Achim Szepanski ist ein echter Tausendsassa: Anfang der 80er in adornitischen Studentenkreisen unterwegs, entdeckte er Ende der 80er Jahre die Philosophie von Gilles Deleuze und Félix Guattari und den Techno, gründete Anfang der 90er die weltbekannten avantgardistischen Elektro-Labels Force Inc. Music Works und Milles Plateaux. Anfang der Zehner Jahre dann veröffentlichte er die beiden Romane Saal 6 und Pole Position in seinem eigenen Kleinverlag Rhizomatique. Diese Romane spielen in Frankfurt am Main, sie wollen insbesondere ein realistisches Portrait der seltsamen Konstellation Bahnhofs-/Bankenviertel zeichnen, in der Szepanski seit Jahrzehnten zu Hause ist. Sicher nirgendwo in Deutschland und nur an ganz wenigen Orten der Welt lässt sich so unmittelbar nachempfinden, was es heißt, in einem finanzmarktdominierten Kapitalismus zu leben.
Diesem Gegenstand, der buchstäblich direkt vor seiner Nase liegt, widmet sich Szepanski nun in seinem dreibändigen Werk Kapitalisierung aus theoretischer Sicht. Es ist der ambitionierte Versuch, das Marxsche Kapital einer radikalen Neulektüre zu unterziehen. Der Text wird dabei grundsätzlich antiphilologisch gelesen – er dient nicht als ‚heilige Schrift‘, die es sorgfältig zu exegieren oder zu der es gar ‚zurückzukehren‘ gälte, sondern als Material, das zu dem Zweck herangezogen wird, den Marx selbst verfolgte: Ein Verständnis des gegenwärtigen Kapitalismus in seinen progressivsten Formen zu entwickeln.
Wie schon Marx bedient er sich dabei großzügig aus einem gewaltigen Arsenal theoretischer Bezüge aus heterogensten Theorietraditionen über (um nur einige zentrale zu nennen) Michel Foucault und Jacques Derrida bis hin zu Nick Land, Günther Anders, Elie Ayache, John Milios, Elena Esposito, Alexander Galloway und Maurizio Lazzarato. In philosophischer Hinsicht jedoch sind seine zentralen Rohstofflieferanten dabei einerseits das bereits erwähnte Philosophenduo Deleuze/Guattari, andererseits das Projekt der „Non-Philosophie“, das der französische Theoretiker François Laruelle weitgehend unbeachtet vom philosophischen Mainstreamdiskurs seit einigen Jahrzehnten entwickelt. Der erste Band, Marx‘ Non-Ökonomie, beginnt dementsprechend nach einer umfassenden Einleitung mit zwei langen einführenden Kapiteln zu Laruelle und Deleuze/Guattari, die sich – wie im Übrigen alle Kapitel des Buches – auch sehr gut separat lesen lassen. Das Laruelle-Kapitel dürfte die erste deutschsprachige Einführung in das Denken dieses zunächst sehr schwer zugänglichen Theoretikers darstellen. Szepanski hebt hier Laruelles radikalen Realismus hervor: Laruelle will ein „Reales“ denken, das nicht mehr – wie in der klassischen Philosophie – als irgendwie auf Subjektives rückführbar gedacht wird oder mit diesem in Wechselbeziehung stehend, sondern als dem Bewusstsein grundsätzlich entzogen und es trotzdem „in der letzten Instanz“ determinierend. Die „Non-Philosophie“ muss als Versuch verstanden werden, dieses „Reale“ trotzdem zu denken, indem es alle Bewusstseinsphänomene (inklusive alle Wissenschaften und die Philosophie selbst) als dessen Symptome interpretiert. Sie verfährt dabei axiomatisch (insofern sie immer bewusst willkürliche, letztendlich politisch motivierte Ausgangsannahmen über das „Reale“ treffen muss), pluralistisch (insofern kein einzelnes Bewusstseinsphänomen beanspruchen kann, das „Reale“ besser zu repräsentieren als irgendein anderes) und experimentell (insofern es die Willkürlichkeit der eigenen Ausgangsaxiome und die Möglichkeit ihres Scheiterns am „Realen“ permanent mitreflektiert und sie wenn nötig korrigiert). Dementsprechend konzipiert Szepanski auch seine „Non-Ökonomie“. Als das „Reale“ setzt er dabei die kapitalistische Ökonomie, als Symptome gelten ihm alle auf diese Ökonomie irgendwie Bezug nehmenden Theorien (inklusive die klassische Ökonomie selbst).
Von Deleuze und Guattari übernimmt Szepanski insbesondere das Konzept des „Virtuellen“, das er in Abgrenzung vom „Potentiellen“ und „Aktuellen“ definiert. Während das Potentielle das bloß abstrakt Mögliche bezeichnet, das Aktuelle das bloß Vorhandene, bezeichnet das Virtuelle das konkret Mögliche, die einem Gegenstand wirklich inhärenten Möglichkeiten – die Kräfte, die er selbst besitzt, und die, die sich seiner bemächtigen können. Das Virtuelle besitzt gegenüber Potentiellem und Aktuellem ein ontologisches Primat: Entscheidend für die Seinsweise eines Gegenstandes ist weder, was er (abgetrennt von aller Möglichkeit) ist, noch, was er (abgetrennt von aller Wirklichkeit) kann, sondern was er wirklich kann, was die ihm immanente reale Tendenz ist.
Szepanski begreift davon ausgehend das „Reale“ des Kapitalismus als Prozess der Kapitalisierung, d.h. der Selbstvermehrung des Kapitals um seiner selbst willen. Dieser hat die immanente Tendenz zur größtmöglichen Beschleunigung mit der Lichtgeschwindigkeit als empirischer, der Auflösung der Zeit im Raum als logischer absoluter Grenze. Diese Akzeleration um jeden Preis erreicht die Kapitalisierung einerseits durch technische Perfektionierung, andererseits durch das, was Szepanski als „Finanzialisierung“ fasst: Die zunehmende Ablösung der Kapitalakkumulation von jeder ‚Realwirtschaft‘ und die Verwandlung des Kapitals in immer weniger von stofflichen Prozessen abhängendes finanzielles Kapital.
Beide Aspekte der Akzeleration des gegenwärtigen Kapitalismus sieht Szepanski in der heutigen Situation in einem geradezu dystopischen Maße realisiert an. Er analysiert dies umfassend in dem zweiten Band, Non-Ökonomie des gegenwärtigen Kapitalismus. Szepanski geht davon aus, dass sich das Verhältnis von Realwirtschaft und Finanzsphäre in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten anders, als noch viele Marxisten annehmen, genau umgekehrt hat: Die Finanzsphäre dominiert die Realwirtschaft strukturell. Das Derivat ist nicht mehr das nur Abgeleitete der Realwirtschaft, die ‚Realwirtschaft‘ ist das Derivat des finanziellen Kapitals.
Diese auf den ersten Blick kontraintuituive These leitet Szepanski von der Logik der Kapitalisierung selbst her: Bereits die elementarste kapitalistische Produktion ist immer auf ihre virtuelle Realisierung auf dem Markt hin bezogen und damit eine Spekulation auf die Zukunft, die abhängig von einem Kredit ist. Insofern folgt Szepanski der von Helmut Reichelt, Hans-Georg Backhaus, Michael Heinrich und anderen entwickelten „Neuen Marx-Lektüre“ und dem so genannten „Zirkulationsmarxismus“. Er geht allerdings weiter als diese, insofern er aus diesem logischen Je-Schon-Bezogen-Sein der Produktion auf die Zirkulation (und damit der Finanzsphäre) folgert, das letztere „in letzter Instanz“ immer das bestimmende Element bildet und im Zuge des der Kapitalisierung immanenten Drangs nach Akzeleration in stets zunehmenden Maße.
