increasingly makes networked media, such as the internet, a breeding ground for conspiracy and insinuation, as the sheer volume of participants and incredible speed of information accumulation means that in the time it takes to put one conspiratorial theory to bed, the raw material for many more will have already begun circulating.(xii)

Such a system of power cannot be escaped by simply celebrating the differences that grow out of life in the Metropolis, for inclusive disjunction allows the Metropolis to connect otherwise incommensurate subjects, flows, temporalities, and visibilities without suppressing their differences. In assembling them, the Metropolis does not leave those incommensurate things unperturbed. Rather, connectivity follows the database logic of positivity that was metaphysically prefigured by Deleuze in Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense.(xiii) Here, things are introduced into the Metropolis through a plane of positivities that unfolds secured elements, exposes them to risk, and eliminates their futurity. Unlike Debord’s “society of the Spectacle,” where the management of society is still dominated by the human eye, we have entered the machine-readable era where information flows circulate outside the reach of human perception. We are thus given the impression that ‘the more things change, the more they stay the same.’ The inclusion and proliferation of difference is thus not a motor for change but stasis. The political potentials made available through inclusive disjunction are the familiar channels of liberal capitalism, such as public influence, legal privilege, and market power. All of these work through a principle of capture often described as “communicative capitalism,” which expands through circuits of exploitation and submission.(xiv)

Resistance to connectivity may require the other side of disjunction, exclusive disjunction: the forced choice between two options. What exclusive disjunction offers is a path for evading the capture as ‘just another difference.’ The first obstacle to exclusive disjunction is liberal pluralism, which is so deeply intertwined with the politics of difference that the very notion of exclusivity may be a tough pill for some to swallow. Forced choice is not the enemy of difference, however, as it does not reduce the world to a simple binary. There are certainly moments of exclusive disjunction that should remain the cause of intense political suspicion, such as the trans-phobic claim that masculinity and femininity are exclusive. Exclusive disjunction does not force a choice between two homogeneous forms, rather it intensifies whatever incommensurability exists between worlds of difference – on each side of a network, on each side of a multiplicity. This is how Deleuze and Guattari can simultaneously affirm “a thousand tiny sexes” and that all radical gender politics begins through “becoming-woman.”(xv) In fact, the illusion that there is only one possible world is a lie perpetuated in the Metropolis to maintain a perpetual present. Exclusion’s difference-making potential only appears paradoxical from the perspective of pluralistic liberalism. If one begins instead from the perspective that the difference of the Metropolis is a repetition of the same, then exclusivity simply clarifies the difference between reform and revolution. To put it suggestively but crudely: instead of convergence culture that puts everything into communication, exclusive disjunction seeks a divergence culture that spins things off to pursue their own paths. There are already instances of this divergence, as seen in various subcultures of glitch and noise, but they do not politicize incompatibility. It is thus post-colonialism that should be our guide, as it has already politicized the incommensurable and has laid a blueprint for global delinking. (xvi)

An excerpt from my forthcoming article “Confronting Connectivity: Feminist Challenges to the Metropolis” in Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies.

(i) Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R Lane (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1983).

(ii) Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 136-137.

(iii) Ibid, 130-131.

(iv) François Zourabichvili, Deleuze: A Philosophy of the Event together with The Vocabulary of Desire, trans. Kieren Aarons (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012). 168.

(v) Ibid, 121.

(vi) Ibid, 121.

(vii)Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1994), 12.

(viii) Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on Societies of Control,” trans. Martin Joughlin, Negotiations 1972-1990 (New York, NY: Columbia University Press), 174.

(ix) Ibid, 175.

(x) Manuel DeLanda, A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History (New York: Zone Books, 2000); Patricia Wise, “Australia’s Gold Coast: A City Producing Itself,” in Urban Space and Cityscapes: Perspectives from Modern and Contemporary Culture, ed. Christoph Lindner (New York: Routledge, 2006), 95-120.

(xi)Guy Debord, Comments on the Society of the Spectacle, trans. Malcolm Imrie (New York: Verso, 1990), 16.

(xii) Esther Dyson, “End of the Official Story,” Executive Excellence 175 (2000).

(xiii) Manovich, Language of New Media; Deleuze, Difference and Repetition; Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale, ed. Constantin V. Boundas (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1990).

(xiv)Dean, Blog Theory.

(xv) Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 213; 275-280.

(xvi) Homi Bhabha, “Location, Intervention, Incommensurability: A Conversation with Homi Bhabha,” Emergences 1 (1993); Kenneth Surin, Freedom Not Yet: Liberation and the Next World Order (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009).

take from here

Der Beitrag Connectivity as Inclusive Disjunction erschien zuerst auf non.

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