Dies hat für Szepanski, anders als Robert Kurz, Norbert Trenkle, Ernst Lohoff und andere Vertreter der auf der „Neuen Marx-Lektüre“ aufbauenden Krisentheorie, nach der der gegenwärtige Kapitalismus mit seiner überbordenden Technisierung und Ersetzung der Ware Arbeitskraft durch Maschinen sich seiner immanenten absoluten Schranke zubewegt, vom Standpunkt des Kapitals selbst her gedacht keine bedrohlichen oder gar existenzgefährdenden Potentiale. Da Szepanski die Arbeitswerttheorie ablehnt und die Mehrwertakkumulation allgemein als Aneignung und Ausbeutung von Differenzen fasst (von denen die zwischen Wert der Arbeitsprodukts und Wert der Arbeitskraft nur eine ist, u.a. geht Szepanski von einem „maschinellen Mehrwert“ aus), kann der Kapitalismus für ihn sehr gut auch in einer – vom Standpunkt der Menschheit freilich in der Tat bedrohlichen und existenzgefährdenden – post-humanen Zukunft fortexistieren und das sogar sehr gut. ‚Krisen‘ sind vom Standpunkt des kapitalistischen Gesamtakkumulationsprozesses her betrachtet notwendige Anpassungs- und Optimierungsmaßnahmen, überhaupt nicht schlecht, sondern im Gegenteil begrüßenswert, Beschleuniger der Akkumulation, in denen überholtes, zu langsames Kapital im großen Maßstab auf der Strecke bleibt und schnelles, flexibles gestärkt hervorgeht.
Szepanski wendet sich aber auch gegen den vor allem im englischsprachigen Raum vertretenen „Akzelerationismus“, einer sich in den letzten Jahren entwickelnden neo-marxistischen Strömung, die den gegenwärtigen neoliberalen Kapitalismus vor allem als Hemmnis von Beschleunigung begreift. Im Gegenteil ist der neoliberale Kapitalismus der größte Beschleuniger aller Zeiten und Beschleunigung kein Wert an sich.
Das dystopische Moment seiner Gegenwartsdiagnose schlägt insbesondere in den Passagen durch, in denen es um die Technik geht. Szepanski sieht das Individuum immer mehr in maschinelle Prozesse kybernetischer Steuerung integriert, die es mehr und mehr zum völligen „Dividuum“ (Deleuze) degradieren. Dies macht er insbesondere an der Entwicklung des Internets mit seinen unglaublichen Geschwindigkeiten, Vernetzungen und Rechenkapazitäten fest, die alle menschlichen Potentiale bei weitem übertreffen und den Menschen mehr und mehr in ein potentiell störendes Anhängsel der Maschinen verwandeln. Diese nach ihm bereits beängstigend reale Horrorvision entwickelt Szepanski vor allem in den beiden glänzend geschriebenen Abschlussessays Akzeleration, Hochfrequenzhandel und Ökotechnik und Arbeit ist Dienst, in denen auch besonders deutlich die kulturdiagnostische Dimension seiner Theorie hervortritt. Die technologische Seite des Prozesses der Kapitalisierung wird zentraler Gegenstand des dritten Bandes sein, der Ende 2015 erscheinen soll.
Die große Stärke von Szepanskis Projekt besteht darin, dass es ihm gelingt jenseits im deutschsprachigen Raum so weit verbreiteter marxologischer und hegelianisierender Borniertheiten das Marxsche Werk wieder als theoretisches Werkzeug lebendig macht. Er liest Marx konsequent nicht von den berüchtigten vier Kapiteln des ersten Bandes (selbst die Fetischanalyse spielt bei ihm überhaupt keine Rolle), sondern vom Marx des dritten Bandes, von der Analyse des kapitalistischen Gesamtakkumulationsprozesses, her. Das macht seine Herangehensweise für deutschsprachige Leser ungewohnt, aber umso gewinnbringender. Insbesondere macht sich Szepanski im Gegensatz zu vielen anderen Autoren, hier wiederum genau wie Marx, die Mühe, wirklich detailliert in die Tiefen seines empirischen Gegenstands einzudringen und sich nicht in abstrakten Allgemeinplätzen zu verlieren. Er stellt den Marx der Fetischkritik, der in Deutschland so lang linke Diskurse dominierte, endlich wieder auf seine ökonomiekritischen, empirischen Füße zurück ohne dabei zugleich hinter die Erkenntnisse der „Neuen Marx-Lektüre“ zurückzufallen, sondern sie aneignend weiterzutreiben.
Aus philosophischer und auch politischer Sicht werfen die Bücher eher Fragen auf als das sie Antworten geben – doch es sind wichtige, produktive Fragen, denen insbesondere die akademische Linke viel zu lange ausgewichen ist. Er stellt nämlich radikal die Politisierung, Ästhetisierung und Kulturalisierung linker Diskurse und Politiken in Frage, die gegenwärtig in vielen Bereichen zu beobachten ist. Ausgerechnet in Zeiten, in denen das Ökonomische so deutlich wie lange nicht auf die unmittelbaren Lebensverhältnisse der Menschen zugreift, beschäftigt sich die linke Philosophie vor allem mit Fragen der Ästhetik, der Politik, der Normativität, der Kulturkritik. Doch welche Bedeutung kann dieser gesamte Bereich des Subjektiven, ja: des Humanen, haben, wenn die Übermacht von Algorithmen und kybernetischen maschinellen Prozessen in der heutigen Lebenswelt den Begriff des Subjekts immer unwirklicher werden lässt. Und wie kann das Humane in einer solchen Situation noch gedacht und vor allem gerettet werden? Ein gewisser Nihilismus durchzieht diesbezüglich Szepanskis Bücher – und doch merkt man jeder Seite an, dass sich Szepanski nicht mit einer Resignation vor diesem herrschenden Nihilismus begnügt, sondern gegen ihn anschreibt. Der Ball ist damit ins Spiel gebracht – inwieweit er aufgegriffen wird, wird sich zeigen. Szepanskis Gegenwartsdiagnose will, wie einst Adornos ähnlich düstere, praktisch widerlegt werden. Von dieser Widerlegung hängt nicht bloß das Bestehen dieser oder jener Wirtschaftsordnung, sondern der Menschheit wie wir sie (noch) kennen (oder es uns zumindest einbilden zu tun) ab.
übernommen von Widerspruch
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I. Beyond Marxology: Coming Out of the German Box
Achim Szepanki’s trilogy Kapitalisierung (Capitalisation) may be the most important publication on Marxist economy in the German-speaking world since Robert Kurz’ Schwarzbuch Kapitalismus) (The Black Book of Capitalism) (1999). To understand this claim one has to know that for the last decades German-speaking Marxist discourse has been more or less completely dominated by the ‘Neue Marx-Lektüre’ (New Marx-Reading), a school of Marxology that has been founded by Hans-Georg Backhaus, Helmut Reichelt, Michael Heinrich, Robert Kurz, and others. 2) Under this label they have established a reading of Marx’ Capital which is strongly focused on the book’s first four chapters in which Marx is said to have developed a structural critique of the form of capitalist socialisation with the logically connected forms of value, money, commodity, and the fetishism of these forms as its structural core. The whole rest of the book is understood as a mere development of this fundamental structure, which many even see as a superfluous and nowadays irrelevant appendix. One is justified in suspecting that the ‘Neue Marx-Lektüre’ is, in its essence, more or less a renewal of the classical Western Marxist reading of Marx as introduced by György Lukács and developed further by the Frankfurt School.
This ‘Neue Marx-Lektüre’ marked a clear progress. It helped to immunise against personalising views on Capitalist societies that can easily lead to forms of anti-Semitism, and views that focus on class struggle while ignoring the economical laws that shape it. Moreover, Robert Kurz, Roswitha Scholz, Ernst Lohoff, Norbert Trenkle, and other members of the journals Krisis 3) (and, subsequently, EXIT! 4) ) have developed since the late 80s under the premises of ‘Neue Marx-Lektüre’ an important analysis of current capitalism. They see it as having reached its final structural crisis as the substance of value (and, thus, profit), human labour, becomes more and more obsolete with the ‘third technological revolution’, i.e. the massive introduction of microelectronic technologies since the 70s.
At the same time, it lead to an unproductive stagnation of Marxist German-speaking discourse. It became more or less cut off from international debates while having little influence on these debates itself. Marxist’ debates have become merely philological and self-referential. The rich analysis that Marx offers in the Capital has been reduced to a Neo-Hegelian cultural criticism, a purely negative critique that also lead to a political stagnation in large parts of the German-speaking radical Left. The probably most awkward manifestation of this is the ‘Antideutsche Bewegung’ (‘anti-German movement’) that abolished classical Communist policy at all in favour of aggressive Pro-Israel- and Anti-Islam-lobbying that corresponds well, all-too-well with the neoliberal economic policy (and its correlating cultural policy of diversity management and political correctness on the one hand, the ideological formation of a Western identity that defines itself against ‘terrorist’ or ‘fundamentalist’ forces on the other hand) of Gerhard Schröder and Angela Merkel. Leftist debates and politics have altogether become more or less completely culturalised and politicised and focused on issues such as queer feminism, anti-Fascism, anti-Racism, and anti-Islamism in the last two decades – a paradoxical, even absurd development if one bears in mind that at the same time the worst economic crisis in decades took place.
Achim Szepanski is – besides for example authors like Frank Engster (2014) and Harald Strauß (2013) – one of the few German-speaking authors who, frustrated by this dissatisfactory situation, have had the courage to come out of the German-speaking box in order to develop a (within a German context) completely new and even revolutionary reading of Marx and may in the long run lead to a re-economisation and re-radicalisation of German leftist politics. Possibly, the German radical left may be, after a long time of decline, a factor to be reckoned with again.
Moreover, the significance of Szepanki’s book does not exhaust itself within a mere German-speaking context. His book is of great importance for an international audience as well. Especially the politicisation and culturalisation under the influence of neoliberalism, i.e. the postmodernisation of the Left seem to be massive problem on a global scale.
II. Marx, Laruelle, Deleuze
The first volume of the trilogy, Marx’ Non-Ökonomie (Marx’ Non-Economics) deals mainly with a re-interpretation of Capital and the development of Szepanski’s philosophical and methodological premises. The freshness of Szepanki’s approach stems mainly from the fact that he – just like Marx himself – is not so much interested in philological nit-picking but uses his theoretical references as mere tool-boxes in order to reach a better understanding of the current situation. And – again just like Marx – he refers to the most innovative theories of his time. Among many others, these are mainly the Marxian critique of political economy itself (seen through the eyes of 150 years of discourse around it that Szepanski receives to an impressively large extent), the project of Non-Philosophy that François Laruelle has been developing for the last few decades, and the post-structuralist heterodox philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.
II. 1 The Conception of Non-Economics
Obviously enough, the title ‘Non-Economics’ refers to Laruelle. The parts of the book on Laruelle are possibly the hardest to comprehend. However, the chapter on Laruelle, Das Konzept der Non-Philosophie (The Conception of Non-Philosophy), can be read on its own as an excellent introduction to Laruelle’s unusual thinking. 5) Szepanski is presumably the first German-speaking author who refers to Laruelle in great detail at all. What he essentially takes from Laruelle is an emphatic conception of ‘the Real’ which determines the world of human activities ‘in-the-last-instance’ (a term that Szepanki’s takes from Laruelle but which also reminds of classical Marxism) without being determined itself. Thus, there is no reciprocity in the relationship between human world and ‘the Real’, but a relationship that is purely one-sided: ‘The Real’ is that which grounds any human activity without being grounded itself. As such, it is never present itself but can only be grasped by interpreting the phenomena of the human world as its symptoms. Consequently, all attempts to interpret it are mere constructions which can make no claim towards ultimate truth. It can only proceed by consciously setting some basic axioms that are in the last instance political.
This assumption leads Laruelle towards the development of a ‘Non-Philosophy’ that completely avoids that which he sees as the major failure of any kind of classical philosophy including classical materialism: seeking an identical subject-object which can be used as a starting point for an absolute knowledge of the world. Philosophy does this by picking one particular phenomenon of conscious experience and declaring it to be the transcendental fundament for any experience and the fundamental principle of the world. Thus, any kind of traditional philosophy reduces the world to a subjective phenomenon – even traditional materialism as its ‘matter’ is still always-already ‘matter-for-a-subject’. Against this, Laruelle takes any kind of human knowledge as an equal symptom of the Real; his method is strictly realist, pluralist, and non-fundamentalist. Thus we see that Laruelle’s (and accordingly Szepanki’s) ‘non’ is not a mere negation but a ‘non’ comparable to the ‘non’ of non-Euclidean geometry: It does not only negate traditional forms of knowledge but integrates it within a more flexible, more comprehensive framework in which it is conserved as a special case.
The same goes not just for philosophy but for any kind of science insofar as any science seeks to seal off its realm of knowledge from other realms and to become absolute by taking mere special cases for the objective manifestation of the Real. Consequently, the goal of Szepanki’s work is to interpret our current world as a symptom of ‘the Real’. His basic axiom is that the Real of our current world is the process of capitalisation. It should be clear that this does not imply that his project is ‘economist’ in a traditional sense of the word. It is exactly ‘non-economist’ insofar as ‘the Real’ of that which is the object of standard economics is itself non-economic. Standard economics are therefore only one tool among many others in order to understand capitalist economy – they are a symptom of capitalisation itself.
II. 2 Capitalisation as a Process
Szepanski develops his conception of capitalisation under quasi-ontological premises that he takes from Deleuze and Guattari. The most important concepts in this respect are ‘the Actual’, ‘the Possible’, and ‘the Virtual’. In opposition to the Possible – which envelops only ‘possible possibilities’, possibilities that are abstract insofar as they merely could be actualised – the Virtual signifies a concrete Possible, possibilities that are already present in the Actual, actual possibilities. In this constellation, the Virtual possesses a quasi-ontological primacy: Things are not determined by what they are but by what they can be, i.e. what is within their power resp. what powers can take possession of them. Thus capital can only be understood as a process, namely: capitalisation, which is shaped by a certain virtuality or inherent tendency. It always transcends its material, immediate manifestations (means of production, money, gold, goods, workers …) towards something else.
II. 3 Capitalisation as Acceleration
In the rest of the first volume Szepanski develops in great detail how this process could be comprehended by using Marx’ Capital. Effectively, he turns the Hegelian reading of the Capital upside down: The first four chapters play little part in his interpretation. The analyses of the concrete capitalist process of production (including especially the large deliberations on modern technology), which Marx gives in the first, and that of the totality of capitalist circulation and financial capital, which Marx gives in the second and third volume of his work, are not seen as mere manifestations of the commodity form but the commodity form is interpreted in the light of the more concrete, more comprehensive phenomena. This casts a completely different light on it: While using it as a material and starting point of his own analysis, Szepanski deconstructs nearly every dogma of the ‘Neue Marx-Lektüre’. He re-constructs Marx’ critique without referring to its ‘holy grails’, the Hegelian conceptions of fetishism and reification, at all, he shows the insolvable difficulties that occur when one wants to deduct the money form from the commodity form in a purely logical way, and he even shows that human labour is not the ultimate source of surplus-value but that there is a machinal surplus-value as well, and that the source of surplus-value has to be interpreted as the privatisation and exploitation of differences in general, not just the difference between paid and unpaid labour.
Especially the last point is crucial: It contradicts any theory of capitalist crisis (such as Robert Kurz’ that has been mentioned above) that supposes that automatisation is the worst problem, even the historical limit, of capitalism. Surplus-value can also be produced in a completely de-humanised production. Thus, Szepanski shows that traditional Marxist critique is based on a humanist prejudice: It is too optimist about capitalism insofar it thinks that capitalism is, in the last instance, a humanist project. Szepanski demonstrates that capitalism does not care about humanity, even the most basic survival of the human race, at all. Not de-humanisation, but on the contrary: humanity, is an obstacle to its development insofar as the human body is less effective than a robot (and a robot less effective than a mere algorithm). Capitalism is more nihilist than even Marx could have imagined in his worst nightmares.
Obviously enough, this point of Szepanski’s theory is also directed against the recent movement of Accelerationism – a thread of current Marxism that claims basically that Capitalism is an obstacle towards technological development and acceleration. 6) On the contrary, the process of capitalisation (especially in its neoliberal mode of total unleashing) has to be understood as a process of radical acceleration with the speed of light as its only empirical borderline, and the self-sublation of time into mere space as its (of course impossible) virtual goal.
II. 4 Capitalisation as Financialisation
Thus, the basic movement of capitalism is pure tautological self-increase, profit for the sake of profit, acceleration of the process of accumulation at any cost its ultimate goal. Consequently, Szepanski demonstrates that the process of capitalisation has to be ultimately understood as a process of financialisation, that financial capital is the ‘ideal form’ of the accumulation of capital insofar it virtually has neither temporal nor spatial limits.
Traditional Marxist analysis already showed that any criticism of ‘financial capitalism’ as a separate phenomenon falls prey to a bad abstraction that can easily lead to reactionary forms of politics such as anti-Semitism. 7) ‘Financial capitalism’ is no surplus-phenomenon that helps or even restrains ‘normal’ accumulation: It is an integral part of normal accumulation of capital, there will be no capitalism without credit, interest, derivatives and so on.
Szepanski goes one step further: Insofar as financial capital is the virtual force of capitalisation it is the dominating one. The sphere of financial capital is not, not even in the last instance, grounded in ‘real economy’; on the contrary, in the last instance real economy is based on the complex processes of financial capital. ‘Real economy’ is a derivative of financial economy, not the other way round.
III. Dystopia as Reality: Nihilism and Death of Man
In the second volume of his project, Non-Ökonomie des gegenwärtigen Kapitalismus (Non-Economics of Current Capitalism), Szepanki takes the step into the analysis of current capitalism under the mentioned premises. It is astonishing how much empirical material and theories from different schools he uses to underlie his diagnosis. Besides the already mentioned theoreticians he uses, to name just a few, Michel Foucault, Hans-Dieter Bahr, Günther Anders, Nick Land, Paulo Virilio, Maurizio Lazzarato, Niklas Luhmann, and Louis Althusser.
The already mentioned immanent dominating tendencies of capitalism have become manifest in a frightening way since the 70s. By and large, the thesis of Szepanski can be summed up in the sentence: Dystopia is now. ‘Real economy’ has already been substituted by financial economy in large parts, the acceleration of this economy has already reached unimaginable measures. At the same time, microelectronic technologies have absorbed and transformed traditional human life-world in a way that hardly anyone would have predicted and that Szepanski describes in the most drastic ways: Technology is by no means a means of human subjectivity any more but, on the contrary, human consciousness is becoming a pure means of technological processes that control it all the way down. At the same time, individuals (and also: companies, institutions, whole states …) are more and more integrated in the streams of financial capital by means of indebtedness. Culture, values, subjectivity, even ‘man’ itself ceases to exist in this new, entirely nihilist situation we are confronted with.
Here lies the true significance and provocation of Szepanski’s analysis. He shows that our current material situation puts into question the way we are traditionally accustomed to act and think on a most fundamental level. This relevance is not only philosophical but directly practical and political: How can we act on an individual or collective scale in a more and more post-human world that challenges the very conditions of possibility of action? How can we even think in such a world in which thinking is more and more substituted by machine computing?
From Szepanski’s point of view, what the Left in large parts does is more or less entirely obsolete and naïve: In a world that is almost entirely reigned by algorithms there is not much room for meaningful cultural criticism, arts, philosophy, theory, and even politics at all. It should be read as a soberly articulated but nonetheless passionate appeal: Forget all this hip deconstruction-/discourse-/aesthetics-/ethics-stuff, focus on the objective reality of our current situation and question the very relevance of all these nice things. The full, unhindered acknowledgement of this situation, how dark it may be, is the only way to change it – and to change it is the obvious aim of Szepanki’s project, however descriptive it presents itself.
Thus, Szepanski undertakes only the very first step of the complete re-definition of the leftist, or even: the human, project that is needed today. He develops neither a normative critique nor a political strategy nor a utopian counter-vision. But it is the most crucial step. It is a necessary book in a dangerous situation.
A third volume will follow in 2015 in which Szepanski will develop further his conception of technology. Possibly (and: hopefully) this volume will show some internal contradictions or breaks within current Capitalism, maybe ‘alignments’ in the sense of Deleuze/Guattari. 8)
References
Engster, Frank 2014, Das Geld als Maß, Mittel und Methode: Das Rechnen mit der Identität der Zeit, Berlin: Neofelis.
Heinrich, Michael 2005, Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. Eine Einführung, Stuttgart: Schmetterling.
Kurz, Robert 1999, Schwarzbuch Kapitalismus: Ein Abgesang auf die Marktwirtschaft, Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn.
Postone, Moishe 1986, ‘Anti-Semitism and National Socialism’, in A. Rabinbach and J. Zipes (eds.), Germans and Jews Since the Holocaust, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1986.
Reichelt, Helmut 2001, Zur logischen Struktur des Kapitalbegriffs bei Karl Marx, Freiburg im Breisgau: Ça Ira.
Strauß, Harald 2013, Signifikationen der Arbeit. Die Geltung des Differenzianten ‚Wert‘, Berlin: Parodos.
1. | ↑ | This article is a longer version of a review I wrote for Marx & Philosophy. Link: http://marxandphilosophy.org.uk/reviewofbooks/reviews/2015/2050 |
2. | ↑ | As the founding text of ‘Neue Marx-Lektüre’ one can count Reichelt’s dissertation Zur logischen Struktur des Kapitalbegriffs bei Karl Marx (On the Logical Structure of the Concept of Capital in Karl Marx) (2001) from 1968, first published in 1970. It has become the standard reading of Marx within leftist German-speaking academia since the late 90s, important protagonists being the group around the mentioned Robert Kurz and his journal Krisis and Michael Heinrich, whose introduction into the Capital, Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. Eine Einführung (Critique of Political Economy. An Introduction) (2005), first published in 2004, became the standard introduction to Marx’ Capital within few years. |
3. | ↑ | Cf. http://www.krisis.org/ |
4. | ↑ | Exit is a new journal founded mainly by Robert Kurz and Roswitha Scholz as a spin-off from Krisis in 2004 after internal disputes. Cf. http://www.exit-online.org |
5. | ↑ | It has to be noted here that the same goes for every chapter of the books: They can all be read separately with great benefit. Just like Szepanski does not interpret Capital as a deductive book, he himself does not write in a deductive way. He shows himself being a good disciple of Deleuze and Guattari insofar as his books are not organised like a tree with a clear, single root but more like a meadow grounded with a network of multiple, interconnected roots, a ‘rhizome’. Any chapter can be taken as its centre. Moreover, he uses in a very Deleuzian way constant repetitions of certain conceptions and arguments as a means of development something new by little variations. While one can criticise this way of writing from a formalist point of view as being redundant, it is felicitous insofar as it reflects the content of the book and allows the reader to find his or her own way through the labyrinth despite of confronting it with one single, inflexible structure the reader has to adapt him-/herself. It is truly written like a tool-box. |
6. | ↑ | Cf. for example the Accelerate Manifesto for an Accelerationist Politics: http://criticallegalthinking.com/2013/05/14/accelerate-manifesto-for-an-accelerationist-politics/ |
7. | ↑ | This main claim of ‘Neue Marx Lektüre’ has been developed especially by Moishe Postone whose 1986 article Anti-Semitism and National Socialism has become a classic in German leftist circles. |
8. | ↑ | I thank Bart Zantvoort for his corrections not just on a linguistic level. |
taken from here
short version here
Paul Stephan
Department of Philosophy, Goethe-University, Frankfurt am Main
Email: Paul_Stephan@web.de
Paul Stephan is currently working on his Master thesis on the critique of Truth in Friedrich Nietzsche under the supervision of Christoph Menke at the Department of Philosophy, Goethe-University Frankfurt am Main. His main interests include German Idealism, Marxism, Existentialism, Critical Theory, Phenomenology, and Post-Structuralism.
Kapitalisierung 1 & 2 hier und hier
Der Beitrag Review „Kapitalisierung 1& 2“ (deutsch/englisch) erschien zuerst auf non.
We are all cyborgs now. To the point where this reality no longer appears at all striking. As so perfectly pictured in Alex Rivera’s film Sleepdealer (2008), we are biological machines strapped to information machines which together function as war machines. It is remarkable how much of our cyborg existence Donna Haraway anticipated. In this essay, I want simply to extract some pertinent themes from four of her books and from an extended interview conducted by Thyrza Nichols Goodeve. I will stress her connection to Marxist thought, not to deny her significance as a feminist writer, but to supplement it.
Donna Haraway was born in the forties, trained as a biologist, and radicalized during the Vietnam war years. Lodged at the History of Consciousness program at the University of California, Santa Cruz in 1980, Haraway is, on her own admission, a product of both cold war techno-science and the struggle in and against its imperial consequences.
One thing that distinguishes Haraway from many other progressive intellectuals of her time is that her background is in the sciences rather than the humanities or social sciences. While she occasionally makes use of Marcuse, I think a more profound influence on her work is that of Joseph Needham, the English Marxist biologist, to whom she devoted a fair chunk of her doctoral thesis and subsequent first book. Needham might stand in here for a lost tradition of intersections between critical theory and the natural sciences, whether of a Marxist or feminist bent.
Feminism diverted her from the life sciences. Haraway: “Feminists re-appropriate science in order to discover and to define what is ‘natural’ for ourselves. A human past and future would be placed in our hands. This avowedly interested approach to science promises to take seriously the rules of scientific discourse without worshipping the fetish of scientific objectivity.” (SCW23)
Science? Technology? Goddess preserve us! There are plenty of feminisms that try to take their stand against techno-science from without. Haraway: “Feminist theory has repeatedly replicated this ‘natualizing’ structure of discourse in its own oppositional constructions.” (PV257) A useful attribute of feminist science studies is that it tends not to make the assumption that there is something inherently radical about philosophy, or culture, or play or poetry over and against the scientific and technical. It does not take sides in advance within the existing intellectual division of labor.
It is, among other things, a practical critique of that division of intellectual labor. “Destabilizing the positions in a discursive field and disrupting categories for identification might be a more powerful feminist strategy than ‘speaking as a woman.’” (PV310) It retains a sort of double discomfort, asking critical questions in a scientific zone, and speaking knowledgeably about actual sciences in a humanities zone.
This is irritating, and usefully so. Feminist science studies persistently recasts the objectivity claims of the sciences, and does so, to make it worse, without dismissing the scientific endeavor. This is irritating in another way as well. Haraway: “Marx insisted that one must not leap too fast, or one will end up in a fantastic utopia, impotent and ignorant. Abundance… is essential to the full discovery and historical possibility of human nature. It matters whether we make ourselves in plenty or unfulfilled need, including need for genuine knowledge and meaning.” (SCW68).
There can be no retreat into the superstructures when there is no food, shelter or safety. The production and reproduction of our species-being, whatever it may be, has to be a central concern of any critical knowledge. Given the rising inequality, poverty and hunger in twenty-first century California, to which the state has responded by mirroring its great universities with a series of equally great prisons, questions of material need return at the heart of the empire.
Haraway’s California is that part that is still a land of surplus, where some more complex questions about food arise other than its insufficiency. Haraway tells some archetypal California stories about food. One involves a religious studies professor who prepares a meal for the department party, the centerpiece of which is a feral pig he shot with an arrow. Complex debates ensue about ritual, ethics, impossible ecologies, and so on.
Such stories are like metonymic fragments of Marx’s metabolic rift. Molecules – in this case proteins – lack enclosing loops back through any sort of dynamic equilibrium. Haraway eschews any easy answers on either of these questions, and makes a wry nod to “the contradictory, thick quality of what we mean when we say ‘California.’” (HLL42)
They are all the same real questions. Here in a contemporary, ramified form, is what Alexander Bogdanov called the tragedy of the totality, a vast yet molecular process that only reveals its contours when something goes wrong, when there is a metabolic rift, of which there are now many, from feral pigs to feral carbon.
Haraway has on occasion described herself as an illegitimate daughter of Marx, and “something of an unreconstructed and dogged Marxist.” (MW8) She remains attentive to how relations congeal into apparently natural things. “Property is the kind of relationality that poses as the thing-in-itself, the commodity, the thing outside relationship, the thing that can be exhaustively measured, mapped, owned, appropriated, disposed.” (MW134) As we shall see, this becomes in her work a useful starting point for understanding how distinctly twenty-first century modes of property and technology are organized.
Unlike many other Marxists, Haraway insists on including nonhuman actors in what would be an otherwise relentlessly human category of that-which-labors. “The actors are not all ‘us.’” (HR66) Techno-science explodes the already wobbly partition between object and subject, nature and culture, apparatus and labor.
Marx may have shown how the commodity is full of labor, but the categories of chimerical objects, those mash-ups of flesh-tech, has much expanded, even if there is still a tendency for the fetish of the thing to obscure the relations of its making. Hence the world can now appear as a vast accumulation not just of commodities or spectacles but of ‘big data’ or ‘selfish genes.’
Haraway tries to keep in view the relations of production that the fetish of the commodity obscures. “I believe wealth is created by collective practice, figured by Marx as labor, but needing a messier metaphoric descriptive repertoire.” (MW94) There is a fetishism in Marx of labor itself – man-with-hammer – that needs attending to as well. If one takes the labor point of view to be what is central to Marx’s work, then what, in the age of techno-science, might now constitute such a point of view?
If Marx proceeded through a critique of the dismal science of political economy, Haraway works through a rather more lively if no less difficult science – biology. “I have always read biology in a double way – as about the way the world works biologically, but also about the way the world works metaphorically.” (HLL24) One of the many functions of biology is defining the limits of what can be said about the potentials of the human, about our species-being. Is there a ‘human race’, or are some races not fully human? And if all races are human, what might the human become?
It is not that biology is reducible to culture and politics. Rather, “the material-semiotic tissues are inextricably intermeshed.” (MW218) Haraway expands the object of critique from political economy to the life sciences, which are no less implicated in the production of the infrastructural givens of the contemporary commodity-world. This adds an essential dimension, if critique is going to grasp – such a primate metaphor! – Marx’s no less full-bodied metaphor of metabolic rift, and flesh it out.
There have been three basic metaphors of causality of the human in the modern period: race, population and gene. Each has its dissenters, critics and utopian or dystopian writers. Each has its genuine scientists caught up in substitutions drawn from social organization which color and overshoot the process of producing evidence. Each also has its ideologues and moral entrepreneurs.
Racecausality held that accumulated cultural differences are somehow carried in the blood. Even among progressives, the very category of race could create a fear of race mixing. Haraway: “The evolution of language, the progress of technology, the perfection of the body, and the advance of social forms seemed to be aspects of the same fundamental human science. That science was constitutively physiological and hierarchical, organismic and holist, progressivist and developmental.” (MW233)
A common response is a welter of attempts to categorize and characterize the races, arranged in some sort of hierarchy. Differences of culture or power become expressions of an order of nature. Haraway: “No wonder universal nature has been a less than appealing entity for those who were not its creators and its beneficiaries.” (MW237)
To which one might add that the temptation to overcome a supposed biological destiny of race, by severing the social from biological being altogether, is and remains a powerful temptation. It has the unfortunate side effect of cutting critical thought off from thinking biology as a techno-science with powerful and perhaps increasing abilities to create new unequal relations for the production and reproduction of life.
While popular racialism lives on, the substituting of racial for other kinds of difference did not survive in biological science. In the postwar years, after the debacle of racialized Nazi biology, and in the wake of new research methods, the basic metaphor of populationcausality arose in its place. A population is a semi-permeable group within a species. There may be as much variation within a population as between. Each may nevertheless be a pool which contain adaptations that are more or less successful.
Populations are not types in a hierarchy; nor are they sets. Each is constantly in flux in changing environments. The metaphysical shift is from a hierarchy of self-same types, where miscegenation at the boundary produces less viable instances, towards a different way of figuring difference and similarity. Populations are internally differentiated but formally equivalent in relation to each other.
Population became a central figure in the modern synthesis, which brought together naturalists, geneticists and experimentalists in a new kind of biological science and culture. Haraway: “This was a scientific humanism that emphasized flexibility, progress, cooperation, and universalism.” (MW238) It broke with the language of race and blood. It stressed the flexible and plastic nature of the human condition, and its capacity to change through education. The human can be socially self-constructing. Actual differences in power, such as the colonial relation, are elided by what ought to be: the ‘family of man.’
The organizational challenges of post-war capitalism put on the agenda the question of the limits to the adaptive nature of the human. Primate studies became a way of conducting experiments and building theories aimed at the adaptation of the human to the rising complexity of technics and organization.
Primate researchers focused on two linked topics: sex and dominance. The male primate fights with other males for access to reproduction. Alongside interest in observing primates in their ‘natural’ setting, were experiments on the primate as an embodiment of drives to sex and power, to see how adaptable its species-being was to the office politics of living in cages and pressing levers for food.
The primate was an experimental subject who could yield insights into techniques for regulating sexuality and power in the modern world for human primates too. Rather than repressing desire or the will to power, technologies and therapies could help the human primate adapt. It’s a small step from the study of primate behaviors to the hormones that supposedly regulate them, and then on to the construction of a techno-science of intervening in the hormonal regulation of primate sexuality – particularly that of humans. The contraceptive pill is here the great techno-science success story.
Population causality naturalized the patriarchal family. Its origin myth is of man the hunter. It is man who is assumed to be the maker of tools, the inventor of elaborated social organization and hence of language. It is man who is curious, who explores, while woman is home yanking yams from the dirt with babies on her teats. This figure was supplemented rather belatedly by woman the gatherer, in some cases as a result of the work of feminist researchers.
Haraway has paid particularly close attention to the role of field studies of natural primate populations in legitimating some elements of the family of man story. The figures of the headman, the sexual division of labor, woman as burdened by children, all pass back and forth from science to culture as substituted figures. Through a study of the basic metaphor of biological economy, Haraway hones her critique on the foundations of postwar American liberalism.
That liberalism’s finest hour was its efforts to overcome, in both science and culture, the benighted effects of the category of race. Haraway wants to push on from that self-congratulatory ethos. “I believe that this capacity of reproducing the Same, in culpable innocence of its historical, power-charged specificity, characterizes not just me but people formed like me, who are liberal, scientific, and progressive…” (MW242)
The problem with the liberal family of man is that “what’s not collected in a reproductive family story does not finally count as human. For all the… emphasis on difference, this is the grammar of indifference, or the multiplication of sameness.” (MW242) A functional causality reigns: that which survives is functional; that which is functional survives.
The liberal family of man gave way to the neoliberal ‘selfish gene’ of socio-biology, and the basic metaphor of gene causality. The population regime took as its units of thought individual bodies and their social groups. The gene becomes the controlling code which uses both bodies and groups for its own ends. The causal metaphor is still functional, but the unit to which it applies is now molecular: The gene that survives is functional because the function of the gene is to survive. “My genes, my self, my investment, my future. It’s much more strictly capitalist.” (HLL152)
Such a science is the product not only of a certain naturalizing of the exchange economy, but also of powerful technologies which produce the gene itself as an artifact in a database. Haraway: “something peculiar happened to the stable, family-loving, Mendelian gene when it passed into a database….” (MW244)
The gene becomes one of the units of currency of the era of ‘big data’. Genomics and informatics merge. The gene can exist in a variety of media, from software to wetware, and some in between. Nature starts to yield not the authoritarian causality of race hierarchies or patriarchal families, but the exchange causality of property in a purified form.
The genetic database is at once about the genes of specific individuals, but also sub-units of that code, and at the other extreme, about our species-being. The design of such a database shapes what can be compared, what kinds of labor can most easily be performed, but meanwhile the gene becomes a thing separated from a totality and accorded its own agency. Meanwhile sub-disciplines of biological science, such as genetics or population biology, start to fork off and coalesce around much more differentiated apparatus, practices and objects of knowledge.
The construction of the gene as an object of techno-science is just one component in an important shift in the practices of substitution between organizational levels. Haraway: “Nineteenth century scientists materially constituted the organism as a laboring system, structured by a hierarchical division of labor, and an energetic system fueled by sugars and obeying the laws of thermodynamics. For us, the living world has become a command, control, communication, intelligence system… in an environment that demands strategies of flexible accumulation. Artificial life programs, as well as carbon-based life programs, work that way. These issues are about metaphor and representation, but they are about much more than that.” (MW97)
Ideology is productive. The shift from thinking organization as energy systems alone to a combination of energy and information systems, enables not only new kinds of science, and technology, and power, but also opens up a space for their critique. Interestingly, some of the new modes of substitution producing both ideology and knowledge might no longer be metaphorical so much as algorithmic, a kind of software (Manovich) and database (Azuma) model of knowledge.
Haraway sees genetic code and computer code as a new kind of fetishism that are partly, but not entirely, legible to the old Marxist and Freudian versions. One might call it the fetish of the program, a new kind of code causality, of which gene causality is but one instance. It is not entirely reducible to either authoritarian or exchange causality, although it has features of both.
By way of illustration, Haraway points to an issue of Mamalian Genome journal which offered its readers a representation of the contents of the chromosomes of a mouse, under the headline, “the Complete Mouse (some assembly required).” (MW98) Code becomes the master layer in the stacked protocols by which an organization is managed. In genetics, code becomes the part via which a whole can be reductively understood. In place of messy bodies, the clean execution of command and control, although as we shall see there are code-based sciences where such a reduction is not easily made.
Commodity fetishism is when relations between people take on the features of relations between things. Collective labor is what hides behind of the commodity. But perhaps it is not so easy to separate labor and thing. Haraway wants to broaden the fetish concept a little. “Curiously, fetishes – themselves ‘substitutes’, that is, tropes of a special kind – produce a particular ‘mistake’; fetishes obscure the constitutive tropic nature of themselves and of worlds.” (MW136) A fetish is a naturalizing of the very thing whose ‘nature’ needs calling into question, but while it may be limiting, it may like ideology be peculiarly productive: “There are amazingly creative aspects to commodity fetishism.” (HLL92)
Gene technology is implicated in commodity fetishism, but maybe also in “another and obliquely related flavor of reification that transmutes material, contingent, human and nonhuman liveliness into maps of life itself and then mistakes the map that its reified entities for the bumptious, nonliteral world.” (MW135) Haraway’s détournement of the fetish repurposes it.
Rather than the commodity fetish, she asks about the corporeal fetish. How do bodies appear as autonomous things against a background of invisible non-bodies? In commodity fetishism, the apparent world of things, governed by the code of exchange value, obscures social relations among people and the production of use value. In corporeal fetishism, the apparent world of bodies, governed by the code of the gene, obscures the tangle of both human and nonhuman processes that produce life.
In corporeal fetishism, the gene becomes a source of value as a kind of thing-itself, or perhaps code-itself. “So the fetishist sees the gene itself in all the gels, blots, and printouts in the lab, and ‘forgets’ the natural-technical processes that produce the gene and genome as consensus objects in the real world.” (MW146)
An abstraction replaces the concrete; the map becomes the territory. “Gene fetishists ‘forget’ that the gene and gene maps are ways of enclosing the commons of the body – of corporealizing – in specific ways, which, among other things, often put commodity fetishism into the program of biology at the end of the Second Millennium.” (MW148)
Just as the commodity fetish makes all things property to be exchanged, so too the corporeal fetish makes all of life a thing to be commodified through ownership of its code. “Genomics ‘globalizes’ in specific ways. Species-being is materially and semiotically produced in gene-mapping practices, just as particular kinds of space and humanity were the fruit of earlier material-semiotic enclosures.” (MW163) Private property produces the split between commodities and the labor that makes it; Intellectual property produces the split between the gene and the organism that makes it.
What was in Needham’s day biology’s commons of research materials becomes increasingly commodified. The ‘mutation’ of the private property form into strictly controlled ‘intellectual property’ makes whole new classes of things available for commodification. “Like the stigmata of gender and race, which signify asymmetrical, regularly reproduced processes that give some human beings rights in other human beings that they do not have in themselves, the copyright, patent and trademark are specific, asymmetrical, congealed processes – which must be constantly revivified in law and commerce as well as in science.” (MW7) Intellectual property grounds a new kind of class power.
A patent defines what is nature and what is not. An artifact of ‘nature’ cannot be patented. For that to happen, nature has to be mixed with labor. Patent is a site of struggle over what counts as subject and what as object. Haraway’s famous example is DuPont’s OncoMouse, the first patented mammal, specifically engineered for the study of breast cancer. (And now itself an obsolete, discontinued ‘product’).
All sorts of organisms are now integrated into a strange techno-nature meant to support human life, or at least those parts of it that can be commodified. Not only mice but dogs and all sorts of other beings are our ‘companions’ within techno-science. In place of the liberal-humanist family, quite another kind: “the technoscientific family is a cyborg nuclear unit, ”now that “life as a system to be managed.” (MW152)
What kind of critical agency is possible in the world of OncoMouse? Do lab rats belong to the working class? Should battery hens be unionized? Should one have the right to share in the surplus produced by one’s cells, even when those cells are not in you body? Consider the case of Henrietta Lacks, an African-American tobacco worker who died of cervical cancer. Cells taken from her body, without her knowledge or consent, were cultured and used in all kinds of research long after her death, from the polio vaccine to AIDS treatments and gene mapping. Those cells proved not only useful for research but profitable for medical business, while her descendants could not even afford health insurance. How is one to think the molecular agencies of such a story?
The figure which it famously proposed as a node of agency is the cyborg, in her ‘Manifesto for Cyborgs.’ “Like any important technology, a cyborg is simultaneously a myth and a tool…” (PV139) It is not the labor point of view, as if labor existed independently of the apparatus with which it is entangled. It is not women’s point of view, as if one could speak of it as a universal subjective perspective, existing prior to the social and technical relations in which it meshes.
Cyborgs are affinities rather than identities, hybrids of human and other organics, information systems, ergonomic laboring, producing and desiring. Cyborgs are monsters, or rather demonstrations, in the double sense of to show and to warn, of possible worlds. “As monsters, can we demonstrate another order of signification? Cyborgs for earthly survival!” (SCW4)
In place of the “god-trick” of speaking as if one had access to a portal to the absolute, the cyborg is a kind of ironic myth, a heretical counter-story to the human as pre-given. “Blasphemy protects one from the moral majority within, while still insisting on the need for community.” (SC149) Like the Marxist-feminist critic inside the research university, the cyborg is always an insider and outsider to techno-science, which after all is pretty much the case now for all of us. “I think the way I work is to take my own polluted inheritance – cyborg is one of them – and try to rework it.” (HLL103)
The cyborg isn’t an innocent figure. “The main trouble with cyborgs, of course, is that they are the illegitimate offspring of militarism and patriarchal capitalism, not to mention state socialism. But illegitimate offspring are often exceedingly unfaithful to their origins. Their fathers, after all, are inessential.” (SCW152) Cyborgs are a kind of orphan, even if in a more troubling sense that parentage is not lost or forgotten but never quite existed, even though “the cyborg… doesn’t have a mother, but it does have a matrix.” (SCW129) The cyborg is a contemporary kind of conceptual personae.
Haraway: “Too many people, forgetting the discipline of love and rage, have read the ‘Manifesto’ as the ramblings of a blissed-out, technobunny, fembot.” (HR3) Surely this stems from the persistence of the ideological pull of the figure of nature, and an inability to think and feel through the emerging forces of production as anything other than poisoned product of techno-science.
Haraway: “From One Dimensional Man (Marcuse 1964)…. the analytic resources developed by progressives have insisted on the necessary domination of technics and recalled us to an imagined organic body to integrate our resistance…. But a slightly perverse shift of perspective might better enable us to contest for meanings, as well as for other forms of power and pleasure in technologically mediated societies.” (SCW154) Perhaps it would be possible to sense a web of human and nonhuman agents, more a mechanically and digitally reproducible compound eye than a single labor point of view.
Perhaps this point of view could be broader than that of labor, and not separate out in advance production from reproduction. Perhaps it could also include something a bit distinct from either, a kind of activity that neither produces nor reproduces, but proposes other means of doing either, or neither, or both. Could it even include the hacker class as a distinctive point of view not entirely reducible to labor? One might start here with the notion of organization, rather than production, as a ‘basic’ level of analysis, but look aslant at its unquestioned functionalism.
There is no real traction to be gained from trying to base a critique on nature versus culture, or the human versus the machine, nor is there leverage in play versus labor. In an era where there is money to be made from all sorts of effort people put in to voluntarily creating and sharing information, then labor itself is an unstable category. Haraway: “we are living through a movement from an organic, industrial society to a polymorphous, information system — from all work to all play, a deadly game.” (SCW161)
Information is more than a powerful metaphor extended via substitution into an explanatory causality for the world, or even for the cosmos. It becomes a powerful means of organizing worlds. Haraway: “communications science and modern biologies are constructed by a common move – the translation of the world into a problem of coding, a search for a common language in which all resistance to instrumental control disappears and all heterogeneity can be submitted to disassembly, reassembly, investment, and exchange.” (SCW164)
It’s a matter of seeing this as at once an actuality, as an ensemble of real phenomena, and yet also as historical, as the product of certain kinds of labor, or more specifically of techno-science as a central way that power works in this stage of the commodity economy – whatever it might be.
It was prescient of Haraway to notice, and early on, that “the new communications technologies are fundamental to the eradication of ‘public life’ for everyone.” (SCW168) The reduction of a wide range of processes, and not just labor, to a thing, or in this case to code, supports a vast extension of private property relations.
The monstrous omens Haraway detected in the late twentieth century came to pass: “A major social and political danger is the formation of a strongly bimodal social structure, with the masses of women and men of all ethnic groups, but especially people of color, confined to a homework economy, illiteracy of several varieties, and general redundancy and impotence, controlled by high-tech repressive apparatuses ranging from entertainment to surveillance and disappearance… The only way to characterize the informatics of domination is as a massive intensification of insecurity and cultural impoverishment, with common failure of subsistence networks for the most vulnerable.” (SCW169-172) And so it came to pass, only it came to be called, by Franco Berardi and others, precarity.
Creating any kind of knowledge and power in and against something as pervasive and effective as the world built by postwar techno-science is a difficult task. It may seem easier simply to vacate the field, to try to turn back the clock, or appeal to something outside of it. But this would be to remain stuck in the stage of romantic refusal.
Just as Marx fused the romantic fiction that another world was possible with a resolve to understand from the inside the powers of capital itself, so too Haraway begins what can only be a collaborative project for a new international. One not just of laboring men, but of all the stuttering cyborgs stuck in reified relations not of their making.
God is dead, and so too is the Goddess. The disenchanting corrosion of all that is solid into the molecular abrades more than one way. If there is no thing-in-itself, no scientific-realist absolute, then there’s no prior and originary subject for a social movement, either. We are always and already insiders.
Haraway: “Feminisms and Marxisms have run aground on Western epistemological imperatives to construct a revolutionary subject from the perspective of a hierarchy of oppressions and/or a latent position of moral superiority, innocence, and greater closeness to nature. With no available original dream of a common language or original symbiosis promising protection from hostile ‘masculine’ separation, but written into the play of a text that has no finally privileged reading or salvation history, to recognize ‘oneself’ as fully implicated in the world, frees us of the need to root politics in identification, vanguard parties, purity, and mothering. Stripped of identity, the bastard race teaches about the power of the margins…” (SCW176)
What needs reworking is the struggle of labor in and against nature. Haraway: “Humanistic Marxism was polluted at the source by its structuring ontological theory of the domination of nature in the self-construction of man and by its closely related impotence to historicize anything women did that didn’t qualify for a wage. But Marxism was still a promising resource in the form of epistemological feminist mental hygiene that sought our own doctrines of objective vision. Marxist starting points offered tools to get to our versions of standpoint theories, insistent embodiment, a rich tradition of critiques of hegemony without disempowering positivisms and relativisms, and nuanced theories of mediation.” (SCW186)
The cyborg point of view is shaped in part by social movements around labor, race, gender, sexuality and indigenous rights. The cyborg point of view is shaped in part by the sciences, by struggles to produce objective knowledge of the world, complete with substitutions transposed into it from the dominant forms of organization.
The cyborg point of view has at least one other component: the point of view of the apparatus itself, of the electrons in our circuits, the pharmaecuticals in our bloodstreams, the machines that mesh with our flesh. The machinic enters the frame not as the good or the bad other, but as an intimate stranger. Apparatus, like sensation, is liminal and indeterminate – an in-between. It is an inhuman thing, neither object nor subject.
One of its special qualities as such may however be to generate data about a nonhuman world. The apparatus renders to the human a world that isn’t for the human. An apparatus is that which demonstrates some aspect of a monstrous, alien world. An apparatus yield aspects, particular monstrosities, which never add up to that consistent and absolute world that is remains the God, or Goddess, of all realists.
An apparatus affords the real, material and historical form of mediation. I take up the significance of this in Molecular Red through a reading of Haraway’s colleague Karen Barad and former student Paul Edwards, who show the centrality of thinking the cyborg-apparatus for understanding techno-science today. Elsewhere I follow the same line of thought to Paul B Préciado. For while there has been a turn towards a revival of scientism and claims for the virtues of a universal rationality, these bypass the more difficult business of grasping how science is actually produced.
Hence the centrality today of Haraway’s work, in which thinking the messy business of making science fully embraces its implication in nets of corporate and military power, its processing and reinforcing of metaphors not of its making, and its dependence on a vast cyborg apparatus. The strength of her work is in not abandoning the struggle for knowledge under such difficult conditions and retreating into mere philosophy.
References
PV Donna Haraway, Primate Visions (Routledge 1990)
MW Donna Haraway, Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium (Routledge 1997)
HLL Thyrza Goodeve, How Like a Leaf: An Interview with Donna Haraway (Routledge, 1999)
HRThe Haraway Reader (Routledge, 2003)
SCW Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs and Women (Routledge 2013)